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The Russian Revolution has been the subject of memoirs and 
the object of research for over a half century. While some 
aspects of the revolution have received considerable attention, 
others have been inadequately treated or neglected. Historians 
have spent much effort studying the Bolsheviks in order to 
explain their success in November 1917. Similarly, some scholars 
have compiled exhaustive treatises detailing the errors of the 
Bolshevik opposition in order to explain the triumph of Novem­
ber. The popular masses and the institutions constructed by the 
revolutionaries, however, have received only slight study or dis­
torted treatment. The chasm between revolutionary enthusiasm 
and organization, usually a fundamental contradiction in revolu­
tion, makes the study of revolutionary institutions in 1917 
essential for understanding the Russian Revolution- The Petro- 
grad Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies was, without 
doubt, the most important revolutionary institution in 1917 
Russia. The study that follows examines not only the structure 
of the Petrograd Soviet, but the decisions made by that body and 
the basis on which it made them.
The Petrograd Soviet has been the object of only one book- 
length study, G. I. Zlokazov's Petrogradskii sovet rabochikh i 
soldatskikh deputatov v period mimogo razvitiia revoliutsiia 
(The Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies during 




(February-June 1917) (Moscow, 1969) . The work covers only one- 
half of the pre-November period of the Petrograd Soviet and suffers 
from distortions common to all Ü. S. S. R. party histories of the 
period. The only non-communist work to treat the Petrograd 
Soviet in any detail is Oskar Anweiler's Die RMtebewegung in 
Russland 1905-1921) (The Council Movement in Russia 1905-1921) 
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1958). The Petrograd Soviet is not the
main object of Anweiler's research which is in no way exhaus­
tive on any aspect of the Soviet movement in 1917. A few 
scholarly articles cover certain narrow aspects of the Soviet in 
1917, but their subjects taken together make up only a very 
slight portion of the total picture of the institution. No 
exhaustive treatment of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and 
Soldiers' Deputies between March and November 1917 exists; in 
the following study the author attempts to realize such a treat­
ment.
Some technical observations are necessary. All dates for 
events concerning the Petrograd Soviet and the Russian Revolution 
are given in the New Style (Gregorian) calendar, not the Julian 
calendar in use in 1917 Russia and which was thirteen days behind 
the Gregorian. The transliteration system from the Russian is 
that of the Library of Congress with the following modifications: 
(a) ligatures have been omitted; (b) in direct quotation of 
materials already in English translation the transliteration 
system in the translation is retained; (c) a few proper names 
which have become standardized in English in other transliterations
have been given in the customary form, e.g., Trotsky, Kerensky, and 
soviet, not Trotskii, Kerenskii, and sovet. Throughout this study 
the term soviet refers only to the political institution prior to 1918 
and not the current common usage of the word to refer to the people or 
government of the U. S. S. R.
I owe an especial debt of gratitude to Dr. Henry J. Tobias, the 
supervisor of this dissertation. Despite a busy schedule chairing a 
large department, he spent untold hours guiding my work, challenging 
my concepts of the Russian Revolution, and aiding my written expression.
To the other members of my committee, Dr s. Russell D. Buhite, Gordon D. 
Drummond, and Dougald T. Calhoun and to Dr. Robert Nye, I am indebted for 
many helpful suggestions and particularly for the questions they raised 
that made me continually reexamine my train of thought as expressed 
in the dissertation. To my students and my academic colleagues I owe 
apologies when the writing of this dissertation detracted from my teach­
ing duties. To Dr. Rob Roy MacGregor, who started me on the path of 
studying history, and Dr. Kenneth I. Dailey, under whom I completed my 
work for the Masters in history, I wish to express my whole-hearted 
appreciation. The numerous archives, libraries, and institutions and 
their staffs that aided me in the procurement of sources I can never 
repay for their efforts and kindnesses beyond the call of duty. I 
particularly wish to express my gratitude to Miss Juanita Means, former 
Reference Librarian at Oklahoma City University, whose bibliographic 
knowledge never failed me and whose penchant for accuracy kept me vigilant. 
I wish to thank my parents for being so understanding and supportive 
of me for all these many years.
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INTRODUCTION
Soviets (Councils) existed in Russia long before 1917. Examples 
in Imperial Russia include the Sovet Imperii (Council of the Empire), 
Sovet Stareishin (Council of Elders), and Sovet Ministrov (Council of 
Ministers). Among Russian revolutionaries the term developed an es­
pecial connotation from its use to designate the revolutionary toiling 
class bodies established in 1905 and 1917. The institutionalization of 
revolution around soviets, however, until the Bolshevik coup de grace 
in November 1917 was never a permanent, organic part of the Russian 
revolutionary world. According to Viktor Chernov,^ the veteran Social­
ist Revolutionary theorist and party leader, "It was an ad hoc organi­
zation of a united socialist and revolutionary front in a militant per­
iod, in the fire and storm of advancing revolution."
In the autumn of 1905 the workers of St. Petersburg created an 
entirely new type of revolutionary organization, a workers’ soviet.
This new structure allowed the workers of the capital to bridge in 
part the chasm between revolutionary enthusiasm and organization, 
generally recognized by scholars as a fundamental contradiction in 
the 1905 Revolution and a major cause of its eventual failure. Al­
though no more than an oversized strike committee at first, the 
Petersburg Soviet provided a rallying point for at least one-half 
of the proletariat of the national capital and as a result came
2
to head a political strike already in progress. Inasmuch as 
the Petersburg Soviet aided the direction of the strike movement, 
the new body established a solid popular foundation, allowing 
it to expand its activities even after the termination of the 
strike which had called it into existence. Thus when the Peters­
burg Soviet on October 19, three days before the end of the Octo­
ber strike, adopted a decree on the freedom of the press, it 
became more than a simple strike committee. This political act 
led the Soviet— at times unwillingly— to organizing an armed 
militia for protection from the reprisals of reactionary groups 
and the police, and led it to sponsor the November strike for 
the Kronstadt sailors and the workers' eight-hour day movement.
The Petersburg Soviet became in actuality a de facto, although 
somewhat cautious, revolutionary government, as the supine 
tsarist regime appeared determined at times to thrust authority, 
in the capital at least, on a body trembling at its own actions.
As an elective proletarian body (one deputy per 500 workers), 
entrusted by its electorate with the execution of definite 
revolutionary policies, the Petersburg Soviet did seek the attain­
ment of political goals, including the overthrow of the existing
regime, the establishment of a constituent assembly, and civil
5
liberties for all classes.
The Petersburg Soviet failed in part because it did not orga­
nize the working class -of the capital and thereby was unable to channel 
the workers' enthusiasm. Unskilled in the technique of revolution 
and without a tradition of organization, the Soviet was unable to
harness proletarian energies and apply them to the task at 
hand. As a democratic institution— the privilege of being 
elected as the representative of one's fellow workers (and the 
constant realization of being recalled if constituent wishes 
were not followed)— meant to the deputies of the Soviet that 
they had to follow the dictates of their constituents, if neces­
sary even against their own better judgement. In effect the 
caprice of the workers, undisciplined and politically inexperi­
enced, determined Soviet policy. The Soviet reversed itself at the 
desire of its constituents and led the demonstration of October 
18. At their will, it sponsored the campaign for an eight-hour 
working day which many deputies realized was reckless, declared 
the November strike, and upon its termination returned to the 
movement for a shorter working day. Consequently, when time 
came for action in late November neither the Petersburg Soviet 
nor the workers of the capital had spent sufficient time on 
organization to defend themselves. Only the apprehension of
the regime, unsettled by a year of revolution, prevented the
6
earlier suppression of the Petersburg Soviet.
The failure of the Petersburg Soviet partially resulted 
from its uncooperative attitude toward the non-proletarian 
portion of Russian society. Relations with the peasantry 
scarcely existed. Whether from a lack of understanding of 
peasant problems or from Social Democratic (the dominant force 
in the Soviet) disdain toward the peasantry as a political 
force, the Soviet rebuffed all efforts of the Socialist
Revolutionaries to attract peasant support and enter into 
relations with the villages. As a purely proletarian organiza­
tion, the Soviet rejected the aid of the bourgeoisie and liberal 
intelligentsia, although it did accept the financial support of the 
liberal Union of Unions. Count Sergei Witte capitalized on this 
and split the regime's opposition through concessions embodied 
in the Manifesto of October 17, successfully isolating the 
Petersburg Soviet from moderate elements in the capital, 
although this was not immediately apparent even to members of 
the Soviet. The November strike and the eight-hour day movement 
revealed, within a short time, the isolation of the Petersburg 
Soviet in the capital and even the lack of unity in proletarian 
ranks. In October the proletariat had not achieved victory 
single-handed; in November, isolated and confronted with the 
neutrality or open hostility of other classes, the Petersburg 
workers went down in decisive defeat.
In view of the Petersburg Soviet's composition and philo­
sophy, whether that body could have achieved cooperation with 
the non-proletarian social elements is a matter of doubt.
From the time of its organization the Soviet was in actuality 
controlled first by Mensheviks and then by Bolsheviks; and although 
both factions of the Social Democratic party disputed the proper 
policy for the Soviet to pursue, both were united in their belief 
that the institution should remain a purely proletarian organizaticn,
When the army was in. ferment, the peasantry and workers were
quiet; when the workers were aroused, the peasantry remained
passive and the army, again obeying its officers, assisted in
subduing the urban workers. Worst of all the Soviet, unable
to lead the revolutionary workers, endorsed goals (e.g., the
eight-hour day ) which united the moderate bourgeois elements
with the government and wasted proletarian strength needed for
7the attainment of more decisive revolutionary goals.
Failure also stemmed from the Petersburg Soviet's meager 
efforts toward promoting the construction of a national soviet 
organization. The Soviet sent two deputies to the Volga region, 
two to Odessa, and a representative to the Moscow Soviet. Soviets 
in Moscow, Odessa, and several cities in the Baltic region in 
turn sent delegates to Petersburg. These few exchanges and an 
abortive effort to convoke an All-Russian Workers'* Congress were 
the extent of the Petersburg Soviet's campaign to unite the 
Russian working class through a national Soviet.
The Soviet example in the capital achieved more than that 
body's own efforts at national organization. Soviets sprang 
up all over Russia in late November and early December 1905 in 
imitation of the successful establishment of a workers' council 
in Petersburg. These Soviets, however, arose too late; the 
flood tide of reaction ran strong and belated uprisings in
Moscow and other cities enabled the regime to crush them without 
great difficulty. Once again revolutionary spirit had outdis­
tanced revolutionary organization and the proletariat, assuming
a task it had not equipped itself to undertake, paid a heavy
8
toll in defeat, starvation, and death.
Two diametrically opposite views of the Petersburg Soviet 
emerged from the experience of the 1905 Revolution. V. I.
Lenin's public view in 1905 of the Soviet was not his private 
viewpoint. In Novaia zhizn* he wrote, "Circumstances may force 
us to participate in non-Party organizations . . .  ; such partici­
pation . . .  is admissable only if the independence of the
workers' party is fully protected, and if the Party members or
groups 'delegated' to non-Party unions or soviets are controlled
9
and directed by the Party as a whole." His real view of the 
Soviet, however, was not in line with the thinking of the rest 
of the Bolshevik party and he was persuaded not to publicize it:
"The Soviet must proclaim itself the provisional revolutionary 
government, or form such a government, and be sure to draw in 
new deputies to this end— not only from workers but also, first,
from sailors and soldiers, who are already reaching out for
freedom everywhere; second, from the revolutionary peasantry;
10
third, from the revolutionary bourgeois intelligentsia . . . ."
With the failure of the 1905 Revolution, however, Lenin saw
alliance between the Soviet and the bourgeois intelligentsia
as useless and formulated the concept of a "democratic dictator-
11
ship of the proletariat and peasantry." Lenin's post-mortem view was a
solitary outlook, as the majority of revolutionaries saw the 
failure of 1905 largely the result of non-cooperation with the 
bourgeoisie. As the Menshevik F. I. Dan wrote of these contrast­
ing metamorphesis of Leninism and non-Leninism (here Menshevism) : 
"More and more Menshevism began to turn the struggle for 'bour­
geois' political democracy and its preservation into its own 
paramount task, reformistically subordinating to it the 'class' 
socialist objectives of the proletariat. Bolshevism, on the 
other hand, stressed the 'construction of socialism'; it cast 
aside and attacked the very idea of a 'consistent democracy'
that from the very birth of Bolshevism had been its fundamental
12
fraction slogan . . . ." Lenin's position was essentially the
13
rejection of democracy and the advocacy of dictatorship. For 
the majority of Russian socialists the 1905 Soviet experience 
meant that in the future they should minimize the socialist 
demands of their programs so as not to estrange the masses from 
their liberal allies. The Soviet appeared destined for obscurity.
The most significant view of the Petersburg Soviet, however, 
in 1905 was probably not that of the parties and their leaders, 
but rather that of the masses. Few bothered to consult the anony­
mous masses who had reared the Soviet on their shoulders and for 
a brief day had stood face to face on equal terms with tsardom.
The memory of those people was long, and the lessons they learned 
were bitter. Eleven years following their defeat by the autocracy 
the workers of Petersburg (then Petrograd), catching their 
breath after the collapse of autocracy, once more gathered in
8
their factories to elect delegates to another Soviet of Workers' 
Deputies. Their experiences and those of the revolutionary 
intelligentsia would clash before November 1917.
According to the last president of the Imperial State Duma, 
Mikhail V. Rodzianko, the soviet movement existed right up to 
1917, as the "Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' Depu­
ties had existed without break, though secretly, since 1905 and
14
had never ceased its agitation." While the Social Democrat,
N. N. Sukhanov, admits in his voluminous memoirs of 1917 that
elections to soviets may have taken place occasionally between
1905 and 1917, "they were illegal, accidental, and without 
15
concrete aims." The study of the 1917 Petrograd Soviet of 
Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies that follows shows Sukhanov's 
assessment essentially to be correct, not Rodzianko's.
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CHAPTER I
THE BIRTH OF "REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRACY"
Like the March coup d'etat the instigation and formation of
the Petrograd Soviet must remain forever beyond partisan claims.
The socialist parties were hopelessly bankrupt, and thus the
early days of the Soviet were a heyday for Independent radicalism.
The Socialist Revolutionary (SR) movement survived In the capital
only as a "skeleton of a few Illegal groups with no generally
1
recognized center." The minuscule Menshevik faction nearly
fell apart with the arrest on February 9, 1917 of a number of
the members of the Labor Group of the Central War Industries
Committee. The Bolsheviks were nearly in limbo. Aleksandr
Gavrilovich Shllapnlkov (Belenin), head of the Russian Bureau of
the Bolshevik Central Committee, admitted that its efforts
were uncoordinated and that the party was entrenched only In
the navy. It did not occur to him that "this would be the last
2
and decisive battle against tsarism." The SR S. D. Mstlslavskll
admitted that "The revolution caught us, the party men of the
3
time, sleeping like the foolish virgins of the gospels."
The SR leader, V. M. Zenzlnov, wrote of the March days, "The
revolution struck like lightning from the sky . . . .  Let us
be frank: It was a great and joyful event, unexpected even by
those of us who had been working toward It for many years and
4
waiting for it always." Socialist leaders, such as Zenzlnov and
11
12
0. A. Ermanskli (Menshevik Internationalist) were in the streets
observing the demonstrators' activities, while I. lurenev (Interdis-
trictite) and K. S. Grinevich (Menshevik Internationalist) delivered
rousing speeches urging the masses to further actions. The
socialist parties apparently held no meetings at all to capitalize
on this outbreak; even the Bolshevik leadership was reluctant
to bring the March days to a head in a showdown with the regime.
Such inaction and indecision most likely stemmed from the majority
of top-ranking socialist leaders, such as Viktor Chernov, I. G.
Tseretelli, V. I. Lenin, Leon Trotsky, F. I. Dan, lu. Martov, and
5
many others being in exile.
Party leaders in Petrograd, however, did make some attempts 
toward united action to organize the revolution on an institu­
tional basis. According to N. N. Sukhanov, the revolution's 
contemporary chronicler, meetings held on March 8 and 9 discussed 
the question of raising a soviet. F. A. Cherevanin (Menshevik 
Defensist) presented such a proposal at a March 9th meeting at 
which time, Sukhanov notes, "instructions for elections [to a
soviet] were issued by this meeting... and successfully carried
6
out by the factories of the capital." Elections, however, did
not immediately follow in the factories, though workers at the
Franko-Russkii and Promet plants did elect representatives to a
7
soviet on March 9.
The developments of March 9 had a strong impact on many lower 
ranking members of the various parties, but the rank-and-file 
were more interested in raising revolution than in ordering it
13
into a soviet. For example, at the Vyborg district meeting of 
Bolsheviks that evening N. F. Sveshnikov summarized the party's 
position: "The atmosphere was exalting, but we felt the absence
of common leadership, and bad communication from other districts. 
Correct revolutionary guidance by the Central Committee was 
really needed." The Vyborg district committee emdorsed a 
resolution introduced by I. D. Chugurin calling for a general 
strike, intensifying the struggle with the police and the reac­
tion to the rising emotions among the masses. The Bolshevik Central 
Committee responded coolly to Chugurin's proposal. Once street 
fighting broke out Bolshevik activists urged an armed uprising 
and demanded that the central committee of their party issue a 
written appeal to the workers to take up arms. The committee 
did publish a diatribe against the war, tsarism, and the bourgeoisie, 
but did not urge the raising of revolution. The Petersburg 
committee at this point, ignored its superior, the central 
committee and decided to issue its own pamphlet and create 
workers' committees in each factory. These Bolshevik activists 
decided that they should escalate the conflict from a general 
strike to one of an armed uprising if the government took strong 
measures against the workers.
On March 10 activist Bolshevik leaders held a meeting which 
discussed, among other things, creating a soviet. One member of 
the underground Vyborg District Bolshevik Committee, N. F.
Sveshnikov, recalls that at the district meeting that evening 
reports were received that many factories had already started to
14
elect representatives to a soviet. The Petersburg Bolshevik
Committee did not issue, contrary to some assertions, an appeal
on March 10 for the creation of soviets. lurenev, an eye-witness,
later wrote that "essentially th?. slogan of a soviet advanced by
the Petersburg committee remained on paper and there were no
concrete actions in the sense of the organization of soviets...."
On that same night of March 10-11 members of Petersburg Bolshevik
Committee were arrested by the police and further efforts to
8
establish a soviet were largely paralyzed.
Differences between the Bolshevik Central Committee and its 
Petersburg committee over revolutionary strategy and establishing 
a soviet grew dramatically after March 9. Aleksandr Shliapnikov, 
as head of the central committee, set a policy of concentrating 
Bolshevik efforts on organizing workers for a May Day movement. 
The central committee was clearly organization oriented, while 
the Petersburg committee was action and mobilization oriented. 
Shliapnikov did not feel that the attainment of revolution was 
possible much less that it would lead to the establishment of 
soviets. The radicalVyborg district Bolsheviks, however, 
encouraged the first strikes and demonstrations, contrary to 
directives of the central committee. Even when Shliapnikov 
tried to restrain the Viborg activists, to avoid provoking an 
uncontrollable political reaction, the Petersburg committee 
responded by adopting a resolution calling for a three-day 
general strike.
The arrest of the Petersburg committee and the government’s
15
vigorous response dampened activist Bolshevik spirits for raising 
and sovietizing (ordering) a revolution. Concerning events, as 
of the evening of March 11, V. la. Kiaurov wrote "... the 
revolution is liquidating itself. The demonstrators are dis­
armed. No one is capable of further response to a government
10
that has taken such decisive measures." Chugurin repeatedly
proposed to Shliapnikov that armed commandoes be organized to
continue the struggle, but the Bolshevik leader always rejected
this, fearing that this would excite the soldiers against the
workers. Shliapnikov thought it best "to continue the work of
propaganda" in order "to win over the soldiers and paralyze 
11
tsarism."
Similar differences and attitudes were also common among
the non-Bolshevik revolutionary elements. On March 10th at the
apartment of the well-known writer, Maxim Gorky, various socialist
sub-leaders met and, according to I. lurenev, decided on Gorky's
12
motion to issue illegal pamphlets to the workers. No practical
results came of a second meeting the following day which
happened to coincide with the regular 6-7 P. M. meeting at A. F.
Kerensky's flat of the so-called Information Bureau of the Parties
of the Left. Attending the session were Kerensky, Chkheidze,
Zenzinov, M. I. Skobelev (Menshevik-Defensisfs), and N. D. Sokolov
(non-party lawyer, close to Menshevik-Internationalists), I.
lurenev, Pëtr Aleksandrovich (Left SR), Znamenskil and
Berezin (TrudovikaJ^H. Erlich (Bund), A. V. Peshekhonov (Popu-
13
lar Socialist), and 0. A. Ermanskii. Surprisingly, the right
16
wing among those present, Kerensky, Erlich, and Zenzinov, 
insisted on the continuation of the struggle, whereas the most 
radical of all, lurenev, feeling the impact of the Bolshevik Peters­
burg Committee's arrest declared; "There is no revolution nor 
will there be. The movement of the troops is dwindling away
to nothing and we must prepare ourselves for a long period of 
14
reaction." As Zenzinov wrote of the encounter:
We were maintaining that the tide of revolution 
was rising, that we should prepare ourselves 
for decisive events; lurenev, who considered 
himself to the left of us, was clearly trying 
to throw cold water on what we were saying. It 
was obvious to us that this attitude was not 
merely his own, but also that of the Bolshevik 
organization in Petersburg. lurenev did not 
hold with forcing the pace; he maintained that 
the incipient movement would not be successful, 
and even insisted that the excited workers must 
be calmed down.15
None of the previous mentioned meetings led to any unified 
action toward ordering the revolution. A session, however, called 
by the sub-leaders of a number of moderate Mensheviks resulted 
in a formal call to form a soviet of workers' deputies. Activists 
from all districts in Petrograd, in agreement with members of the 
Imperial State Duma Social Democratic leadership, met on March 
10 at the headquarters of the Consumers' Union of Workers (one 
of the few legal workers' organizations still in existence).
The meeting opened about 3P.M. with 30 to 40 representatives 
from almost all thirteen districts of the capital, including a 
number of district officials of the Cooperatives Union. Among
17
those attending were N. S. Chkheidze, the Menshevik Duma leader 
and later chairman of the Petrograd Soviet, the previously 
mentioned Cherevanin, and I. G. Volkov and N. Xu. Kapelinskii, 
leaders of the cooperative movement in Petrograd. After discus­
sing the situation, they decided to call a council of workers' 
deputies modeled on the St. Petersburg Soviet of 1905. The Workers' 
Cooperatives and boards of workers' sickness-benefit-funds were 
to organize elections in the various factories. Am all-city 
center set up in the office of the Petrograd Union of Workers' 
Cooperatives would receive all information from the districts.
The initial assembly of the Soviet was scheduled for the following 
day. The representatives present spread the news of these plans 
to the factories in their districts.
Word of the plan to form a soviet spread in the capital with 
16
remarkable speed. I. Gordienko, a Bolshevik worker, heard
17
street agitation that same day urging the election of a soviet.
The Menshevik organ, Rabochaia gazeta, on March 20 reported:
"It was unanimous among the masses and on the second day of the 
revolution— on Saturday the 25th of February [March 10] — one 
heard the slogan: it is necessary to create and organize a
soviet of workers' and soldiers' deputies." An Okhrana agent, 
Shurkanov, at the time noted:
The question of the creation of a soviet of 
workers' deputies is proposed.... The election 
of deputies to a soviet of workers' deputies is 
being carried out in factories; and probably to­
morrow morning or at least by tomorrow evening 
a soviet of workers' deputies will begin its
function.
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The Petersburg committee of the Bolshevik party reacted to 
the Menshevik proposal to form a soviet by reluctantly proposing, 
on the Interdistrictites' demand, to create an "information 
bureau for the guidance of factory committees," only to have 
Shliapnikov reject their proposition. After the imprisonment 
of the Petersburg committee, Shliapnikov was even more skeptical 
toward raising revolution much less soviets and ”'did not find 
the strength within himself to issue instructions the following 
day . . .
Momentarily the Menshevik initiative was also hampered, 
for the police rounded up the leaders of this movement on the 
night of March 10-11, along with the five Bolshevik sub-leaders.
After issuing the Menshevik appeal for the convocation of a soviet, 
several of these representatives left the headquarters of the 
Consumers' Union of Workers for a meeting at the offices of the 
labour group of the Central War Industries Committee. The revolu­
tionaries were under police surveillance, for as soon as the 
representatives arrived on the premises of the labor group of the 
War Industries Committee, they were arrested. (Still yet another 
segment of the labor group attended a joint meeting with the 
representatives of the public organizations in the Municipal Duma, 
and though not arrested the imprisonment of their colleagues appar­
ently curtailed their efforts). That same night interior Minister 
A. D. Protopopov ordered the arrest of over one hundred other persons, 
all sub-leaders of the revolutionary parties. The government did not 
arrest leaders such as Shliapnikov, Zenzinov, lurenev, and Ermanskii, 
but the imprisonment of the one hundred sub-leaders resulted in a
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loss of local leadership needed to establish a soviet as an organ­
izational base of the revolution.
While the workers initially responded enthusiastically to 
the proposal to create a soviet, the street fighting that broke 
out that same day overshadowed that effort. Nonetheless, elec­
tions to a workers' soviet did occur. For example, in the Vyborg 
district the Parviainen Factory workers elected deputies on March
11. F. Z. Evseev (Bolshevik) recollected that in the tool shop 
of the munitions factory workers had prepared for the formation 
of a soviet before March 12. F. A. Lemeshev, I. G. Gavrilov, and
V. la. Kaiurov (Bolsheviks) recalled workers electing deputies 
to the soviet on March 10 and 11.^^^^ Such lower party echelon 
activities contrasted strangely with the beliefs of top level 
Bolshevik leaders and their lieutenants that a revolution was not 
in progress and would not develop out of the current disturbances.
The soviet movement received renewed force when insurgents 
attacked the Kresty prison in the Vyborg district and released a 
number of political prisoners. Among these men were K. A. Gvozdev 
and B. 0. Bogdanov, leaders of the labor group of the Central War 
Industries Committee, which had made the first serious efforts 
toward establishment of a soviet. While the Bolsheviks from Kresty 
went off to fight in the streets, Gvozdev and Bogdanov and others 
concerned with giving direction to the revolution through the organ­
izational base of a soviet went to the Tauride Palace. Its geographical
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proximity to the workers' district was not the only reason the 
palace became the center of revolutionary insurgency, as the Soviet 
Russian historian, E. N. Burdzhalov, explains:
The new ^cial strata,which participated in the 
revolutionary struggle for the first time,looked 
upon the State Duma as something like popular 
representation and upon the Duma leaders as 
fighters against the tsarist regime. They 
regarded the Duma as(theiiQcenter and deemed 
it possible to sever themselves from the past 
in the least painful way with its assistance.
The soldiers, having broken their oaths to 
the tsar and joined the people,wished to obtain 
approval of their conduct from this "legal 
institution." The officers who had joined the 
soldiers, and the masses of the city population 
who supported the uprising, endeavored to 
absolve themselves from responsibility for their 
actions by the authority of the Duma. This is 
why the slogan: "To the Tauride Palace! To the
State Duma!" met with wide support from the 
popular masses.
A few activist Bolsheviks in the Vyborg district appealed to 
insurgents to make the Finland Station the center of the uprising, 
but they too soon joined with those heading for the Tauride 
Palace.
At the Tauride Palace insurgents met the socialist deputies
of the Duma, Chkheidze and Skobelev, and requested that Kerensky
arrange with M. V. Rodzianko for a meeting room in order to
organize a soviet. Thé Duma president expressed his opinion on
the danger of granting such a request to which Kerensky replied:
"What's dangerous about it? After all, somebody must take charge 
22
of the workers." Thus the enormous meeting hall of the Duma 
Budget Commission, room 12, was open about 3 or 4 P. M. to the 
socialists— quite appropriately on the left wing of the palace.
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Prince S. P. Mansyrev, a Kadet who witnessed this event, recalled 
that in this group were seven or eight men who told him that 
they had just come from Kresty prison and that tdaey intended to 
establish a soviet under the chairmanship of G. S. Khrustalev- 
Nosar, the all but forgotten president of the 1903 Soviet. "It 
was thus by our collaboration," commented the prince bitterly,
23"that this little group of suspects could proclaim the Soviet."
Those present at this preorganizational meeting were to a 
man intelligentsia: Chkheidze, Skobelev, Bogdanov, Gvozdev,
Broido (Mensheviks); shortly joined by the lawyer Khrustalev- 
Nosar, the Mensheviks Sokolov and Grinevich and the Cooperatists 
Volkov and Kapelinskii. The Mensheviks Groman, Frankorusskii, 
Sokolovskii, G. S. Pankov; the Bolsheviks Shliapnikov and P. A. 
Zalutskii; the SR E. B. Surin; the Bundist Erlich; and the Inter­
nationalists Sukhanov and I. M. Steklov probably also attended,
25but not Kerensky though he had arranged the meeting place. This 
gathering constituted itself as a "Provisional Executive Committee 
of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' Deputies" and quickly issued 
the following appeal to the populace of the capital:
Citizens! The representatives of the workers, 
soldiers, and inhabitants of Petrograd who are 
meeting in the State Duma, announce that the 
first meeting of their representatives will be 
held to night at 7 o'clock in the evening within 
the confines of the State Duma. All troops 
which took the side of the people should immed­
iately elect their own representatives, one per­
son per one company. Factories elect their 
own deputies, one person per one thousand
22
people. Factories which have less than a 
thousand workers elect one deputy from each 
factory.
Until recent years Soviet Russian historians dated a Bolshe­
vik appeal for a soviet from March 11 or one day earlier than the
27
manifesto from the Tauride Palace. However, the Soviet Russian
historian, Burdzhalov, has proven that this appeal was actually
edited on March 12 and published on March and therefore after
28
the victory of the revolution. More importantly, however, the
Bolshevik manifesto did not call for elections to a soviet,
29
but rather for a provisional revolutionary government! Some
party members feared the soviet concept, since they knew the
Bolshevik party to be so weak that the Mensheviks would control 
30
it. Soviet Russian historians have now acknowledged that the
"bourgeoisie" came to power in March because of better organiza-
31
tion and political ability than the Bolsheviks.
This last manifesto, which also contained all the planks of 
that party's platform, appeared in a supplement to the first 
issue of Izvestiia, the Petrograd Soviet's organ. The Bolshevik 
Vladimir Bonch-Bruevich explained how he seized the printing works 
of the popular daily, Kopeika, offered the newspaper to the 
Soviet Executive Committee, received approval, and proceeded to 
print the first issue of Izvestiia. Though an editorial board 
had been elected, Bonch-Bruevich, on his own, issued a Bolshevik 
supplement which was completely out of step with the program 
of the new Soviet Executive Committee. Later he wrote:
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This was among my early sins committed in 
Izvestiia, sins for which later, as more of 
them accumulated, I was asked to make public 
confessions and for which I was subjected to 
an interrogation by that Pope of Menshevik 
bigots, Tseretelli himself, and was finally 
deprived of my mandate in Izvestiia because 
of my Bolshevik convictions.
The Interdistrictites and Left SR's on March 12, before the 
Bolshevik manifesto appeared, also published an appeal for the 
establishment of a provisional revolutionary government, indi­
cating that they, like the Bolsheviks, were hostile toward the 
establishment of the Petrograd Soviet. The Interdistrictite 
lurenev maintained in his memoirs that the manifesto called for 
elections to a soviet of workers' and soldiers' deputies and 
that this call for elections was the first to appear. Two leaf­
lets were printed in quantities of 300,000 about 10 P. M. on 
March 1:̂. on the confiscated presses of Novoe vremia. Approximately 
200,000 copies were distributed, the rest to be distributed at 
the Tauride Palace the following morning. Furthermore lurenev 
maintained that these manifestos were the first materials to be 
printed in the same printing house that issued the first edition 
of Izvestiia of the Petrograd Soviet. However, as already seen, 
the Mensheviks on March 10, two days before the lorenev initia­
tive, issued a call for a soviet, and again on the afternoon of 
March 12 called for the organizational meeting of a soviet. Indeed, 
the first meeting of the Soviet opened a half hour before the 
Interdistrictite appeal was even printed. Thus lurenev's 
initiative was not the first call for a soviet. Furthermore,
2k
the letter's appeal did not call for a soviet, according to reports 
and documentation other than lurenev's, but for a provisional 
revolutionary government. On March 15 lurenev's associates tried to issue 
a pamphlet, which the Soviet confiscated, calling for the estab­
lishment of a provisional revolutionary government by the Soviet,
non-cooperation with the Provisional Government, and the complete
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break of soldiers with officers. Clearly neither the Bolsheviks, 
nor the Interdistrictites or Left SR's wished a soviet to convene.
The provisional executive committee of the Petrograd Soviet 
did not limit itself to convoking the organizational meeting of 
that body. Measures were taken to organize supplies for the 
mutinying, scattered, and homeless military units that had 
abandoned their barracks. "The Provisional Supply Commission", 
headed by V. G. Groman and Frankorusskii, set up a soldiers' 
supply base in the Tauride Palace and the citizens of Petrograd 
to assist in feeding the hungry soldiers. As Sukhanov noted 
in his memoirs :
For the armed, hungry, shelterless, terrorized and 
ignorant masses of soldiery now represented no less 
a danger to the cause of the revolution than the 
organized forces of tsarism. Indeed, there might 
be doubts as to the existence of the latter, but 
the former were there to be seen.34
As incredible chaos reigned in the streets of Petrograd, 
the Soviet set about to order the situation. If the revolution
was to be successful, the disorder of the streets had to be stilled
and the soldiers organized to defend the Tauride Palace against
counterrevolutionary forces. One of the members of the provisional
25
executive committee, Kapelinskii, telephoned socialist officers
to give leadership to organizing the peasant soldiers. Thus the
provisional committeemen turned to the SR's and specifically to
the remnants of the 1905 SR military organization, as there was
no doubt that the majority of the rebellious peasant soldiers
leaned in the direction of "agrarian socialism." Two officers
of the defunct SR officers' organization of 1905, Colonel S. D.
Mstislavskii (S. D. Maslovskii), and Lieutenant V. N. Filippovskii,
were charged with heading a provisional military committee;
Mstislavskii, a highly competent officer, was "cooling his heels"
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at the time as the librarian for the General Staff Academy. 
Mstislavskii wrote of the military situation he had come to 
command :
Our situation was catastrophic. It is true 
that [General] Khabalov made essentially a 
gross error by withdrawing his troops from 
the center of the city and giving the "rebels" 
a chance to surround them from all directions 
. . . .  But was there really a revolutionary 
atmosphere in the city?. . .  I remember 
crowds of unarmed soldiers roaming about the 
city, juveniles engaged in arson, and automobiles 
driven madly about the streets. If only we had 
one cohesive unit which maintained its compo­
sition. We had neither artillery, nor machine 
guns; neither commanding officers, nor communi­
cations. With the exception of Filippovskii . . , 
who arrived fifteen minutes after me there were 
no officers.36
Mstislavskii's first attempts to organize the soldiers gathering 
in the Tauride Palace were fruitless. The troops, exhausted and 
hungry, flatly refused to obey orders, preferring instead to 
join in the organizational meeting of the Petrograd. Soviet that was
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about to convene. Engulfed in a human flood, the military commit­
tee transferred its activities to the Duma side of the palace, 
next to the study of the deputy Duma chairman, N. V. Nekrasov. 
Here, Kerensky and Nekrasov met Mstislavskii and seemingly 
approved of the letter's military activities. Here also were 
twenty front-line officers, none connected with the local 
soldiery, but the only soldiers momentarily willing to aid 
Mstislavskii. Armaments consisted of four unlubricated machine 
guns and when a young soldier was ordered to commandeer vaseline, 
he reported, to Mstislavskii's great indignation, that none was 
available as no shops were open for business at so late an hour. 
Though they had no arms, Mstislavskii nevertheless dispatched 
officers to such strategic positions as the Nikolaev and Tsarskoe 
Selo railway stations, hoping that they might pick up some 
revolutionary soldiers on the way by the "vendee system." He 
also managed to form a shock detachment of some fifty soldiers 
under the command of Ensign Petrov. Eventually some obvious 
precautions were taken, some strategic posts occupied, but the
result of their indefatigable labor was "merely to reduce chaos 
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to confusion." Ironically the commanders of both the imperial 
troops and the revolutionary troops believed in the superiority 
of the other side.
The organizational meeting of the Petrograd Soviet 
scheduled for 7 P. M. on March 12 made it improbable that
factory workers and military units could conduct elections 
for delegates to the Soviet in only four hours.' Fighting still
27
raged in the streets when the appeal was distributed through the 
capital. "Would the workers and soldiers even respond to the 
appeal?" some questioned. These leaders apparently were anxious 
to form a soviet as quickly as possible, regardless of the reac­
tion of the insurgents to their appeal. Sokolov was even con­
vinced that the session should open immediately upon the arrival
38
of twenty to thirty delegates from the workers.
By 7 P. M. only socialist intelligentsia had collected at
the Tauride Palace to organize a soviet. To his dismay the
Bolshevik leader Shliapnikov found no delegates fnom the workers
and won approval to delay the opening of the session for an 
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hour and a half. When Shliapnikov telephoned a mumber of Bolshe­
viks to attend the opening Soviet session to increase his party's 
influence, they ignored his order. Lower echelon paxty members 
were highly suspicious of a soviet created by intelligentsia
and refused to attend as, "The Bolshevik comrades were too busy
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fighting in the streets."
The first session of the Soviet of Workers’ Deputies opened
in room 12 of the Tauride Palace at 9 or 10 P. M. About 50
delegates attended with mandates voted by factories and military
41
units and another one to two hundred with no mandate; no 
official regulations about representation apparently existed. 
Shliapnikov notes, "a majority of delegates, if not all, had 
merely ’oral’ credentials without any other certifications from 
their factories. But who could check on it? It was decided 
that the meeting of that day was merely an initiative meeting.
28
and the real meeting with normal representation would be held 
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later." As noted, most of those in attendance, .were not factory 
or military delegates, but rather socialist inteULectuals and 
party leaders. Thus the organizational meeting of the Soviet 
was actually packed with persons who seemingly had nothing to 
do with the uprising. However, the revolution consisted of more than 
mobilization and if its goals were to succeed had. to draw the mobil­
ized into a politically participant forum or institution. While 
the men in the Tauride Palace may have initiated little of the 
uprising, their actions allowed the mobilization process to 
continue. They were the organizers of the revolution's institu­
tional basis.
Who were the men in the left wing of the Tauride Palace 
that night? A partial listing is available: Aleksandrovich (Left
SR), Baturskii, Skobelev, Chkheidze, (Menshevik Defensists), 
Braunstein, Grinevich, Frankorusskii, Sokolov (Menshevik Inter­
nationalists), Erlich (Bund), Gvozdev, Groman, Khrustalev-Nosar 
(Mensheviks), lurenev (Interdistrictite), Kapelinskii (Coopera­
tor), P. A. Krasikov, Kerensky, Znamenskii (Trudoviks), Pankov 
(Left Menshevik), Peshekhonov (Popular Socialist), Shliapnikov, 
Molotov, Zalutskii (Bolsheviks), Surin (SR Internationalist), 
Sukhanov, Steklov (Internationalists), Zenzinov (SR Defensist). 
Mstislavskii and Filippovskii (SR Defensists) were meeting as 
the military committee at the time. Kerensky may have appeared 
at the meeting briefly. While the presence of all of the above 
is attested by at least two witnesses, the attendance of Avilov,
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Demianov, Potresov, and Tikhonov is noted by only one eye-witness. 
The following day I. M. Bramson, N. V. Chaikovskii, V. B. Stanke- 
vich [Vladas Stuchka] (Trudoviks) M. G. Rafes (Bund), N. S. 
Rusanov (SR), and V. Chemolusskii (Popular Socialist) arrived. 
Presumably Volkov and Broido who attended the evening organiza­
tional meeting of the provisional executive committee meeting 
were present, whereas Bogdanov who also attended that session
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is specifically noted by Sukhanov as not at the later session.
The organizational meeting of the Petrograd Soviet opened
in the midst of the exhilaration caused by the victory of the
rebellion. Chaos set in as new groups kept pouring into the
hall; "God knows with what mandates or intentions," wrote Suk- 
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hanov. Sokolov ran about seating deputies, trying to determine 
if they were delegates with or without a mandate (consulting or 
voting representatives), Sokolov finally opened the session 
sometime before 10 P. M. The first order of business was the 
selection of a presidium. Menshevik-Defensists nominated 
Khrustalev-Nosar for permanent chairman only to be met with 
vehement opposition from Shliapnikov. The Bolshevik leader 
proposed the explosion of the 1905 Soviet chairman on the grounds 
that he was a renegade, a collaborator with the reactionary news­
paper, Novoe vremia, and an anti-Semite. The proposition for
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explosion passed without rebuttal, 33 or 35 votes to 10. The 
delegates then proceeded to elect to the presidium the Duma 
deputies, Chkheidze, chairman, and Kerensky and Skobelev, vice- 
chairmen. For the secretariat Gvozdev, Grinevich, Sokolov, and
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Pankov were nominated and elected. At this point Chkheidze
delivered a short speech in which he stressed the significance
of the revolution, informed the delegates of the formation of
the Temporary Committee of the Duma, and appealed to the Soviet
and the "democracy" to consumate the revolutionary upheaval . He
concluded his speech with the words: "Long Life to the Revolu-
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tion! Long Life to the Revolutionary Army!" Kerensky also
appeared briefly, made an emotional speech, and disappeared to
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the Duma wing of the palace , both characteristic of his future actions.
The meeting proceeded, with Skobelev and Chkheidze taking
turns at presiding, to set up committees to deal with specific
problems. The assembly approved a credentials committee, to be
headed by Gvozdev, a supply commission, to be headed by Groman
and Frankorusskii, and elected a literary commission composed
of Avilov, Bonch-Bruevich, Sukhanov, Sokolov, Peshekhanov,
Steklov, and Grinevich. The literary commission was ordered
to draft an appeal for Immediate issue to the citizens of 
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Petrograd.
Frankorusskii, speaking for the food supply commission, 
revealed the critical state of food supply in the capital. He 
asked for authority to confiscate the food stocks of the commis­
sary department as well as all other private and public food 
supplies, in order to make provision for soldiers and the general 
population of the capital. The meeting immediately empowered
the commission to do as proposed and its heads, Groman and
49
Frankorusskii, withdrew to begin work.
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The military problem constituted a serious danger for the
revolution. The tenor of the decisions made by the session
indicated a higher degree of optimism than what the military
commission warranted. The Menshevik Braunstein proposed to
restore order by organizing a militia in every city district
under commissars (the first use of the term) to be dispatched
by the executive committee. How the commissars were to organize
disciplined revolutionary forces out of hungry mobs to face a
50
trained military force was not even considered.
Some members of the executive committee did retire to dis­
cuss defense with the military commission which had just come 
under the control of the Temporary Duma Committee's representa­
tive, Colonel Engelhardt. Duma president Rodzianko and the 
Soviet leader Sokolov had a violent exchange concerning the 
appointment of Engelhardt and only the concilitory attitude of 
the SR's Mstislavskii and Filippovskii resolved the matter.
Sokolov, however, refused to be reconciled and retired to the 
Soviet to request that the body define its relationship with 
the military commission. Regardless of who led the commission, 
aside from a few improvisations, "hardly anything was being 
done," commented Sukhanov. The executive committeemen, seeing 
the defense of the city a problem apparently beyond the capabilities 
of the commission, returned to the Soviet to tackle this urgent 
task only to find that the session had just closed.
While discussion of the military problem continued outside the 
Soviet forum, the premier meeting of the Soviet plenum transacted 
other business. The session voted to publish a central news organ.
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They appropriately adopted the title Izvestiia (News) and elected to the 
editorial board the members of the literary commission. While 
the independents Sukhanov, Steklov, and Sokolov in the first 
weeks controlled the editorial policy the Bolshevik Bonch- 
Bruevich for a brief time had some input and influence.
The session also took up the danger of counterrevolutionary 
propaganda. After the members of the literary commission— except 
Grinevich who polished the final draft of the Soviet's first 
appeal— returned to the session of the Soviet a debate arose 
concerning freedom of the general press. Steklov urged that all 
presses be halted pointing to the danger of counterrevolutionary 
agitation, while Sokolov and Sukhanov fought for the absolute 
freedom of the press. Finally, a compromise was reached and 
newspapers were to be published on each editor's responsibility.
At this time a question was placed before the Soviet on whether 
presses should be taken over for revolutionary use; Peshekhonov 
opposed it and apparently the proposition failed as no presses 
were confiscated.
Sometime after midnight the assembly turned from commissions
to consumating the structure of the Petrograd Soviet. An
executive committee was established and members appointed to 
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it. In the first days of the revolution this committee, 
rather than the presidium issued all orders and business.
Chkheidze, Skobelev, and Kerensky as well as Gvozdev, Sokolov,
Pankov, and Grinevich became members automatically as they 
made up respectively the presidium and the secretariat. Those
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elected included P. A. Krasikov (Pavlovich), Sokolovskii, the very
popular non-party condidates, Steklov, Kapelinskii and Sukhanov,
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and Shliapnikov and Aleksandrovich. Sukhanov noted that the 
workers' delegates did not even know the people for whom they 
voted. Party members present voted for "their own", in so far as 
they knew them! In order to increase the influence of his own 
party Shliapnikov proposed that each socialist party should be 
given the right to send two delegates to the committee; this was 
approved. The Mensheviks sent Bogdanov and Baturskii; the Bolshe­
viks, V. Molotov (Scriabin) and Zalutskii; the SR's, Rusanov 
and Zenzinov; the Bund, Erlich and Rafes (the latter soon 
replaced by Liber); the Trudoviks, Bramson and Chaikovskii (the 
latter soon replaced by Stankevich); the Popular Socialists, 
Peshekhonov and Charnoluskii; the Interdistrictites, lurenev;
and the Latvian Social Democrats» P. I. Stuchka [not Stankevich-
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Stuchka] and M. lu. Kozlovskii. Though Shliapnikov raised 
the important question of establishing district soviets in Petro­
grad, the late hour made a detailed discussion of the problem 
impossible and the session voted to refer the matter to the 
executive committee which was to dispatch representatives to 
each district to organize local soviets.
The first session of the Petrograd Soviet ended about 4 
A. M. Workers and soldiers had often interrupted the proceed­
ings demanding the floor to report the adhesion of a new group 
to the revolutionary cause. These emotional and incoherent 
speeches were enthusiastically welcomed and applauded but
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accomplished nothing. The great importance of this session was 
that the radical intelligentsia gained the recognition of the 
revolutionary masses and moved forward with the institutionali­
zation of the revolution through the establishment of the Petro- 
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grad Soviet.
At the close of the first session of the Soviet, the execu­
tive committee under Chkheidze's chairmanship withdrew in order 
to establish the substructure of the Soviet. The first item 
discussed was the establishment of local soviets. The committee 
decided to dispatch "commissars for establishment of popular 
power in the districts of Petrograd." Shliapnikov, Peshekhonov, 
and Surin were appointed commissars of the most volatile districts, 
Viborg, Lesnoi, and the Petrograd-side respectively. The 
committee then endorsed the resolution of the Soviet plenary 
session concerning the creation of a workers' militia and 
established rallying points in each district for wandering, 
homeless soldiers. Furthermore, the activities of the military
commission were to be scrutinized through the eyes and ears of
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Sokolov and Aleksandrovich who were named to this commission. 
Chkheidze and Kerensky were appointed to the Temporary Duma 
Committee to act as "watchdogs" and representatives of the 
Soviet. According to Shliapnikov:
The executive committee entrusted them with 
preventing [the Duma Committee] from taking 
a course which might conflict with that of 
the executive committee of the Soviet of 
Workers’ Deputies. They had to watch over 
the activities of the State Duma Committee
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and should not permit Gospoda (Messieurs) 
Miliukov and Rodzianko to compromise with the 
remnants of tsarism behind the back of the 
people who stood up for the r e v o l u t i o n . 59
By sending Chkheidze and Kerensky as "watchdogs" of the Tempo­
rary Duma Committee, the executive committee had therefore pre­
sumed that the Temporary Committe of the State Duma, not the 
Petrograd Soviet, would take state power (as Marxist dogma 
required that the socialists not do so). The position of the 
Soviet in relation to the Duma Committee was to watch over the 
letter's activities so that the liberals would not chart a 
revolutionary course detrimental to the toiling masses. All
members of the executive committee, including the Bolsheviks,
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shared these views.
In accordance with the decisions made at the pre-dawn 
session of the executive committee on March 13, the first 
proclamation of the new body to the people of Petrograd and 
of Russia was issued that same day:
The old regime has brought the country to 
ruin and the population to famine. It was 
impossible to bear this longer, and the 
inhabitants of Petrograd came out on the 
street to express their dissatisfaction. 
They were greeted by a volley of bullets.
In place of bread, the tsar's ministers 
gave them lead.
But the soldiers would not act against 
the people and turned against the Govern­
ment. Together with the people they seized 
guns, arsenals, and important governmental 
institutions.
The fight is still on and must go on to 
the end. The old power must be completely 
crushed to make way for popular government. 
In that lie, the salvation of Russia.
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In order to succeed in this struggle for 
democracy, the people must create their own 
governmental organ. Yesterday, February 27, 
there was formed at the capital a Soviet of 
Workers' Deputies, made up of representatives 
of factories, mills, mutinied troops, and 
democratic and socialistic parties and groups. 
The Soviet, sitting in the Duma, has set for 
itself as its main task the organization of the 
popular forces, and the fight for the consoli­
dation of political freedom and popular 
government.
The Soviet has appointed commissars to 
establish the people's authority in the 
districts of Petrograd. We invite the 
entire population of the capital to rally 
at once to the Soviet, to organize local 
committees in their districts, and to take 
into their hands the management of local 
affairs.
All together, with our forces united, we 
will fight to wipe out completely the old 
Government and to call a constituent assembly 
on the basis of universal, equal, direct, 
and secret suffrage.
Though the early morning March 13 session of the executive was 
short, its members exhausted, and the following manifesto hastily 
drawn up, nevertheless, the document is more remarkable for what 
it failed to mention than what it did proclaim. Though no 
comprehensive program was possible, at this early date and under 
unsettling conditions, the problems of land, peace, and state 
power were not mentioned. Though the proclamation called for a 
government based on the will of the people, it did not state 
whether this government was to be formed from the Soviet or 
from the Duma Committee, nor what the socialists' relationship 
to the new government would be.
Before the relationship of the soviet to the government 
could be worked out, the new body had to attend to ordering its
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own internal operations and relationships. Sukhanov wrote
of the first regular session of the executive committee on
March 13 and those that followed during the first days: "They
were not meetings, but a frenzied and exhausting obstacle
race . . . neither at that session nor in the general during
the days that followed could there be any question of fulfilling
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a program of work." The work of the executive committee was
interrupted by an endless stream of persons who thought
their business urgent. "In a great majority of cases these
emergency matters were not worth a barley-corn . . .  I
remember," Sukhanov noted, "only unimaginable hubbub, tension,
hunger, and the feeling of irritation at these 'exceptional
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reports.' There was simply no way of stopping them." Not
only was the environment disrupting but the executive sessions
themselves were chaotic. The chairman's seat was usually
vacant, for Chkheidze was on twenty-four hour call and "spoke
practically without stopping. . . .  He would scarcely have time
to return to the meeting of the executive committee and take his
things off before some delegate would burst in with a categorical
demand for Chkheidze . . . and the tired and sleepy old Georgian
would get his fur coat on again with a resigned look, put on his
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hat, and disappear from the executive committee." The plenum 
of the Soviet was, if possible, even more chaotic. Its sessions 
took on an atmosphere of a political circus, mass-neetings in 
which meaningless, hysterical phrases were proclaimed by anyone 
able to gain the attention of the sweat-soaked delegates packed
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in the hall. In the words of Sukhanov, the assembly finally
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acquired the look of a mass-meeting in a riding-school,"
as chairs and tables disappeared from the hall and delegates
craned their necks to see the presidium which along with several
busy-bodies stood atop a lone table tryingto direct the meeting!
As a result, the executive committee was almost from the first
forced to ignore the plenary Soviet, particularly after the
delegates showed little concern about the practical measures
being under taken by the executive. The plenary body considered
approval of the executive's actions as little more than a
formality, and says Sukhanov, this formality was no obstacle for 
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the committee.
As the methods and procedures of operation were worked out, 
the executive turned to issues and problems. The need to arm the 
workers had been recognized at the first session of the execu­
tive committee on March 13. However, the second meeting at 11 
A. M. that same day not only made no further progress toward 
organizing a workers' militia, but the Soviet executive even 
refused recognition to a delegation of the workers' militia of
the Sestroretsk district declaring that they did not represent
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the totality of that district's population. The action of
the executive committee presumably followed, as the result of
the Duma Committee's directive calling for the creation of a
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city militia under the command of D. A. Kryzhanovskii.
In fact, the executive committee issued a manifesto calling 
for support of the Duma-created militia:
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In the Municipal Duma a citizen's militia 
is being organized. Even students are called 
to participate in it. The representative body 
of the revolutionary proletariat, the Executive 
Committee of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies 
has decided to unite the central organ of the 
workers' commissariats with this Duma organiza­
tion... Remember, comrades that you take part 
in the militia at the instruction of the Soviet 
of Workers' Deputies. Remember that the Soviet 
of Workers' Deputies is your highest authority.
The purpose of the workers' militia, however, had been to create 
a fighting force to oppose the expected counterrevolution, as 
every revolution from the time of the French Revolution had to a de­
gree suffered from the sword of reaction. While the Duma leaders 
like the socialists also feared the forces of autocracy, they 
considered the restoration of order essential to mounting an ef­
fective .defense. . Yet, the workers' militia and the city militia 
worked at cross-purposes; the former to bolster the defense 
of the revolution by seizing more weapons, the latter to restore 
order by confiscating arms. The Soviet decision to aid in the 
restoration of order and then mount a defense resolved the con­
flict, but in favor of the Duma initiative.
The Soviet leaders, however, knew that the revolution could 
not succeed with workers alone; the organized support of the 
soldiery was absolutely essential. Therefore at the second 
meeting of the Petrograd Soviet, after presenting the organiza­
tional measures that the executive committee had taken to which 
the Soviet plenum voted its consent, the Menshevik leader,
Steklov, expressed the opinion of the majority of the socialist 
leaders that "It is necessary to rely not only on the workers 
but also on other groups. We won't be able to hold out without
40
70
the other representatives of other strata of the population."
As will be remembered, the executive had appointed Chkheidze
and Kerensky as "watchdogs" of the Duma Committee, however, unlike
1905 the socialists this time were willing to cooperate with
the liberals and bourgeoisie. The soldiers, however, unlike
the workers and party groupings remained unorganized. Engle-
hardt had issued orders in the name of Rodzianko on March 12
to all officers and soldiers; "(I) all individual soldiers and
military units should return to their barracks immediately; (2)
all officers should return to their units and take necessary
measures to restore order; and (3) commanders of units should
appear at the Tauride Palace at 11 A. M. on March 13 in order
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to receive further instructions." Rodzianko's orders met
with a hostile reception from the soldiers who immediately
protested to the executive committee of the Soviet. According
to M. Rafes, a Bund leader, Chkheidze and Kerensky, who were
also members of the Duma Committee, told the soldiers that the
order had not been discussed by the Duma Committee, and that
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Rodzianko had issued it on his own. The soldiers demanded that
the Soviet arrest Rodzianko. The Soviet executive did deliver
a protest to the Duma Committee though Shliapnikov tells us
that "no proper appraisal" was reached by a majority. According
to Engelhardt, his attempt to restore order and discipline among
the soldiers was denounced as counterrevolutionary by the Petro- 
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grad Soviet. To calm the outraged soldiery, the representatives 
of the executive committee in the military commission issued the
4l
following directive on March 13 which ordered them to: "I)
assemble at their barracks by regiment, 2) appoint temporary
commanders and junior officers, 3) establish guard units,
seize streets, railway stations, and other important public
and state institutions, 4) bring an end to (aimless) driving of
automobiles in the streets, 5) organize food supply in the
regiments and barracks, 6) establish communications between
the general good centers and barracks, 7) not leave the soldiers
for a long time in the barracks without attention, leadership,
and information from the insurgent populace, 8) regard the Peter
and Paul Fortress and the Tauride Palace as strong points of all
of Petrograd, 9) establish local bases from the local barracks of
individual regiments, and 10) isolate the officers who did not
join the people or who might exert harmful influence upon the 
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soldiers." To appease the infuriated soldiery Col. Engelhardt 
issued the following statement which appeared the morning of 
March 15:
On this day of March 1 a rumor circulated 
among the soldiers of the Petrograd Garrison 
to the effect that in regiments officers are 
confiscating arms from soldiers. These rumors 
were checked in two regiments and were found 
to be false. As Chairman of the Military 
Commission of the Temporary Committee of the 
State Duma, I announce that the most resolute 
measures, including execution of the guilty, 
will be applied to prevent acts of this 
nature on the part of o f f i c e r s . 7 5
During the morning of March 14 a preparatory session with 
members of the executive committee concerning the rights and
1+2
allegiance of the soldiers was held by deputies of the military 
units that had carried out elections the previous day. The 
meeting ran into the scheduled noon session of the Petrograd Soviet 
and Chkheidze, Skobelev, and Sokolov left for the plenary meeting 
over which Sokolov presided; they were shortly joined by the 
soldier delegates. As acting chairman, Sokolov delivered an 
introductory speech in which he stressed the necessity of main­
taining a relationship between the Soviet and the military 
commission of the Duma Committee in view of the fact that "the 
revolution" possessed few officers. Only through this linking, 
he asserted, could the experience and knowledge of the officers 
be available to the soldiery. He proposed that soldier representa­
tives be nominated to the commission, adding that they might even 
play a leading role in it. Then Sokolov proposed the discussion 
of three questions: (1) to which organization should the soldiers
by subordinate? (2) should arms be turned over the officers?
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(3) what should be the relationship between soldiers and officers?
The soldiers were determined that they would enter into 
the revolution as they willed. While the revolutionary intelli­
gentsia recognized from the first the importance of the soldiery, 
as shown by the manifesto of March 12 calling for the election 
of soldier delegates to the Soviet, nevertheless, the intelli­
gentsia felt that the soldiers should not become too deeply 
involved "in the disrupting influence of politics." Approxi­
mately twenty delegates from the troops of the Petrograd
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garrison took part in debating the soldiers' position. The
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Bundlst soldier representative, S. Z. Klivanskli (Maksim) 
maintained that the Duma Committee was attempting to disarm 
the soldiers and once they had done so would "snuff out the 
revolution." He called for a Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies, 
or a Soviet of the Petrograd garrison and the union of a 
Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. F. F. Linde, a 
Menshevik-Internationalist soldier seconded the proposition for 
a Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, for "no one can 
win against the workers and soldiers together— they are the 
whole people." A. P. Borisov, a Menshevik and member of the 
Lithuanian Life Guard Reserve Battalion,castigated the officers 
in the military commission as free-loaders "who recognize the 
revolution, but who joined it only after it was evident that 
there was no danger in doing so." He urged definitive action 
as "everything is undecided." The SR engineer, Xu. A. Kudriavtsev, 
of the Red Cross Automobile Section, opposed any "liquidation 
of the Commission" and proposed that "Soviet representatives 
enter the Commission and control its activity." In spite of 
Klivanskii's and Linde's opposition, a compromise was suggested:
The soldier mass is organized in the Soviet 
of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. The opinion 
of the Military Commission will be recognized, in 
so far as it does not deviate from the opinion of 
the Soviet. ̂ Soldier deputies are to be sent to 
participate in the Military Commission.
Once the position of the soldiers vis-à-vis other revolutionary 
groups was defined, the soldier delegates turned to their own 
internal affairs. On the proposition of returning weapons to
officers, discussion was short. Klivanskii opposed the action, 
while another soldier suggested that weapons other than firearms 
be returned to the officers. Vakulenko (non-party), of the 
JËger Life Guards Battalion, proposed that weapons "be under 
the control of elected non-commissioned officers."
The relationship between officers and men resulted in a 
heated discussion. This question essentially concerned 
only the returning officers and not those few officers 
who had remained with their troops and resolved any differences. 
The problem had arisen as the result of the Military Commis­
sion's order that officers return to their units and restore 
order. "They are trying to put the soldiers under their thumb 
again," exclaimed the soldier-delegate Marchenko, "and they are 
behaving even worse than before." "The officers have come 
back, and sided with us, in order to get around us," chimed 
Melenchuk, a Semenovskii guardsman, adding, "Now we are the 
bosses— the workers and us. We won't allow them to get around 
us." Emotional complaints spewed forth about incidents of 
corporal abuse and officers' demeanor toward troops. Marchenko 
finally posed the question: "what powers remain with the officer,
and what with us?" Linde opposed the return of any officer "who 
did not participate in the revolution," and added, "we must 
assert our will and choose . . . ." "Those who do not unite 
with us, are to be driven away from the battalion," demanded 
another. However, as Sokolov had pointed out at the opening of 
the session, the revolution needed the officers. Representatives
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of the Preobrazhenskii battalion complained precisely of this, 
stating that they had no officers even for instruction. Then 
Klivanskii stressed that not all officers should be accepted 
by the troops, especially those who had abused their position, 
insulted and offended their men, or who had used corporal
punishment. The officers, however, who are acceptable to the
men should be addressed "as citizens, like themselves." He 
also noted that the "defense of the Fatherland against the external 
enemy" made the retention of the officers essential and that 
order had to be reestablished and anarchy mastered. These 
expressions were all well and good but these soldier delegates 
came from the Imperial Guards and their officers were not likely 
to meet even the least of these propositions. As one soldier
put it, "We, the Guards, have a special sort of officer. The
first hundred aristocratic families. We would scarcely have one 
left [were we to follow these guidelines]." Finally debate 
ended and a full program was decided on in a draft resolution 
presented by Klivanskii. It proposed that the soldiers form a 
soviet and join the workers' soviet; that all troop units send 
their representatives to the Petrograd Soviet; that no weapons 
be returned to officers; that the question of arms, as well as 
the economy of units, were both to be included under soldiers' 
control; and that discipline was to remain the same (as formerly) 
while on military duty. To these points were added the sugges­
tion that the Duma Military Commission be accepted only insofar 
as it did not diverge in policy from that of the Soviet, as
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well as providing for despatch of soldier delegates to participate 
in the commission. These and the other decisions were then 
presented to the executive committee of the Petrograd Soviet.
The Soviet leaders quickly overcame their hesitations about 
soldier-participation in politics. Sokolov even pressed for 
election of soldier representatives to the executive committee; 
the result of which was to coopt ten soldier delegates onto the 
executive for three days (but who in fact remained on the 
committee for over a month): Sadovskii, Paderin, Badenko, Linde,
Sokolov (a Kadet!), Kudriavtsev, Borisov, Klimchinskii, Barkov, 
and Vakulenko. "It was assumed," wrote Shliapnikov, "that elec­
tions of deputies to the Soviet from the garrison would occur. . . 
and that these delegates then would elect new executive committee 
members." At about 8 P. M. the executive committee in accordance 
with the soldiers’ wishes resolved to constitute a "Soldiers’ 
Section" to which delegates were to be elected on the basis of 
one delegate per company; the Soviet now became the "Petrograd 
Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies." As for the proposed 
measures concerning the soldiery, the executive committee, after 
a brief discussion, decided to publish a single order that "should
be distributed today." The executive appointed a committee to
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compose the order with Sokolov acting as draftsman.
In order to insure their new position in the revolution, 
the soldier-delegates also sought the endorsement of the Duma 
Committee. Late in the evening of March 14 twenty soldier 
delegates approached Engelhardt and asked him to frame an order
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containing their demands. According to the British military 
attache, Sir Alfred Knox, Engelhardt told him that same day 
that the soldiers' demands were "fairly moderate, but embodied 
the idea of regimental committees." It provided only for the 
election of junior officers and for a certain measure of control 
by soldiers of the domestic economy of units. Engelhardt con­
veyed the proposals to the Duma Committee but found categorical 
opposition. The delegation withdrew after Engelhardt announced 
the Duma leaders' decision and presumably returned to the 
Soviet Executive Committee where the decision was soon made to 
draw up the order. Engelhardt relates that sometime after the 
delegation had withdrawn a soldier delegate from the Soviet 
asked the colonel what he proposed to do and when Engelhardt 
replied that the action was thought premature, the soldier turned
on his heel, saying: "So much the better. We wild, write it
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ourselves."
The exact evolution of the soldiers' order indicates how 
considerable the influence of the soldiery was in the first days of 
the Soviet. Sukhanov has left us his highly descriptive portrait 
of what transpired:
Around 10 o'clock, going back behind the curtain 
of room 13, where the executive committee had been 
in session shortly before, I found the following 
scene: N. D. Sokolov was sitting at a table writing.
He was surrounded on all sides by soldiers, standing, 
sitting, and leaning on the table, half-dictating 
and half-suggesting to Sokolov what he should write. 
There flashed through my mind Tolstoy's descrip­
tion of how he used to make up stories together 
with the children in the school at lasnaia Poliana.
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It appeared that this was a committee elected 
by the Soviet to compose an "order" to the 
soldiers. There was no agenda and no discussion 
of any kind, everyone spoke, and all were completely 
absorbed in the work, formulating their collective 
opinion without any voting. 1 stood and listened, 
extraordinarily interested. When the work was 
finished they put a heading on the sheet: "Order
No. 1" . . . Its contents were completely 
covered by decisions of the Soviet and had nothing 
terrible in them.80
The content of the document was essentially Klivanskii's five
point resolution which he had brought up in the Soviet. A. N.
Paderin (Bolshevik) recalled that only one argument arose:
whether the proposition should be called an appeal or manifesto,
as Sokolov suggested, or an order (prikaz) as the soldiers 
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insisted. The final draft of the order was presented to the
executive committee after no more than a half hour where it
was approved without further discussion and sent on to the
plenary Soviet. The soldiers in the Soviet were "beside them- 
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selves with joy" when the full Soviet approved the order.
The order was immediately issued in leaflet form that same 
night and in Izvestiia the following morning :
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Order No. 1
To the garrison of the Petrograd District, to all the 
soldiers and sailors of the guard, army, artillery, and 
navy, for immediate and strict execution, and to the workers 
of Petrograd for their information:
The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies has resolved:
1. In all companies, battalions, regiments, parks batter­
ies, squadrons, in the special services of the various military 
administrations, and on the vessels of the navy, committees
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from the elected representatives of the lower ranks of the 
above-mentioned military units shall be chosen immediately.
2. In all those military units that have not yet chosen 
their representatives to the Soviet of Workers' Deputies, 
one representative from each company shall be selected, to 
report with written credentials at the building of the 
State Duma by ten o'clock on the morning of the second of 
this March.
3. In all its political actions, the military branch 
is subordinated to the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' 
Deputies and to its own committees.
4. The orders of the Military Commission of the State 
Duma shall be executed only in such cases as do not con­
flict with the orders and resolutions of the Soviet of 
Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.
5. All kinds of arms, such as rifles, machine guns, 
armored automobiles, and others, must be kept at the 
disposal and under the control of the company and battalion 
committees, and in no case should they be turned over to 
officers, even at their demand.
6. In the ranks and during their performance of the 
duties of the service, soldiers must observe the strictest 
military discipline, but outside the service and the ranks, 
in their political, general civic, and private life, 
soldiers cannot in any way be deprived of those rights 
that all citizens enjoy. In particular, standing at atten­
tion and compulsory saluting, when not on duty, is 
abolished.
7. Also, the addressing of the officers with the 
titles "Your Excellency," "Your Honor," etc., is abolished, 
and these titles are replaced by the address of "Mister 
General," "Mister Colonel," etc. Rudeness toward soldiers 
of any rank, and, especially, addressing them as "thou"
[ ty ] is prohibited, and soldiers are required to bring 
to the attention of the company committees, every infrac­
tion of this rule, as well as all misunderstandings 
occurring between officers and privates.
The present Order is to be read to all companies, 
battalions, regiments, ships' crews, batteries, and other 
combatant and noncombatant commands.
PETROGRAD SOVIET OF WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES
March I, 1917
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The Left SR's and Interdistrictites, it will be remembered, 
were vehemently opposed to the Soviet; they were determined that 
the soldiery not be organized in support of that body. Almost 
at the same time that "Order No. 1" was being preipared, another 
manifesto was being drawn up in Petrograd; it became confused 
with "Order No. 1." While "Order No. 1" did not sanction the 
election of officers by the soldiery, this proclamation did so; 
called for troops to take matters into their own Brands, sanc­
tioned violence, and called for the complete breaak. of the rank 
and file with the officers' corps:
Comrade soldiers ! It has happened ! You have 
revolted, the oppressed, enslaved peasants ansà 
workers have revolted, and the autocratic govern­
ment has fallen to the ground with a clash and 
with disgrace. . . . Soldiers! Be on guard Lest 
the lords of the nobility deceive the people1 Go 
to the Duma and ask it: Will there be land for
the people, will there be freedom, will there be 
peace? . . .  In order not to be deceived by the 
noblemen and officers— this Romanov gang— take 
power into your own hands. Elect your own pla­
toon commanders, company commanders, and regimental 
commanders, elect company committees for taking 
charge of food supplies. All the officers must 
be under the control of these company committees. 
Accept only those officers whom you know to be 
friends of the people . . . Soldiers! Now that 
you have revolted and won, former enemies will 
come to you along with your friends— officers who 
have called themselves your friends. Soldiers!
The tail of a fox is more to be feared than the 
tooth of a wolf. Our only loyal friends and 
brothers are the workers and peasants. Get into 
closer contact with them! . . . Your representatives 
and workers' deputies must become the Provisicmal 
Government of the people and from this government 
you will obtain land and freedom! . . ."84
P[ress] B[ureau] Mezhduraionnyi (Interdistrictite) 
Committee of the RSI®P
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P[ress] B[ureau]. Committee of 
the Socialist Revolutionaries
The executive committee of the Soviet upon learning of this pro­
clamation resolved to suspend its publication until it could be 
discussed the following morning. Sukhanov, usually quite radical
in his views, personally confiscated several bales of the mani-
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festo in V. M. Molotov's possession but not without a row.
Chkheid ae and Kerensky addressed a communication to the Petrograd
garrison pointing out that the manifesto "was a deliberate
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forgery, perpetrated by agents provocateurs." While not exactly
true, a great many provocative leaflets were being distributed
about the city during the first days of the revolution. The
actual authors of the proclamation were not the organizations
named in the document but the work of Aleksandrovich and lurenev.
While lurenev was only criticized by his Soviet colleagues, the
SR party when it convened for its first Petrograd Conference on
March 15 sternly reprimanded Aleksandrovich and repudiated his 
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actions. Aleksandrovich, however, was not overly bothered 
by such action and posed as being completely faithful to the SR 
party. He was the nucleus around which Left SR's would gravi­
tate.
To confound the situation still further A. I. Guchkov
issued on March 17 an "Order No. 1" in the name of the Ministry
of War. This order demanded that every soldier stand his ground
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and make no changes in the status quo. This action improved 
nothing and forced Guchkov to appeal to the Soviet to clarify
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its "Order No. 1." Though only the Aleksandrovich-Iurenev 
appeal called for election of officers, officers nevertheless 
were either confirmed or dismissed by their troops. Those 
dismissed were sometimes turned over to the Military Commission; 
others were arrested by their men or allowed to return to their 
quarters. The radical manifesto had shocked a number of Petro­
grad Soviet deputies and these responded quickly to Guchkov's 
request to issue a second order so as to clarify the first and 
formed a joint committee along with members of the Military 
Commission under the chairmanship of General Potapov, a friend
of Guchkov's with socialist connections. Order No. 2 of the
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Petrograd Soviet which appeared on March 19, attempted to 
clarify differences between the Alekandrovich-Iurenev order and 
that of the Soviet. Election of officers had not been sanctioned 
by the Soviet's Order No. 1, but. as some elections had taken 
place all officers so selected "up to the present time and con­
firmed or submitted for confirmation by the army authorities 
must remain in force." The purpose of the conraittees, it explained, 
was to allow the soldiers of the Petrograd garrison "to share 
in the general political life of the country." Order No. 2 also 
confirmed giving wide civil rights to the soldiers and ending the 
old military order greetings between officers and troops.
Finally, this second order also noted that Order No. 1 had been 
issued primarily to the Petrograd garrison, but it did not
specifically dismiss the notion that it applied throughout the 
90military. Therefore the Soviet had to issue another directive.
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Order No. 3 which appeared in Izvestiia on March 8/21, specifically 
stating that Orders No. 1 and No. 2 applied only to the soldiers 
of the Petrograd Military District.
* * *
The question of state power was first discussed on March 
14-15, the problem being raised in the March 14th morning session 
of the executive committee. Several members, however, were ab­
sent and debate was deferred to a meeting later that evening. 
Russian socialists essentially advocated one of three types of 
policy vis-a-vis state power: 1) a coalition of socialists and
bourgeoisie, 2) non-cooperation by socialists with the bourgeoisie 
and establishment of a socialist revolutionary government, and 
3) socialist cooperation but not participation in a bourgeois 
government. The majority of Russian socialists held to this 
last view, while the left wing, Bolsheviks, Left SR's and Inter­
districtites urged non-cooperation; and Bundists and Popular 
Socialists, the right wing, advocated the policy of coalition.
The agenda of the evening session included 1) character and 
class composition of the first revolutionary government; 2)
demands to be made of this government; and 3) personal composi-
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tion of the ministries. Erlich, a Bund leader, maintained in
the discussion that followed that if the new government was to
have a revolutionary character the leaders of the Soviet would
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have to participate in it. Rafes, also a Bundlst, explained:
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The working class of Russia is taking such an 
active part in the development of the revolution 
that without its direct participation in the 
creation of the state life, the revolution 
would hardly be carried out to a favorable end. 
It is indispensible to lead the active work 
of the working class in the direction of 
revolutionary state construction.^^
Apparently the left wing was not too vocal about creating a 
socialist revolutionary government. Some historians have main­
tained that the first days of the revolution were an era of
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good feeling among "socialists" and, as a result, that the
Bolshevik failed to form their own faction in the Soviet until 
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March 22, that the majority policy exerted "strong influence" 
on the Bolshevik leaders to support the Provisional Government, 
and that some Bolshevik members of the Soviet voted on March 15
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for the formal transfer of power to the Provisional Government.
That only 19 out of 400 deputies present voted for a socialists
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revolutionary government bears out this last point. Until Lenin’s 
return to Russia in April, the pages of Pravda called for 
Bolshevik support of the Provisional Government and cooperation 
with the other socialist parties. Though Shliapnikov writes 
that "only eight members stood for the revolutionary democracy" 
on March 14, he admits that the Bolsheviks shared with the Men­
sheviks the belief that the revolution was a bourgeois-democratic 
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revolution. According to Sukhanov, a decision was made by a
vote of 13 to 7 or 8 that "we should not send representatives of
democracy to the ministry of Miliukov and should not demand their
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participation in it." Rafes, however, tells us that this
55
decision vas not final. The March 14 meeting was considered
only a preliminary discussion and the question was put on the
agenda for the next session on March 15. In the meantime the
various parties were asked to poll their membership and report
the stand of each organization at the executive committee
session which was to convene shortly before the plenary Soviet
100
the following morning.
After the Soviet leaders had decided not to take state 
power, they set about formulating the demands to be made of the 
new government. Sukhanov had devised a set of conditions to 
impose on the Provisional Government which he now presented to 
the Soviet. A good many of the demands had been voiced by the 
Progressive Bloc of the State Duma before the revolution. These 
included political and religious amnesty, guarantee of basic 
freedoms, universal suffrage in election of local administration, 
and abolition of discriminatory organizations, a proposed popular 
militia to replace the police, and the convocation of a Consti­
tuent Assembly. The third point in Sukhanov's program called 
for abstention of all efforts (but not advocation) to predetermine 
the future form of government; that is, until the convocation of 
a Constituent Assembly. Points eight and nine, however, were 
radical and derived directly from a recognition of the elemental 
force of the Petrograd garrison: (8) no disarmament and no
withdrawal from Petrograd of the army units that took part in 
the revolutionary movement ; and (9) the enjoyment of full civil 
and political rights by the soldiers. The entire program dealt
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with immediate conditions. No attempt was made to force any
socio-economic or foreign policy scheme on the country; indeed,
notes Sukhanov, . .it was vital to wait as long as possible."
As no major objections were raised the program was quickly 
101
adopted.
The debate turned to whether the Soviet should support the
Provisional Government even if it did not accept some of the
Sukhanov program. The Bundists and Popular Socialists argued for
unconditional support of the new government "insofar as" the
basic ideas of the Soviet were honored. Sukhanov urged support
of the Provisional Government only if it met all the conditions.
This latter became the viewpoint of the rest of the executive 
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committee. Concerning the make-up of the new government, the 
executive committee decided on a hands-off policy. The bourgeois
Ileadership could form their ministry from whatever circles they
wished. The executive committee refused to have any influence at
103
all on its personnel.
Things, however, took a different turn, for tiie same night 
that produced "Order No. 1" resulted in an even more important 
action concerning state power. Some members of the Soviet Execu­
tive Committee on their own initiative joined with the Temporary 
Committee of the Duma in a meeting that led to the formation of 
the Provisional Government. According to Sukhanov, "On my own 
responsibility I went over to the right wing of the Palace to
arrange about the meeting. It was best to work through Keren- 
104
sky . . . ." Failing, however to gain Kerensky's immediate
57
support, Sukhanov to his surprise came upon Chkheidze and Sokolov
in the Duma chambers and quickly obtained their agreement "for
]05
an immediate 'constituent' conference." When Nekrasov delivered
this proposition to his Duma colleagues, Miliukov notes that they
"willingly accepted this proposal" and set the session for 12
106
midnight, a half hour later. Sukhanov maintained that the 
bourgeoisie had to assume power or the revolution would perish, 
as the disunity of the socialists made the creation of a State 
apparatus of power impossible. "The existing State machine . . .
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might obey Miliukov, but would not obey Chkheidze," he continued.
So as not to deprive the bourgeoisie of the hope of winning power,
the conditions of the socialists were to be minimal, that is,
the required freedom of agitation in order to prevent the "dic-
108
tatorship of capital." The question was whether or not the
"propertied classes of Russia consent to accept power under such
conditions? And the task therefore is to compel them to take 
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power." As the old Menshevik A. Potresov put the matter: "At
the moment of the bourgeois revolution, the best prepared, socially
and psychologically, to solve national problems is this same
bourgeoisie. . . . even if it be only for a brief period of his- 
110
tory." The SR leader Viktor Chernov tells us that "neither
theory or doctrine won out in the ranks of Soviet democracy, but 
it was a direct feeling of the 'burden of power' that triumphed, 
when socialist doctrinaires of 'bourgeois revolution' proposed—  
with 'profound theoretical justifications'— to transfer this 
burden from their shoulders to the shoulders of the privileged
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class." Why then did the Soviet not take power? First of all,
says Chernov, because this was the line of least resistance, for
the socialists were beset by disunity. Secondly, the socialist
leaders were in exile and their lieutenants in Petrograd hesitated
to assume the trying responsibility. Thirdly, the bourgeois leaders
were well-known throughout Russia whereas the socialists, masked
by pseudonyms, were targets for reactionary legend. Fourthly, the
socialist leaders were "absolutely ignorant of the technique of
governmental administration and its apparatus." Finally, the
bourgeois parties had more than a decade of "public existence and
stable, legal organizations," while the socialist-groups had incurred
112
periodic decimation at the hands of the tsarist regime.
Chernov’s points require some qualification. First, none of 
the Duma deputies had experienced much first hand about the mechanics 
of government. Thus while the socialist deputies were ignorant of 
the techniques of government, in practice so were the bourgeoisie.
The liberals and socialists had worked all of their lives for change 
with little or no attention being paid to understanding the operation 
of institutions once the revolution was achieved. Their sudden thrust 
into positions of command in March 1917 left them unprepared. The 
first days of the re-volution clearly revealed their ineptitude in 
sol-ving practical matters, such as transport, food supply, and mili­
tary organization. Second, while only remnants of the socialist parties 
remained in 1917, the following of the liberal parties was relatively 
small by conçarison with that of the socialists and hardly better organized.
The fear of counterrevolution, haunting the So-viet leaders like 
a specter, made them reluctant to assume state power. "When at the beginning 
of the revolution," Skobelev recalled later, "I went to the entrance
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of the Tauride Palace to meet a group of soldiers . . . and to
make a speech to them, I was almost certain that I was making one
of my last speeches, and that in a few days I would be shot or 
113
hanged." Steklov on April 12 at a Soviet conference stated 
that, at the time, the victory of the revolution, even in a mode­
rate bourgeois form, was uncertain. The mutinous soldiery was 
without leadership and organization and could hardly be expected
to face well-ordered tsarist forces. "Every moment we expected
114
that they would come and arrest us, if not shoot us," he said.
Sukhanov, usually calm and collected, recollected later that if
Cossacks or any organized force had attacked, "we could not have
looked anywhere for salvation and they would have conquered the
115
revolution with their bare hands." The experience of the 1905
Revolution in which the bourgeoisie were pushed into the arms of
reaction by radical socialist demands had resulted in the
socialists moderating their goals in order to gain bourgeois
support in a united revolutionary front. The 1905 experience
had also made possible not only close collaboration between the
SR's and the Mensheviks but even ideological domination of the
116
former by the latter. The metamorphosis of the SR leader­
ship after 1905 seems to have been the most important single 
factor that contributed to accommodating the Constitutional Democrats. 
This position came about not only from the terrible 1905 
disaster, but the result of the war and adoption of defensism, 
as well as the indicated fear of inexperience in ministerial 
governing as opposed to Kadet "expertise."
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As the Soviet Executive Committee had adjourned earlier, 
no mandate existed for the negotiations concerning state power 
into which Chkheidze, Sukhanov, Sokolov and Steklov entered with 
the Duma committeemen. In fact, they were in violation of the 
decisions made earlier that day. These men, however, apparently 
felt no strong need to have a formally authorized delegation, "nor 
was there any necessity," wrote Sukhanov, to have a meeting 
with the full membership of the executive committee. Steklov 
did take notes in order to make a report to the Soviet. In fair­
ness to these leaders, however, it must be emphasized that "Order 
No. 1" had only minutes before been approved under the strong 
pressure of the insurgent soldiery. Sukhanov expected the demand 
for the Soviet to establish a provisional revolutionary govern­
ment to mount with increasing vigor unless action was taken that 
117very night.
The negotiations between the Soviet leaders and the Duma
Committeemen over state power opened at midnight. Representing
the Soviet were Chkheidze, Steklov, Sukhanov, Sokolov, Skobelev,
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Filippovskii among others. Those representing the Temporary 
Duma Committee included thirteen or fourteen liberals and
119
left-wing monarchists, most notably Miliukov and Nekrasov.
120
Kerensky attended as a representative of both sides. After
an informal start the session took on a businesslike and "respon- 
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sible" tone. Once the Duma Committeemen realized that the 
socialists were equally aware of the danger to the revolution 
of the "reign of anarchy," they made direct proposals of mutual
6l
support, all of which Sukhanov described as desultory conversation 
obscuring the central question:
The Provisional Committee of the State Duma, which 
had taken executive power into its hands, was still 
not a government, even a "provisional" one; the 
creation of this government still lay ahead. . . . 
The Soviet . . . wished to express its relationship 
to the government being formed in the right wing, 
make clear its views on the tasks of that govern­
ment, and state demands which in the name of the 
entire democracy it was presenting to the govern­
ment created by the revolution.
The meeting turned from the question of where state power 
should reside to specific qualifications of that power. Steklov 
read the Sukhanov program which had just been adopted in the 
plenary Soviet and explained it point by point using every argu­
ment he could to sustain the socialist requirements. Many of
the "propertied" persons present, Sukhanov tells us, appeared
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uneasy and perplexed. However, "Nekrasov remained completely
serene, and on Miliukov's face it was possible even to detect
signs of deep satisfaction," for the latter had been expecting
124
some binding peace program. Miliukov, as spokesman for the
other side, replied: "The conditions of the Soviet of Workers' and
Soldiers' Deputies in general are acceptable and in general they 
may constitute the groundwork for an agreement with the committee
of the State Duma. Nevertheless there are some points to which
125
the committee definitely objects." Miliukov openly rejected 
point three of the Soviet program which concerned the future 
form of government, and he wished to limit the civil liberties
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of the soldiery. This Russian European was not really afraid,
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Sukhanov tells us, of the freedom of the army or of a Consti­
tuent Assembly so long as they were based on a constitutional monarchy. 
Miliukov knew that unless a constitutional monarchy was estab­
lished at once a de facto republic would probably come into e:cis-
127
tence; "They wanted to establish a republic at once," he wrote.
The Soviet Executive Committeemen, however, did not want to 
bind themselves to any form of government until the Constituent 
Assembly could make the decision in the name of the people.
While the Soviet had appealed to the people to struggle against 
the autocracy, none of its proclamations had called for the aboli­
tion of the monarchic principle. Chkheidze and Sokolov labelled
Miliukov's proposition utopian and absurd if he thought the
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Soviet would sanction the defense of the Romanovs. In principle
therefore, the socialists could not accept the proposal for
preservation of the monarchy, but would not deny the right of
Miliukov's group advocating such a policy independently of the
Soviet. As for the civil liberties of the soldiery, Miliukov
granted the rights of citizens to soldiers "to the limits
allowable under military and technical conditions," and he
defended the "retention of strict military discipline in the
structure and the carrying out of military service," while
introducing equality for soldiers "in civil rights." He agreed
to "not disarming and not sending out of Petrograd those troops
which had taken part in the revolutionary movement" and which had
129
just assured the victory of the revolution.
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For their part the Soviet leaders agreed to limit 
civil rights of soldiers to off-duty hours, and, according to 
Miliukov,also concurred to drop the demand for the election 
of officers. The Monarchist V. V. Shul’gin had asked the Soviet 
chairman why the socialists were so insistent on an elected 
officer corps, Chkheidze "raised his thoroughly tired eyelids, 
rolled his eyes and answered in a whisper: ’In general every­
thing has failed. . . a miracle is needed in order to save. . . 
We must try it. . .  . It cannot be any worse. . .because, I 
tell you. . . .everything has failed. . . .’" Shul’gin also 
recalled, "Miliukov was carrying on an endless argument about 
’the elected officers' corps’ . . . that there was no such 
thing in the world, and the army would disintegrate.The 
Sukhanov program, however, included no such demand. Possibly 
the Aleksandrovich-Iurenev order, issued only a few hours 
before the meeting, calling for election of officers became 
confused in Miliukov’s and Shul’gin's minds with the execu­
tive committeemen's program in much the same way as it became 
confused with the Soviet’s "Order No. 1." Sukhanov, however, 
notes that he did not see the other order until after the 
joint meeting. In any case election of officers was not 
part of the Sukhanov program nor part of the Soviet’s "Order 
No. 1." Sukhanov stated that the demands "were in the first 
place a minimum, and secondly absolutely categorical and final." 
He observed that "among the masses an inconparably broader pro­
gram was developing with every day and every hour, which the
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masses were following and would follow." The Soviet leaders
were trying to direct this movement and keep it within reasonable
limits he stated, "But if these limits were under the complicated
circumstances, to be imprudently settled, and not in accordance
with the stride of the movement, then a spontaneous explosion
would sweep them away together with all of the contemplated
governmental 'combinations.’" He concluded: "Either we could
stop this spontaneous explosion or nobody could. Real power
therefore was either ours or nobody's. Only one solution was
possible: to agree to our conditions and accept them as the
133
governmental program." Miliukov countered, "These were your
demands addressed to us. But we have our own demands of you. . .
He asked the executive committee to take immediate action to
restore law and order and establish contact between soldiers
and officers. He also requested, that a Soviet appeal inform the
public of the formation of a government with Soviet sanction
that should be recognized as legitimate by the masses and enjoy
their confidence. He suggested also that in this appeal the
Soviet request popular confidence in the officers' corps and
that the soldiery concede their recognition of the commanding 
134
staff. To Miliukov's surprise the Soviet leaders accepted
all of his demands and he openly revealed his satisfaction.
Sukhanov started to compose the proclamation to be issued by the
executive committee but found "my head was as empty as my
135
stomach," and was relieved by Sokolov. Sukhanov found 
Sokolov's draft "really disastrous," being nothing more than an
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explanation to the soldiers of the characteristics of the officers' 
corps. Worse it gave the impression that no relationship should ex­
ist between officers and men and that the former perhaps " should
136
be attacked root and branch." Miliukov certainly did not
consider Sokolov's draft acceptable and set about with Sukhanov re- 
137 138
drafting it, and getting it approved by the Sorxet leaders.
Sukhanov wrote that Miliukov "added a third (and last) para­
graph to the second paragraph that I had written, and fixed his
139
signature below mine." Miliukov's draft appealed for the
people to strive to arrest anarchy and lawlessness lest the
revolution and the people's freedom fall into ruin, and further,
that differences between the soldiery and the officer corps
be reconciled to protect the revolution from the military forces 
140
of reaction. Miliukov, at the time, was obviously elated:
"This is almost the same thing that I had told the soldiers from
the tower of the regiment barracks. And it was accepted for
141
publication in the name of the Soviet!"
The session of March 14-15 with the Soviet leaders trans­
formed the Temporary Committee of the Duma into a revolutionary 
institution. No longer could it claim to be an organization 
functioning within the legal system of the old regime. While 
attempting to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the masses of the 
Russian people by seeking the endorsement of the popularly 
supported Soviet, the Miliukov group agreed to policies that made
the government in essence -impotent and dependent on the Soviet and
142the whims of the masses.
66
Sukhanov saw this as the only course of action open to Miliukov;
He understood that without an accord with the 
Soviet no government could either arise or remain 
in existence. He understood that it was entirely 
within the power of the executive committee to give 
authority to a bourgeois regime or withhold it. He 
saw where the real strength lay, he saw in whose 
hands were the means of assuring the new government 
both the indispensible conditions for work and its 
very existence. Miliukov realized that he was 
accepting power not from the hands of the monarch 
in Tsarskoe Selo, as he had counted on doing 
throughout the preceding decade, but from the 
hands of the victorious revolutionary p e o p l e . 143
Actually both the executive committee and the temporary committee
were charting a dangerous course. The Duma Committeemen were
faced with demands by the High Command, on the one hand, and, on
the other, with the requirements of the Soviet, which represented
to them the masses of people. The executive committeemen were
similarly, however, faced with the demands of the right, the
bourgeoisie and more importantly the army, on the one hand, and,
on the other, the elemental strength of the garrison barracks
and the streets, or the stikhiia. Another three weeks had to
pass before "democratization" of the army really began to erode
the authority of the High Command and thus in the first days
the military was a very real power with which to reckon. As
for the stikhiia, Kerensky had warned at the very outset of the
revolution, on March 8, that the masses would flatten everything
144
unless their demands were satisfied. Such were the Scylla 
and Charybdis for the revolutionaries at that time.
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CHAPTER II 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET
The political and social makeup of the Petrograd Soviet partially 
reveals why that body perservered in the political ideology that it held 
and made the decisions that it did. Some features and characteristics 
of the Petrograd Soviet are immediately discernable from a survey of its 
most prominent members, but the available sources are not abundant enough 
to give a thorough-going survey of its entire composition. Records of 
general meetings do not exist; affairs of the various commissions are 
poorly preserved in the U. S. S. R. archives; and no general roll of 
deputies with an indication of party affiliation exists.^ Partially 
the state of sources is a reflection of the disorder and confusion that 
generally reigned in the Petrograd Soviet and its executive committee. 
Balloting for the Soviet plenum was chaotic and the number of members 
of that body uncertain, even to its own executive.  ̂ As Viktor Chernov 
related, "If there was one thing the Soviets did not resemble, it was 
a regular governmental institution."^
The general power structure of the Petrograd Soviet is the one 
overriding feature of the institution that must be noted from the first. 
As seen previously, the executive committee completely dominated the So­
viet plenum. With the creation of the bureau of the executive committee, 
the executive in turn was preempted. Dominating the bureau was a group
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of five Mensheviks and one Socialist Revolutionary, referred to un­
kindly by opponents and jokingly by its own members as the "Star 
Chamber." What allowed the "Star Chamber" of I. G. Tseretelli, N. S. 
Chkheidze, M. I. Skobelev, F. I. Dan, Abram Gotz (SR), and V. S.
Voitinskii to develop such a structure and thereby dominate the Pet­
rograd Soviet? An illucidation of the class and party structure of 
the capital Soviet offers some understanding for the dominant posi­
tion of the Menshevik-SR bloc leadership.
The election of the first deputies to the Petrograd Soviet large­
ly determined thereafter the makeup of its plenum. By the ground 
rules for the election soldiers were to elect one deputy from each 
conçany and workers one deputy for each 1,000 men and one from each fac­
tory with less than a thousand workers. In mid-March soldier deputies 
numbered approximately 2,000 whereas the workers had only 800 depu­
ties, a ratio of soldiers' to workers' delegates of 2.3 to 1.^ Origin­
ally the conçjanies in question were those making up the swollen re­
serve regiments of the capital, as each of these conçanies numbered a thousand 
or more soldiers.^ If only these companies of 1,000 troops each had 
elected deputies, at most this would have meant the election of 271 
deputies as the Petrograd garrison numbered approximately 271,000 men.^
Soon, however, every company, regardless of size— and most consisted 
of 150 to UOO men— sent a deputy to the Petrograd Soviet. Furthermore 
while the original appeal to elect deputies was limited to troops of 
the garrison, on March I8 the Petrograd Soviet adopted a special reso­
lution which "advised the election of candidates from units based in
the suburbs." This meant that some U66,800 troops had deputies in 
8
the Soviet. Yet this was not all. Some army units beyond, and some naval
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units within the limits of the capital took advantage of this resolution
to send representatives to the Petrograd Soviet, e.g., the Cruiser Aurora,
the 6,203 men of the Second Baltic Depot, Kronstadt, plus army units far
9
•from the capital— even some front line troops. Most of the deputies came
10
from combatant units made up of I50 to 400 men per company. In the house­
hold guards— Egerskii, Grenaderskii, Preobrazhenskii, Volynskii, and Petro-
11
gradskii regiments— the average, however, was in to 420 men per deputy.
Each reserve regiment had in the Petrograd Soviet from I5 to 36 deputies,
12
depending on the number of companies that made up the regiments. In ad­
dition, small units of command staff clerks and other service staff sent 
deputies, as did military hospitals, infirmaries, military depots, and mil­
itary service shops. From 47 non-combatant detachments 36 sent 83 deputies 
from a constituency of 6,130 persons or one deputy per I36 men. The staff 
and service personnel of I6 military academies sent 67 deputies, of which 
40 deputies came from nine of the academies having a constituency of 4,293 
persons or one deputy per IO7 men. The majority of soldiers* deputies, as
13
can be seen, came, however, from the combatant units. In June 768 soldiers' 
deputies gave their military service positions as follows; 387 privates,
58 officers, 36 military cadets, 35 clerks, 250 non-commissioned officers.
Of the total 902 deputies in the Soldiers* Section at the time, 421 came 
from 28 infantry regiments, 52 from military schools, 63 from volunteer un­
its, 22 from artillery units, 20 from three ships* companies, 27 from tech­
nical units, 8 from motorized units, 4 from the Cruiser Aurora, 5I from 
command personnel and sentries, and about 200 from command staff clerks,
military hospitals, military depots, military service or repair shops, and
14
other military installations.
As for the workers, their 800-plus deputies came from a population of 
some 380,000 blue-collar industrial workers and 120,000 white-collar employ­
ees,^^ Large and intermediate enterprises employed 97 percent of the indus-
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trial workers, leaving 11,400 or 3 percent of the blue collars working in small 
enterprises.^^ The white-collar employees included workers from the 
Petrograd railway junction, the city tram company, the municipal en­
terprises, the post office, telegraph and telephone exchange, small
artisan enterprises, trade union establishments, teachers of primary
17schools, and workers from medical foundations. A study of some 90
enterprises, comprising approximately one-sixth of all industries
in Petrograd, shows that deputies were generally chosen from these
large plants within the limits or close to the limits of standard 
18representation. To give but one example, the largest enterprise
in the capital, the Putilov iron works, sent 40 deputies from 30,000
19workers or an average of one deputy per 750 men. The following 
table illustrates the representation from 90 of Petrograd’s enter­
prises:
SOVIET DEPUTIES CHOSEN FROM 90 ENTERPRISES20
Number & Percentage of Deputies Chosen According to Following No
Workers . of
Up to 50 31-150 151-300 301-500 501-700 701-900 901-1000 
& More
Total
1 (No.) - 8 13 18 117 89 246
0.4% 3.5 5.5 7.5 47.2 35.9 100%
As the above table indicates, plants employing over 700 workers sent 
83.1 percent of the deputies elected. The six largest enterprises 
in the city: Putilov, Truboch, Obukhov, "Treugol"’, Okhten, and Bal­
tic, alone sent nearly 100 deputies to the Petrograd S o v i e t . Though 
this analysis of 90 or one-sixth of the enterprises in Petrograd can­
not be considered an exact copy of all elections to the Soviet for all
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the factories in the capital, nevertheless, the figures are a signi­
ficant indication that the majority of workers' deputies came from 
the intermediate and largest plants. An analysis of the representa­
tion of the small plants adds further proof to this thesis.
Workers in small enterprises and all other workers in any cate­
gory (excluding large plants) had a total representation of only 200 
22deputies. This largely came about because workers in small plants 
elected their deputies to the Petrograd Soviet tgr uniting a few en­
terprises so as to conform to the regulation of cane deputy per 1,000 
workers. For exangjle, on March 23 a united gathering of 1,040 in­
dustrial workers from five intermediate and small plants elected one
deputy to the Petrograd Soviet; and 640 workers from three plants and
23950 workers from two tanneries also elected one deputy. Small en­
terprise workers, as a result of such methods, had so few deputies to 
represent them in the Soviet that workers in plants numbering less than
500 were invited by the executive committee of the Petrograd Soviet
2Uto a general meeting to elect deputies, one per every 500 workers. 
Workers in domestic industry and a portion of the white-collar enploy- 
ees elected representatives to the Petrograd Soviet only after organ­
izing professional unions. Fifteen of SU such organizations sent 43 
deputies to the Petrograd Soviet.
The social composition of the constituencies from which the sol­
diers’ and workers’ deputies to the Petrograd Soviet were chosen was 
greatly colored by a large percentage of peasants. Most of the sol­
diers were raw recruits of peasant origin; undoubtedly, many of the 
workers were also peasants. In 1917 ten of the fifteen million men
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under arms were peasants, and in a country 80 to 85^ peasant in 
population this meant a large percentage of the urban working 
population was in the military service, that is, one-fourteenth 
of the peasant population was in the army, compared to one- 
seventh of the non-peasant population. The early draft calls 
greatly depleted the ranks of the urban working force and gen­
erally only peasants remained to fill positions. In the II58 
enterprises of Petrograd new workers composed over UO^ of the 
work force by 191?.^? While some white-collar types, such as 
bank clerks, made up part of the new workers, probably the 
largest percentage of new males were peasants (the number of
28women increased considerably in some industries). Regard­
less of how many new workers were peasants, the Russian workers, 
except in skilled positions in heavy industry, even before the 
war could be considered at best half-proletarian (many being 
peasants who were marginal workers living near urban centers)
Partisan politics until 1917 made little headway among the 
workers of Petrograd and scarcely had touched the peasants in 
uniform or at the bench. The SR agrarian program, however, 
quickly lured the peasant in the capital and as the SR dele­
gation swelled in numbers, partisan politics emerged in the
30Soviet plenum. The SR's could count on the support of over 
400 members in full standing (i. e. , registrants who accepted 
the party whip) and on sympathizers from among those not in­
scribed on any party roll to bring its voting strength to well 
over 1,000 members of the Soviet.This appears to have been
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more than enough votes to override any opposition the SR's faced prior 
to late July. The SR numerical nomination of the Soviet plenum oc­
curred so soon in March 1917 that some minority (numerically) parties 
accused the SR's and their allies, the Mensheviks of purposefully 
giving the soldiers and small factory wprkers electoral preference in 
the initial elections. Though on the surface such an accusation 
might seem justified, nothing was further from the truth, inasmuch 
as the small factories, as already demonstrated, were not over-rep­
resented in the Soviet plenum. As for the soldiers, according to 
the Bolshevik leader Shliapnikov, the SR's and Mensheviks initially 
opposed the admission of soldier deputies and gave in only reluc­
tantly.
The Petrograd Soviet was not split into populists versus Marx­
ists, but divided along party lines. The party alignments were 
fairly well defined, though the marxists, unlike the populists, 
split into smaller factions. The SR's fairly quickly swallowed up 
any populist opposition from the Trudoviks (Toilers) and the Pop­
ular Socialists. Joining the SR's was the Menshevik wing of the 
Social Democrats. The Bundists and Cooperativists were followers 
of the Menshevik-SR bloc. With the return of lu. Martov, the father 
of Menshevism, the Menshevik Internationalists split in late May from 
the Menshevik center and a lively quarrel began. The following of 
the Martov group, however, was so feeble numerically that it never 
offered any serious challenge to the bloc. The sister party of the 
Mensheviks, the Bolsheviks, were of course against the bloc. Their 
strength, however, until the commencement of a number of irregular
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elections in June was slight: 22 deputies as of March 22, 65 by mid-
April, 100 by mid-May. Just prior to the June reelections the Petrograd 
Soviet plenum consisted of about I5OO deputies with mandates: $02
soldiers' deputies and about 6OO workers' deputies. The party conço- 
s it ion of the Soldiers' Section was 306 SR's, 298 Mensheviks, 105 Bol­
sheviks, and 198 deputies divided among Menshevik Internationalists, 
Trudoviks, Popular Socialists, Edinstvo Social Democrats and others.
The reduction in the number of soldiers' deputies resulted partially 
from the transfer of some 50,000 Petrograd garrison troops and their 
deputies to the front during March and April. As for the Workers'
Section its party composition is not precisely known. As the Bolsheviks 
received about half of the seats in the Workers' Section in the June re- 
elections, 300 deputies at least and probably as many as 500 of the total 
of this section were Mensheviks and SR's and their syngathizers prior to 
the election (100 of these were SR's if not more as the party had 400 
registered deputies under the whip). All parties in the Petrograd Soviet 
looked upon the institution as a parliament, as a place to advance their 
party programs among the "revolutionary democracy" and articulate it
34
into the political consciousness of the masses.
As intelligentsia dominated the various socialist parties, so they 
also dominated the Petrograd Soviet. The executive committee that init­
iated the first elections were intelligentsia, as was the executive 
elected at the first plenum meeting. As late as the end of March only
35
seven of the executive committee * s k2 members were workers. New mem­
bers with deliberative votes were coopted onto the executive after the
36
initial elections, as no further elections were held until September.
By mid-April mechanical additions to the committee raised its total mem-
38bership to 90 with only 10 coming directly from the plenum.
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The executive committee added so many members that it became too 
unwieldy to handly daily affairs efficiently. The committee had created 
a number of special commissions or sections on March l6 to alleviate some 
of the pressure of day-to-day affairs: 11 departments consisting of in­
ternational affairs, labor, military, legislature, propaganda, Soviet ad­
ministration, press, local Petrograd affairs, and extra-metropolitan. Each
39
department consisted of an executive committeeman and staff. To coord­
inate the work of these departments and prepare questions for discussion 
at the Soviet’s plenary meetings, the executive created a special bureau
on March 27, congosed initially of seven members and three candidate mem- 
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bers. On April 23 Tseretelli proposed that the executive set a bureau 
to coordinate its work in much the same way as the special bureau coordi­
nated the work of the departments, Tseretelli found the executive commit­
tee too divisive and suggested that a bureau composed of homogeneous per­
sonalities might overcome this by preparing questions for discussion in 
the full committee. When the executive rejected this, Tseretelli pro­
posed two days later that all current affairs become the autonomous con-
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cem of the various departments, yet within limits defined by the executive.
He suggested that the special bureau takeover all matters of great impor- 
tance, or those requiring solution as a matter of policy. To integrate the 
work of the departments and the special bureau Tseretelli recommended that 
the executive selection representatives from the various departments to 
conpose the special bureau. While the executive retained final authority, 
questions even of national importance would not come.before the committee 
until analyzed by the special bureau. As the special bureau had members 
from all parties it also became too unwieldy to deal realistically with 
daily affairs, though chaired by Chkheidze and run by its vice-chairmen, 
Tseretelli and Chernov. Tseretelli, however, found it a more workable ap­
paratus than the 90 member executive for the operations of the homogenous
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bureau that he did form by caucasing with colleagues outside of official 
meetings— the "Star Chamber."
The "Star Chamber" was the real decision-making body in the 
Petrograd Soviet. An informal group of five Mensheviks and one 
SR met early each morning at Skobelev's apartment where the leader 
of the "Star Chamber," Tseretelli, was staying at the time. No 
records of meetings were kept nor are there any memoir accounts 
available of what was transacted. Voitinskii, a member of the 
group, reports that not only were problems discussed and how they 
were to be solved, but that the group even drew up resolutions 
and plans to be submitted to the bureau (thereby to the executive 
committee and from there to the Petrograd Soviet plenum). Each 
member of the "Star Chamber" carried out some responsibility.
Tseretelli engineered the programs and led the discussions of the 
group. Dan assisted Tseretelli at the meetings and saw to it that 
the Mensheviks stayed in line beyond Tseretelli's policies. Gotz 
kept the SR's whipped into shape for the group. Chkheidze guided 
the Petrograd Soviet plenum and its executive committee in the 
service of the chamber. Skobelev and Voitinskii acted as trouble­
shooters in the barracks, at the front, in factories, and the lat­
ter along with Dan guided the editorial policy of Izvestiia, the 
Petrograd Soviet's news organ. Dan wrote articles and declarations 
for Izvestiia explaining the Petrograd Soviet's policy in terms 
of the Menshevik party program, while Voitinskii tried to reach a 
broader audience of workers and soldiers. Thus like its English 
namesake, the "Star Chamber" wielded considerable political in­
fluence and met in secret deliberation on a great variety of subjects.
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All six members of the "Star Chamber" were closely bound to 
one another. Tseretelli, Gotz, Dan, and Voitinskii, during tsar­
ist exile in Siberia, developed an ideological union with reference 
to the First World War; a significant achievement as the war had 
split all socialist parties in Europe and as Gotz was a populist 
SR, Voitinskii at the time a Bolshevik, and only Tseretelli and 
Dan, Mensheviks. Four of the group were from the same region, 
the Caucasus; Tseretelli, Chkheidze, and Voitinskii being Georgians, 
and Skobelev a native of Baku. Tseretelli, Skobelev, and Chkheidze 
served in the Imperial State Duma.; Tseretelli being the leader of 
the Mensheviks in the Second Duma until e:d.led, and Chkheidze the 
Menshevik leader in the Third and Fourth Dumas. Union also re­
sulted from intellectual compatibility. Gotz, Chkheidze, and Sko-
46belev were willing followers of Tseretelli, while Dan and Voi­
tinskii, both intellects and leaders, found Tseretelli's ideas and 
their own usually in accord. As Trotsky noted, Gotz concerned
himself with "kitchen matters" and preferred to work behind the 
47scenes. Skobelev at 37» two years older than Tseretelli, had 
only joined the Mensheviks in 1912, having worked with Trotsky
48on the Vienna Pravda from I907 to 1912. As for Chkheidze, he 
was at 53 the oldest member of the Petrograd Soviet executive. 
Though a tireless worker in the Petrograd Soviet's behalf, the 
accidental shooting of his son shortly after the March coup so un- 
nerveihim that at times he sat in meetings completely lost in
49his thoughts, neither hearing nor seeing anything. Feodor Dan, 
next to Martov, was the most gifted of the Menshevik theoreticians
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and a grand party organizer.He, however, became Tseretelli's 
lieutenant in mapping out party strategy because the Georgian was 
the heart and the will of the Mensheviks. Voitinskii was happy to 
serve as a tactician for the Tseretelli-Dan strategies.
Tseretelli led the Petrograd Soviet because he was a brilli­
ant, beloved spokesman of the majority and a politician of the 
first order. According to V.D. Nabokov, the Kadet head of the 
Provisional Government's chancellory, Tseretelli's ideas conformed
to the usual Marxist pattern, and Nabokov adds, he expressed those
52ideas with brilliant clarity. A.F. Kerensky speaks of the Georgian
as one of the most beloved leaders of the Russian d e m o c r a c y .̂ 8
Typical of foreign contemporary opinion was that of Sir Bernard
Pares, the British dean of Russian studies, who found the tall,
lean Georgian a gentle and chivalrous man--a quality that the Soviet leader
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retained throughout the tribulations of the revolution. As for 
Tseretelli's political acumen, V.B. Stankevich who served with 
him on the executive committee of the Petrograd Soviet, tells 
us; "On the whole the history of the committee, from the point 
of view of its organization and membership, could be divided into 
two periods, one prior to and the other following the arrival 
of Tseretelli. The first was a period replete with hazards, vacil­
lations, and vagueness, when anyone who wished could use the name 
and organization of the committee. . . . With the appearance of 
Tseretelli ^April 0  the character of the committee changed rad­
ically. He joined . . . with a deliberative vote only. The 
first day he modestly declined to express his opinion since he
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was as yet unfamiliar with the general situation. The following 
day he delivered a long speech, seemingly groping for firm ground. 
. . .  On the third day Tseretelli arrived as self-confident lead­
er of the committee and the Soviet . . . the latter at once changed
from a medley of all sorts of people into an institution, into 
55an organ." Because Tseretelli was a man of integrity, convic­
tion, personal magnetism, and oratorical greatness, a man who 
"knew what he wanted, had a definite plan, believed firmly in 
it, and was able from the framework of this plan to examine and 
deal with particular issues that came up, "he was a man who com-
56manded respect even from his political enemies. In a time
of confusion when most men had a great many self-doubts, a man
like Tseretelli understandably became the leader of the Petrograd
Soviet. At 25 years of age he was the most popular speaker in
the Second Duma, the leader of the Mensheviks, and even the re-
57cognized mouthpiece of the Bolsheviks. For one so young to be 
recognized as party leader in 1907) it is little wonder that 
Tseretelli became Menshevism*s spokesman a decade later.
Beyond its own immediate members the "Star Chamber" usually 
had several other prominent Petrograd Soviet leaders at its ser­
vice. The ideological position with reference to the World War 
(Siberian Zimmerwaldism, discussed in Chapter III) that bound the 
six members of the "Star Chamber" together, was also a strong 
element binding other socialists to the six. Two Siberian Zim- 
merwaldists who regularly attended the meetings of the "Chamber" 
were V.A. Anisimov and K.M. Ermolaev. Anisimov was a member of
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the executive presidium of the Petrograd Soviet and Ehrmolaev a mem-
58her of the Menshevik Central Committee. Frequent participants at 
the meetings included Liber (Bundist), Chernov (SR leader), and the 
Siberian ZimmerwaldistsS.L. Vainstein and N.S, Rozhkov, Bog­
danov and Gvozdev (Menshevik Soviet executive committeemen), Pesh­
ekhonov (Popular Socialists leader), and Avksent'ev (SR chairman
, 60of the All-Russian Peasants' Soviet).
The "Star Chamber" quite naturally evoked some opposition as 
it broke tne cardinal Soviet position of arriving at decisions in 
free and open discussion. A group of ten members of the executive 
committee (later others joined) banded together as a sort of counter­
weight to the "Star Chamber." To mock Tseretelli’s attempt to assemble 
a bureau of like-minded executive committeemen they took the name Homogeneous
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Bureau., Like the "Star Chamber" this diverse political group met each 
day. The radical independent Social Democrat Sukhanov belonged 
despite his view that the Homogeneous Bureau was fundamentally sub­
missive to the right-wing Petrograd Soviet majority.The fact 
that Liber was a member of the Homogeneous Bureau and a frequent 
participant in the "Star Chamber" and usually followed the Tsere­
telli line would tend to give some credence to Sukhanov's opinion.
In the Petrograd Soviet Tseretelli was the "leading spirit, of 
course," wrote Sukhanov, "Consequently half of the Soviet dicta­
torship and all the corresponding honors, and all the odium— must
63be laid to his account." The numerically feeble opposition to 
the "Star Chamber" could do nothing, maintained Sukhanov, against 
pseudo-Mameluke soldier deputies and a Swamp of young unstable de-
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uties with shifting views "instinctively attracted towards peace 
and the cause of the proletariat . . . headed by the binary stars 
Chkheidze and Skobelev."^
The SR-Menshevik bloc leadership froze their control of the 
Petrograd Soviet by not sanctioning general re-elections to the 
plenum. Even the Bolsheviks, however, admitted on March 15 that 
the social and party composition of the Petrograd Soviet plenum 
with new elections would not have changed at the time, as the 
Bolsheviks were only beginning to develop their work under legal 
conditions.^^ Initially, however, re-elections were not sanctioned 
by the executive committee because no majority could be mustered 
to decide of what a mandate should consist. To reduce the stand­
ard of representation, so that a workable number of deputies of
1,000 or less would make up the Petrograd Soviet plenum, the plenum 
already in existence would have.had to sanction such a proposition. 
That meant making a good two-thirds of the 3,000 elected in March 
resign their authority, practically a hopeless business. Bogdanov 
on March 15 proposed an artificial and cumbersome way to alleviate 
the difficulty: leave the existing Soviet plenum for ceremonial,
historical sessions— "without debates but for any kind of practi­
cal work form a small Soviet out of it by allowing one delegate 
for each 2,000 citizens (soldiers and workers) and one delegate for 
each organization or union. Neither the Petrograd Soviet plenum 
nor the executive committee ever carried the question of new man­
dates or re-elections to a.conclusion until just prior to the 
November coup of the Bolsheviks. Matters were simply eased by the
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routine activities of the mandate commission, which mercilessly 
weeded out the mandates and by a month and a half later had re­
duced the Petrograd Soviet plenum by half of the 3,000 members 
66of March. Eventually the full Soviet was reduced to about
1,000 members of a result of the strict surveillance of irregu­
lar elections that began in late April with the recall of a dep- 
uty by the Putilov metal works; soon other deputies were re­
called by the same method as at Putilov.
The executive committee discussed the possibility of new
elections on May 28 and set up a commission to prepare a draft.
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order on the holding of elections. The bureau of the execu­
tive committee on June 6, however, decided that only partial
69elections and not general elections were to be held. Izvestiia 
warned the next day that "Re-elections to the Petrograd Soviet of 
Workers’ and Soldiers' Deputies reflect badly on the work of 
the Soviet;" the editors urged the electors "to be cautious" in 
their choices. The partial re-elections resulted in a consider­
able transformation of the full Petrograd Soviet. The Bolsheviks 
won about half of the seats in the Workers* Section aind more than 
a quarter in the Soldiers' Section during late May and June.?^ On 
June 13 the Workers* Section adopted a Bolshevik resolution for the 
first time demanding the transfer of all power to the Soviets.
The SR-Menshevik bloc, however, continued to control the full Soviet 
through the Soldiers* Section and the substantial number of deputies 
under its whip in the Workers* Section, and by refusing to put exe­
cutive re-elections on the agenda.
The SR-Menshevik bloc also attempted to retain control 
of the Petrograd Soviet through the district soviets of the 
capital. In April the bloc briefly attempted to transform 
the thirteen district soviets of Petrograd into local bases 
for the implementation of their decisions. The Petrograd 
Soviet created an Interdistrict Conference of Soviets in 
April to co-ordinate the activities of the various city dis­
trict soviets and align them much more closely to the city
72Soviet, Two representatives from each district soviet
were coopted onto the executive committee of the capital
Soviet. V.A. Anisimov, a regular participant of the "Star
Chamber," was made chairman of the Interdistrict Conference
of Soviets and sought to move the district soviets along the
73lines decided by the "Star Chamber." A number of economic 
questions were discussed in May by the interdistrict confer­
ence but its meetings were suspended in June at the time of 
the All-Russian Congress of Soviets and not reconvened until 
the July days led the city Soviet to call for assistance from 
the district soviets to collect arms from the workers. The 
districts in July refused to follow the directives of the city 
soviet and became increasingly rebellious thereafter. The Men- 
shevik-SR bloc leaders, however, had already dropped the idea
of building on the districts and from June on had concentrated
7htheir efforts on the All-Russian Congress of Soviets.
The Menshevik-SR leaders solidifie^ their control of the
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Petrograd Soviet in the All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' 
and Soldiers' Deputies. On March 31 the Petrograd Soviet executive 
committee issued an appeal to all local soviets throughout the na-
75tion to send representatives to Petrograd for a congress of soviets.
Approximately 600 delegates arrived in the capital, 470 of them with
76mandates, from 120 cities and towns. The All-Russian Cossack Con­
gress sent 11 delegates, each army sent eight deputies, and each
soviet sent two delegates (one each from the soldiers' and workers'
77sections). A great many local soviets, for some reason or another,
78did not send representatives. As a result, the committee organ­
izing the congress decided to consider the March congress not a 
plenipotentiary Congress of Soviets, but a preliminary All-Russian 
Conference which would prepare for the Congress. The All-Russian 
Conference between April 11 and l6 discussed the war, the forth­
coming Constituent Assembly, workers' and soldiers' problems, or­
ganization of local soviets and regional associations, but most im­
portantly it established the guidelines for the convocation of the 
Congress. The following rates of representation was established: 
soviets elected by between 25,000 and 50,000 people were to send two 
delegates; 50-75,000, three delegates; 75-100,000, four delegates;
100.150.000, five delegates; 150-200,000, six delegates; and over
200.000, eight delegates. Soviets representing less than 25,000
people were to unite with other soviets and send delegates according
79to the general rates.
In order to unite the Soviets throughout the country and to 
establish permanent contacts between them, the All-Russian Conference
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recommended the calling of regional congresses of soviets and the 
election of regional committees. The delegates to such congresses 
were to be elected from all the Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ 
Deputies in a given region. The Conference urged that the regional 
associations of Soviets include representatives of the organized 
working peasants. *
The leadership of the Petrograd Soviet wrote instructions on 
the procedure to be followed in calling regional congresses of 
soviets and the setting up of regional associations of soviets.
The Petrograd Soviet guidelines called for dividing the country 
up into thirteen regions. These regional congresses and district 
associations were to link the All-Russian organization with the
80local soviets.
The Menshevik-SR leaders concentrated their efforts on seeing 
to it that they controlled the executive committee of the All-Russian 
Congress that was to meet in June. Through the executive of the 
All-Russian organization they could control all the soviets in the 
country, they felt, or at least set up guidelines for national pol­
icies. Once more the hand of the "Star Chamber" went to work, as 
a frequent participant of that body’s sessions, Bogdanov, was given 
the work of organizing the All-Russian Congress of Soviets.
The "Star Chamber" gained control of the Congress, thereby 
buttressing their control over the Petrograd Soviet. As in the 
Petrograd Soviet, the number of soldiers' deputies was almost double 
the number of peasants' (not in uniform) and workers’ deputies com­
bined, as some two-thirds of the 20,323,000 persons that took part
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in the Soviet Congress elections were soldiers. As in the capital
Soviet, the breakdown of votes by party shows that the Menshevik-
SR bloc had a large majority, the opposition never exceeding l60
votes on any issue during the course of the congress; SR*s 285,
Mensheviks 248, Menshevik Internationalists 32, Bolsheviks 105,
Unaffiliated Socialists 73, Interdistrictites 10, Bund 10, Edin-
stvo Social Democrats 3, Popular Socialists 3, Trudoviks 5, An-
82
archist-Communists 1. Though the All-Russian Central Executive 
Committee (VsTsIK) emerged from the congress plenum,only half of 
its 300 members were elected by vote of the Congress. One hundred 
more were elected by provincial soviets, and the executive committ­
ee of the Petrograd Soviet designated the last fifty. Furthermore, 
provincial soviets members returned to their homes after the termi­
nation of the Congress and functioned there as the designated rep­
resentatives of VsTsIK. The remaining two hundred VsTsIK members 
constituted the permanent headquarters in Petrograd. As with the 
Petrograd Soviet executive, VsTsIK eventually created a permanent 
bureau which in turn chose a smaller board of directors presided 
over by the Petrograd Soviet chairman Chkheidze. The board was 
responsible for the overall direction of the work of the All-Russian 
Soviet. As elections to VsTsIK were on the basis of proportional 
representation, so that all of the socialist parties were represented 
in proportion to their numerical strength in the Congress, the Men­
shevik-SR bloc held the majority of the seats. The Social Democrat 
Sukhanov noted another reason for "Star Chamber" control: "The
Central Executive Committee membership included, of course, both
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Kerensky and Lenin. But they never came once. In general a good 
half was made up of dead souls, who scarcely ever appeared in the 
Soviet c e n t e r . A s  with the Petrograd Soviet, the Menshevik-SR 
high command set up a control, in the case of the Central Execu­
tive Committee, a board of directors, but in fact, the real govern­
ing and decision-making body was the "Star Chamber" under the command 
of l.G. Tseretelli. As an interesting bit of double-talk, the Con­
gress voted to establish the principle that the socialist ministers 
were responsible to VsTslK for their actions, when in fact the con­
trolling forces of VsTsIK were these same socialist ministers.
From the time Tseretelli returned to the capital from exile on 
April 2 until Trotsky became chairman of the Petrograd Soviet in 
September, Tseretelli charted the policies and decisions of the cap­
ital Soviet. Behind all of Tseretelli's actions lay his unshakable 
belief in the cause of revolutionary defensism which called for a 
body and soul commitment to a diplomatic quest for peace.
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CHAPTER III
FURY OVER WAR; A PYRRHIC VICTORY FOR REVOLUTIONARY DEFENSISM
By March 1917 every facet of Russian society had voiced a position 
on the war. Overwhelmed with the task of consumâtIng the revolution, 
however, neither the Petrograd Soviet nor the Provisional Government 
mentioned war or peace In their Initial programs. What type of war 
effort therefore was the new Russia going to conduct? Paul N. Miliu­
kov, the new Foreign Minister, and the Russian General Staff had long 
advocated a war to a victorious end. The Initial reaction of the 
majority of Russian socialists was to liquidate the war at once through 
the concerted efforts of International socialism. The struggle, how­
ever, was for a universal, not a separate peace. As lu. Martov, the 
father of Menshevlsm explained, "A separate peace would only be the 
overture to a continuation of the war, but on the side of the Central 
Powers. Separate peace thus being a mere fiction, I reject It and 
commit myself to general peace." From 191^ Lenin alone of Russian soci­
alists advocated the transformation of the war Into a civil war so 
that the Russian and German peoples could come to a separate peace 
over the graves of their belligerent governments. Yet how did the 
socialist majority propose to achieve universal peace particularly 
In the face of Miliukov’s pro-war stand. Until the return of Tseretelli 
and his Siberian Zlmmerwaldian cohorts, the Petrograd Soviet had no
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definite program of action. Tseretelli's program of "revolutionary 
defensism," advocating defense of the revolution while liquidating 
the war, clashed sharply with the pro-war factions. The portent was
perhaps civil war unless these groups moderated their differences.
As the Petrograd Soviet leaders had made no foreign policy de­
mands of the new government at the time of its formation, Miliukov 
seized the first opportunity to assert his own position. Many of the 
men who made up the Provisional Government had opposed the regime of 
Tsar Nicholas II for its ineffectiveness'in prosecuting the war. Even 
Kerensky had not opposed a war fought for national defense. Therefore 
on March 17, three days after the Provisional Government took office, 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, with the consent of his ministerial 
colleagues, dispatched a foreign policy statement to Russia's allies.
In addition to announcing the formation of the new government, the note 
reaffirmed existing treaties and vowed to fight the war to a victorious 
end:
In the domain of foreign policy, the cabinet . . . 
will remain mindful of the international engagements 
entered into by the fallen regime, and will honor 
Russia's word . . . .
Faithful to the pact which units her indissolubly to 
her glorious Allies, Russia is resolved, like them to 
assure . . .  an era of peace among nations . . . .
The Government . . . will devote all its energy to 
bring the war to a victorious conclusion, and will 
apply itself to the task of repairing as quickly as 
possible the errors of the past, which have hitherto 
paralyzed the aspirations gnd the self sacriface of 
the Russian people . . . .
Miliukov assumed that the ostensible bungling of the war effort by the 
tsarist regime was the root cause of patriotic Russians not supporting
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the war. He then carried his logic a step further and expounded the 
theory that the revolution was primarily a protest against the slack-
3ness of the Imperial Government in conducting the war. The liberal 
Baron B. E. Nol'de, legal adviser to the Provisional Government, in­
terpreted such a hypothesis as "one of the most naive self-deceptions 
of this epoch, rich in all kinds of fictions."^
The "war to a victorious conclusion," however, was for Miliukov 
also a war of imperialistic annexations. On March 20 the Foreign 
Minister revealed the government’s foreign policy objectives to the 
Russian nation and emphasized: "The Government will observe sacredly
the alliances which bind us to the other powers, and will unswervingly 
carry out the agreements entered into by the Allies . . . For Miliu­
kov this meant realizing Russia's share of the spoils at the war's end.
He did not want the Allied agreement of 1915 to become a mere "scrap 
of paper" at the conclusion of hostilities and therefore renewed the 
efforts of his predecessor to press the General Staff to undertake an 
expedition against Constantinople. As the operation required 200,000 
to 250,000 men. General M. V. Alekseev, the chief of staff, labelled
it inopportune as long as the military situation along Russia's 1100
6
mile front remained insecure. On March 23rd Miliukov called for Russian 
possession of the Turkish Straits and remarked that their neutralization 
was "even less acceptable" to Russia than if the Turks continued to con­
trol them. He declared that Russia was fighting to unite the Ukrainian 
people of the Austro-Hungarian Empire with the Russian Ukraine and to 
obtain Constantinople and the Straits.^
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Though Miliukov's Imperialism was anathema to the socialists, the 
Petrograd Soviet, because of Its numbers and diversity of socialist 
opinion, was slow to formulate a united response. However, as early as 
March 16, the day before Miliukov's first dispatch to the Allies, N. S. 
Chkheidze and N. N. Sukhanov of the executive committee, discussed the 
issuance of an appeal to European socialist parties and workers to
g
join together and force a general peace on the belligerent governments.
The appearance of Miliukov's March 20th statement provoked Sukhanov
Into writing a strong and forceful rebuttal to the Foreign Minister's
9views. Though written for Immediate Issue In Izvestiia, the executive 
committee altered it slightly and presented it to the Petrograd Soviet 
plenum for debate!"̂  Chkheidze, fearing that the still patriotic Soldiers' 
Section might vote down the manifesto, ençhasized fighting for peace 
during the discussion. He noted:
We will not put down our rifles. We propose to the Ger­
mans to overthrow Wilhelm II as we overthrew the autocra­
cy. If the Germans do not heed us, we will fight for our
freedom to the last drop of our blood. We make these pro­
posals arm In hand. We are not tired and we are not plead­
ing for peace. The slogan of our proposals Is: DOWN WITH
WILHELM! 11
Though Sukhanov heatedly accused Chkheidze of making an erroneous inter­
pretation of the proposed Soviet manifesto, the soldiers nevertheless 
voted reluctantly for the declaration. The manifesto of March 27, a 
"Call to the Peoples of the World," reflects the fervor and faith of 
the Russian socialists during the first weeks that the revolution could 
conquer the war:
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. . . The Russian people now possess full political liberty. 
They can now assert their mighty power in the internal gov­
ernment of the country and in its foreign policy. And, ap­
pealing to all people who are being destroyed by the monstrous 
war, we announce that the time has come to start a decisive 
struggle against the grasping ambitions of the people to take 
the decisions on the question of war and peace into their own 
hands. Conscious of its revolutionary power, the Russian 
Democracy announces that it will, by every means, resist the 
policy of conquest of its ruling classes; and it calls upon 
the peoples of Europe for a concerted, decisive action in 
favor of peace . . . .
Toilers of all countries: we hold out to you the hand of
brotherhood across the mountains of our brothers' corpses, 
across the rivers of innocent blood and tears, over the 
smoking ruins of cities and villages, over the wreckage of 
the treasures of civilization. We appeal to you for the 
reestablishment and strengthening of international unity.
In it is the pledge of our future victories and the complete 
liberation of humanity.
12PROLETARIANS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!
On March 31 the Petrograd Soviet, in response to non-socialist 
organs that found the manifesto deplorable but not in basic conflict 
with Miliukov's position, published a blistering editorial in Izvestiia 
attacking the slogan, 'Var to the Victorious End." It emphasized that 
the capitalists who dominated all belligerent governments had imperial­
istic aims. That such were the motives of the Central Powers was beyond 
doubt. The desires of the Russian imperialists, however, to have Con­
stantinople, of British imperialists to have Mesopotamia, of French 
imperialists to have Syria, were no less deplorable. The editorial 
concluded by reaffirming the principles laid down in the Zimmerwald and 
Klenthal manifestos of 1915 and 1916 calling for the cessation of hos­
tilities on the basis of no annexations and no indemnities. The soci­
alists emphasized that the very real differences between the bourgeoisie
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and themselves "could never be obscured by the poisonous fog of chau­
vinism."^^
The breach between the Petrograd Soviet and the Provisional 
Government over the war derived from a deep socialist theoretical 
commitment. Russian socialists, whether populist or marxian, all 
accepted as irrefutable truth Marx's position that war is the inevit­
able attribute of the capitalist system. The majority regarded the 
manifesto of the Zimmerwald Socialist Conference, written by Leon 
Trotsky, as a testament of faith. For them the World War was a log­
ical outcome of the imperialist system by which the exploiters of 
all lands attempted to "foster their greed for profit by the exploi­
tation of human labor and of the natural resources of the entire 
world." They believed that the leaders of the various socialist par­
ties throughout Europe had betrayed the working class by suspending 
the class struggle for the duration of the war. They were certain 
that the socialist who voted war credits to their national governments 
to carry on the war and who had even participated in these governments 
had actually accepted responsibility for the war. If these socialist 
leaders had refused to cooperate with the imperialists and had not 
forsaken the international solidarity of the working class, the war 
would not have followed.
While Russian socialists generally agreed on the cause of the war, 
they differed in their attitudes toward its liquidation. Viktor Cher­
nov, the Zimmerwaldist leader and ideologue of the Socialist Revolu­
tionary party, found four tendencies among Russian socialists;
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1. To end the war immediately, regardless of cost. Even
a bad peace would be better than continuing a war which 
could only aggravate national hatreds, contribute to 
the mass destruction of human life and property, and 
lessen moral sense and decency.
2. To make internal sabotage and to destroy the military 
organizations of the state. This was dictated by the 
desire to defeat one's own government which was assumed 
to be worse than the external enemy. To change the im­
perialist war into a civil war.
3. To accept the war completely so that the threatened 
national interests could be protected. To generate a 
united war effort and to postpone all factional and 
party strife and the solution of all social issues 
until the end of the war.
4. To produce an internal revolution during the war in 
order to change the character of the war. To give the 
war new revolutionary aims in place of the old conser­
vative, imperialistic aims.14
These differences in attitudes toward the war often crossed party lines.
The Leninists alone were completely homogeneous in their attitude toward 
the war, advocating the second tendency on Chernov's list, and then only 
after the arrival of their leader in Petrograd.
The view toward the war, however, that triumphed in the Petrograd 
Soviet and in Russia before November was the fourth tendency on Cheimov's 
list, that of the Siberian Zimmerwaldists. A few months after the out­
set of the First World War, a small band of tsarist political exiles 
living in Siberia formulated under Tseretelli's guidance a unified 
position on the armed conflict. As Zimmerwaldists, the Siberians stood 
for a general peace and for the reestablishment of the Second International 
as essential steps toward the restoration and preservation of peace. The 
task therefore was to reunite the various factions of the socialist move-
m
ment. The Siberians maintained that Russia’s unilateral withdrawal 
from the war would achieve nothing. Tseretelli accepted the posi-
V
tion of August Bebel, the German socialist leader, that a just de­
fense was possible, but Belgium alone, Tseretelli noted in 1^14,
"is conducting a defensive war."^^ He staaçed ultrapatriotic de­
fensism as wrong but considered accomodation with moderate defensism 
possible. The theme of a just defense, however, became largely 
overshadowed by the Siberians’ strong antiwar position. They did 
not sufficiently elaborate precisely what they meant by a just 
defense, yet as long as the Siberians did not overly emphasize 
this last element in 1917 5 their style of Zimmerwaldism provided 
the basis on which most Russian socialist could unite. That is, 
they agreed to strive for peace while defending the revolution 
against the German imperialists: revolutionary defensism.
Revolutionary defensism was also the basis on which most socialists 
and non-socialists could come to some accord, yet it had to triunph in 
the Petrograd Soviet before such a con^romise was possible. On April 3j 
1917 the executive committee debated the questions of war and peace. 
Sukhanov opened the session with an attack on Chkheidze’s interpretation 
of the Soviet’s declaration of March 27, labelling the view a capitu­
lation before Miliukov. Noting the prevalence of propaganda for war to 
a victorious end, he called for the mobilization of all proletarians and 
soldiers into a Soviet sponsored peace canpaign which would absolutely 
refuse to follow the tsarist militsiry program. Miliukov, he said, had
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coopted the tsarist policy and the Soviet had to force the Provisional 
Government to make an overt announcement, together with the Allies, of 
a peace proposal on the basis of no annexations or indemnities. Sukhanov 
insisted that to follow Miliukov's policy would result in war without 
end, hunger, and catastrophe. On the other hand, to follow a policy of 
immediate peace would not weaken the morale of the troops or sabotage 
the defense of the revolution. These peace proposals, put forward by 
the Petrograd Soviet, would "purify the war of the stain of imperial­
ism." To call upon the German, and Austrian socialists to renounce 
their socialist-patriotic policies while at the same time practicing 
defensism at home in Russia was useless. If the enemy rejected the 
peace proposals of the Petrograd Soviet, the army would know "that 
it was really spilling its blood for the revolution and for freedom.
His speech attempted to show that the Petrograd Soviet faced a contra­
dictory position: defense and peace. For Sukhanov the way out of this
dilemma was to have an exclusive commitment to peace.
Apparently for Sukhanov, defense, like law and order, would some­
how be taken care of without the Petrograd Soviet's aid. His proposed 
campaign for immediate peace in the army and among the working class 
would have meant the destruction of the government, yet Sukhanov de­
sired neither its overthrow nor any change in the existing relationship 
with it. Many of Sukhanov's associates shared these misconceptions.
They sincerely believed that the German proletariat would accept the 
proposals and, together with the other proletarians of Europe, would
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force their respective governments to make universal peace. lu. Larin, a 
Menshevik Internationalist, even suggested that peace was possible by
simply telegraphing this demand of the Russian Revolution to the bellig-
 ̂ 18 erents.
Tseretelli changed the emphasis of the whole debate from peace to 
defense. "His beautiful voice rang out like a bell and the blue veins 
across his forehead showed plainly," as he reproached Sukhanov. In 
his maiden address in the executive committee, he attacked Sukhanov's 
proposals because they had not mentioned defense against the enemy, 
support for the army, discipline and fitness for battle, or working for 
defense on the home front. Indeed, Sukhanov's resolution amounted to 
the virtual exclusion of national defense from the slogans of the revo­
lution. To Tseretelli's consternation defensists in the executive com­
mittee seized upon his remarks to emphasize that any struggle in Russia 
for peace was unpatriotic, dangerous to the front, and useless to all 
save Imperial Germany. The German Social Democrats, they noted, were 
not conducting a campaign for peace, but were vigorously defending the 
despot, Wilhelm II. News of a German attack at Stokhod, inflicting 
heavy casualties on the Russian positions, appeared to justify the worst 
fears of the defensists, momentarily silencing any rebuttal.
The next day, April 4, the Petrograd Soviet leaders reached a com­
promise in order to stand united against Miliukov. Tseretelli determined 
that peace receive equal emphasis with defense, worked out a single res­
olution which with minor changes an overwhelming majority of the execu­
tive committee approved. In response to a Bolshevik demand for some
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steps in the peace campaign, the executive passed a Tseretelli
proposition that the contact commission request the Provisional
Government to issue an official statement renouncing any intentions
19of seeking annexations or indemnities at the war's end. *.
From Swiss exile lu. Martov, leader of Menshevik Internationalism, sent 
an alternative to Tseretelli's revolutionary defensism and Lenin's 
separate peace propositions. He proposed that the Petrograd Soviet 
demand that the Allies begin negotiations at once for a universal 
peace and that if they rejected the ultimatum Russia should break 
with them and wage a separate war in case of German attack. Martov 
did not agree with Tseretelli that such an action would result in 
a separate peace- As a minimum, Russia would prove at home and abroad 
that she had no interest in either German or Allied imperialism and 
would regain her freedom of action, having disentangled herself from 
Allied obligations. The worst result would be a separate war, not a 
separate peace,should the Germans launch an offensive to take advantage 
of Russia's isolation. Martov found Tseretelli's revolutionary defens­
ism based on the weak instrument of persuasion, utilizing only diplo­
matic and political pressure that had failed to halt the war in the 
first place. As for Lenin's program, peace did not have to wait 
until after a social revolution (civil war) had liquidated capitalism 
and imperialism in Europe. Furthermore, Lenin's separate peace with 
the German people depended on the slight hope of civil war breaking 
out and destroying Kaiserdom. Russia needed more than mere persuasion 
and chance to end the war and only a real ultimatum would achieve any­
thing. For Martov, "either the revolution will kill the war or the war 
will kill the revolution.""
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Martov's proposition was probably unrealistic. Even had it 
triumphed in the Petrograd Soviet prior to the adoption of Tsere­
telli's revolutionary defensism, trying to force it on the govern­
ment probably would have led to civil war; a real possibility as reveal­
ed by the consequences of Tseretelli*s attempt to implement the more cautious 
policy of revolutionary defensism. Without the support of a major­
ity of Russian society an ultimatum to the Allies would have carried 
no force. The ultimatum itself was a faulty concept. Even if the 
Allies agreed to open negotiations for a universal peace, armistice 
was possible only if the Germans agreed. As Martov's proposition 
attracted virtually no attention at all, clearly mo hope existed for 
its success.
On April 6 the Petrograd Soviet opened its offensive against 
Miliukov's war policy in a meeting between the government and the 
Soviet's contact commission. Tseretelli stated as diplomatically as 
possible that the plight of the army and of the rear and the disaf­
fection and apathy of the soldiers and workers resulted from the war 
policy of the Provisional Government. The govermaent had to renounce 
all war aims except defense of the fatherland. Soch a statement would 
allow the Soviet to mobilize the soldiers and the workers in an all 
out effort to defend the country and the revolution. Prime Minister 
L'vov asked how the Soviet leaders could speak of the government's 
aggressive tendencies or its imperialistic designs: "Isn't a large
area of our country occupied by the Germans? Do the Soviet delegates 
know exactly what they want?" The commission, however, insisted the
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government declare that Russia's only war aim was defense of the father­
land against external aggression. Miliukov refused, but Finance Min­
ister M. I. Tereshchenko responded that such a document was possible.
The "Left seven" now emerged in the cabinet apparently finding grounds 
on which to achieve a compromise with the Soviet leaders.
Two days later, on April 8, the Provisional Government invited 
the contact commission to the Mariinski Palace, stating that the cab­
inet had now met the Soviet's request for a statement on war aims. It 
read in part:
. . . The defense of our inheritance by every means, 
and the liberation of our country from the invading enemy, 
constitute the foremost and most urgent task of our fighters, 
defending the nation's liberty.
Leaving to the will of the people, in close union with our 
Allies, the solution of all problems connected with the 
World War and its conclusion, the Provisional Government 
considers it to be its right and duty to declare at this 
time that the purpose of Free Russia is not domination over 
other nations, or seizure of their national possessions, 
but the establishment of a firm peace on the basis of self- 
determination of peoples. The Russian people does not intend 
to increase its world power at the expense of other nations.
It has no desire to enslave or downgrade any one. In the 
name of the loftiest principles of justice, it has removed 
the shackles from the Polish people. But the Russian people 
will not permit their fatherland to emerge from this great 
struggle humiliated and sapped of its vital forces.
These principles will be made the basis of the foreign policy 
of the Provisional Government, which is unswervingly executing 
the will of the people and defending the rights of our father­
land, fully observing, at the same time, all obligations as­
sumed toward our Allies.21
This declaration was sheer double-talk and did not satisfy the Zimmer­
waldists in the Petrograd Soviet. Addressed onty to "The Citizens of
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Russia," not Russia's Allies, it renounced any desires for annexation, 
yet by implication at least, managed to retain phrases which in no way 
narrowed the meaning of Miliukov's original note of March 18. Tsere­
telli noted that the document made no direct allusion to the renunci­
ation of annexations of foreign territories, and that it reaffirmed 
existing treaties. Thus, it ought to have included a statement on the 
revision of these treaties together with a corresponding communicating 
to the Allies. Miliukov's response was that he had "in mind some such 
address to the Allies concerning a revision of treaties. Just now I
consider the moment unfavorable, but I see no obstacle to taking such 
22a step shortly."
When the executive committee refused to accept the Provisional 
Government's declaration in its original form, the government promptly 
produced a revised version. To the passage stating that "the purpose 
of free Russia is not domination over other nations, or seizure of their 
national possessions" was added the phrase "or forcible occupation of 
foreign territories." The vast majority of the executive committee 
accepted this version and on the surface it seemed to bring the Petro­
grad Soviet, the Provisional Government and the General Staff together; 
the Soviet calling for revolutionary defensism; the Provisional Govern­
ment seemingly willing to go along with this concept in their proclama­
tion; and the Supreme Commander determined to keep the Russian armies 
on the defensive until he believed them capable of mounting an offensive.
Tseretelli on April 10 at the All-Russian Conference of Soviets 
called on the government to use its influence to impose the Soviet 
peace program on the Allied powers. The Georgian Menshevik thus
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T3iis conference adopted Tseretelli*s position in a resolution 
that praised the modified declaration of the Provisional Govern­
ment on war aims and then added:
. . . The Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers* Deputies will 
support with energy all the efforts of the Provisional Gov­
ernment along this line. They call on all peoples, both 
Allied and enemy, to bring pressure on their governments 
to renounce their plans of conquest. In addition to this, 
each nation, in both coalitions, should .insist that its gov­
ernment persuade its Allies to make a general renunciation of 
annexations and indemnities . . . .
Russia's revolutionary people will continue to do its best 
to bring about peace on the basis of brotherhood and the 
equality of free nations, as soon as possible. An official 
renunciation of all ideas of conquest by all of the govern­
ments would be a most powerful means to bring the war to an 
end on these terms.
While the resolution appealed to the workers, peasants, and soldiers
24of Russia to defend the nation as long as war continued, the Soviet 
now not only insisted that the Russian government renounce its own 
annexationist ambitions, but required the government to persuade the 
Allied governments to do the same. This objective became the key 
element in the Petrograd Soviet's foreign policy program down to the 
Bolshevik coup. This resolution also made it plain that the Soviet 
leaders were intent on dispatching the Provisional Government's de­
claration of March 27 to the Allied governments; they would not have 
it restricted simply to the Russian nation. While the Soviet's for­
eign policy goals slowly took shape, Miliukov in no way altered his 
own position.
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As soon as the All-Russian Soviet Conference ended, the Petrograd 
Soviet dispatched delegates to the All-Russian Congress of the Fronts 
at Minsk in order to consolidate its position on peace with the soldiers. 
To their delight, Chkheidze, Tseretelli, Gvozdev, and Skobelev found the 
soldiers generally in accord with the Petrograd Soviet's peace efforts. 
The troops asked Tseretelli if the Provisional Government had made an 
effort to bring about peace? Had the Allied governments or Germany re­
sponded to the Petrograd Soviet's call for a general peace? Could Rus­
sia make a separate peace with Germany? Tseretelli told the assembled 
soldiers' delegates what the Provisional Government and the Soviet had 
done to put the question of peace before the Allies and Germany. Al­
though he could report no favorable response to these proposals, the 
soldier-delegates reportedly accepted the Petrograd Soviet's position 
that while the war continued, the army had to maintain its fighting 
capacity and that a separate peace with Germany was out of the question. 
While radical leftists remained silent, rightwing elements demanded:
"What law gives us the right to compel other nations— England, France, 
and Germany— to bow to the will of a small band of Russian workers and 
soldiers?" Tseretelli retorted that "the call for a general peace 
proceeded not from "a small band of Russian workers and soldiers' but 
from all revolutionary Russia, which was striving to awaken a frater­
nal response in the peoples of all other belligerent countries." That 
the rightwing could even express such sentiments was an indication that 
anything less than revolutionary defensism would probably have aroused
considerable resistance from a majority of the soldier-delegates. Clearly
25the defeatists were an insignificant segment.
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The Petrograd Soviet not only garnered mass support in its strug­
gle for revolutionary defensism but also the talents of returning ex­
iled socialist leaders. In particular, the SR leader Viktor Chernov, 
one of the most important returning exiles, moved the Soviet for­
eign policy program forward. He reported that in Western Europe the 
Petrograd Soviet's campaign for a democratic peace had made a tre­
mendous impression, but declarations of the Foreign Minister had cre­
ated the impression that the Provisional Government was out of step 
with the "revolutionary democracy." Chernov suggested that the dep­
uties urge the Provisional Government to send the Soviet's "Declaration 
on the Aims of the War" to the Allies as a diplomatic note. As this 
idea accorded with the frequently expressed views of the men on the
executive committee, its members decided to raise the question at the
26next session between the contact commission and the ministers.
Chernov made use of every forum to attack Miliukov's policy.
In the press Chernov used Professor Miliukov's own writings to lash 
"Miliukpvi-Dardanelskii," "Miliukov the Conqueror" into submission. Not only 
should Miliukov resign, but the "Augean Stables" of the Foreign 
Ministry and its envoys should be cleaned out. At the April 24th 
meeting between the commission and the government Chernov raised the 
issue of sending the Soviet's April 9th declaration to the Allies.
He had already learned that Prime Minister L'vov had no ob­
jections to sending the declaration as a diplomatic note. Miliukov, 
however, maintained that the note would only increase apprehensions 
in Paris, London, and Washington that Russia was about to conclude a
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separate peace. Skobelev and Tseretelli countered that more important
apprehensions existed at home and recounted the intense interest of the
soldiers at the Congress of Fronts on the peace question. A majority
of Miliukov's colleagues in the cabinet now disagreed with him and the
Foreign Minister finally consented to sending the note. However, he
attached a proviso, to which no one paid any attention at the time, that
he would send a covering note of his own along with copies of the "De-
27claration of the Aims of the War."
If Miliukov intended to procrastinate in sending the note, Ker­
ensky made this impossible. In violation of an understanding among the 
ministers on non-disclosure, Kerensky revealed to a reporter that the 
Provisional Government was considering the transmission of a note on 
war aims to the Allies. The news report suggested that such a note 
had already been drafted. Kerensky claimed that he was a victim of 
careless reporting. Guilty or innocent Kerensky's April 27 repudiation of 
the story, which noted that "The government has not discussed and is not 
preparing any note on the question of war aims," was equally provocative 
and hardly Innocent. Public clamor for the dispatch of such a note Increased 
dramatically, especially as the Foreign Minister talked frankly of ac­
quiring Constantinople and on April 26 told the Manchester Guardian 
correspondent that Russia "must insist on the right to close the Straits 
to foreign warships and this is not possible unless she possesses the 
Straits and fortifies them." On April 28 Delo naroda, the SR organ, 
repeated its demand of April 24 that the government communicate the 
Soviet's April 9th declaration to the Allies and singled out Miliukov 
alone as standing in the way of compliance, not the government as a whole.
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The response of the executive committee was decisive: It would with­
hold endorsement of the government's Liberty Loan until Miliukov dls- 
28atched the note.
On May 1 Mullukov fulfilled the letter but not the spirit of the 
agreement between the government and the Soviet. He transmitted the 
April 9th declaration but In his covering note to the Allies he com­
pletely negated the Soviet's Intent of no annexations. He spoke of 
"the victorious completion of the present war In full accord with our 
Allies," reiterated "Russia's duty to abide by the agreements assumed 
toward the Allies," and stated that "the progressive democracies of 
the world would find a way to establish the guarantees and sanctions 
necessary to prevent new bloody conflicts In the future." While the
ministers saw Miliukov's covering letter as perfectly acceptable
29(Kerensky quibbled a little). It stunned the Soviet leaders. '.'If 
Miliukov had consciously striven to cause a rift between the Soviets 
and the Government," complained Tseretelli, "he could not have used a 
better method than this document." To the Soviet leaders, these key 
phrases were simply a restatement of Miliukov's original Ideas on 
foreign policy, and they regarded the note as an outright provocation. 
Chkheidze remarked: "Miliukov Is the evil genius of the revolution."
The Foreign Minister had even dispatched the note on May 1, the Inter­
national labor holiday— a calculated mockery the socialists believed.
As news of Miliukov's note spread through the Taurlde Palace, the 
Initial response was to take violent action. The Interdlstrlctlte 
lurenev called upon the Soviet to answer Miliukov's provocation by an 
appeal for mass protest. Bogdanov, a Menshevik defenslst, usually
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calm and restrained, was beside himself with rage and endorsed the 
proposition for an appeal to the populace. The Bolshevik leader, 
Shliapnikov, called for the commencement of class warefare. Stanke- 
vich and Bramson admonished the Soviet not to gamble the fate of the 
revolution on the tactlessness of a single minister. Kamenev, more 
restrained than his fellow-Bolshevik Shliapnikov, asked the executive 
committee if it needed further proof of the correctness of the Bol­
shevik contention that a bourgeois government must inevitably follow 
an imperialistic program. Tseretelli assured the executive committee 
that Miliukov's note violated all aspects of the accord between the 
contact commission and the Provisional Government. He urged caution 
because an appeal to the masses might well result in anarchy, violence,
and civil war. By a majority vote he received the committee's author-
31ization to reopen negotiations with the ministers.
On May 3, before negotiations could recommence, news reached the 
Soviet of alarming developments among the populace. The Finland reg­
iment, led by the philosopher-mathematician F. F. Linde, a former 
executive committeeman, marched out of its barracks under arms and 
moved toward the Mariinskii Palace. Following them were the 180th 
Rifle regiment, the Moscow regiment, and units of the Klexholm and 
Pavlov Guards regiments plus sailors of the Second Baltic and Guards 
Naval Depots. These troops carried placards inscribed "Dismiss Mil­
iukov and Guchkov" and "Down with the Policy of Aggression." The 
soldiers surrounded the palace and declared that they would arrest 
Miliukov and the whole Provisional Government. Work stopped in the
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factories and crowds moved toward the center of the capital to join 
the protest. When General Lavr Kornilov, Military Commandant of 
Petrograd, asked for permission to call out troops for the ministers' 
protection, the government flatly declined. The executive committee 
sent some of its members to the scene of the damnstrations to appeal 
to the populace to go home and the troops to retmm to their barracks. 
The Soviet spokesmen pointed out that the executive committee had not 
called for demonstrations, and if continued, they might lead to blood­
shed. The Soviet committeemen asked the people to remain calm and
wait for orders "from the leading organ of the Democracy." The crowds
32dispersed and the troops returned to their barracks.
On May 4 supporters of Miliukov staged a counter protest that led 
to violence, forcing the Soviet to assume momentarily military powers. 
Banners appeared in the streets calling for "War to the Victorious End," 
"Support for the Allies," "Down with Anarchy," and "Send Lenin back to 
Germany." Patriotic,, conservative citizens, intelligentsia, and even 
some soldiers joined in this demonstration. Counter-demonstrations 
quickly erupted and violence and bloodshed occurred. For a time it 
appeared that civil war would break out on the streets of Petrograd. 
General Kornilov ordered troops under his command to protect the gov­
ernment. More troops refused than obeyed Kornilov's order and notified 
the executive committee of their decision. Kornilov had previously 
infomed the government that of the 125,000 troops under his command 
only 3,500 would come to the government's defense. Immediately, the 
executive committee ordered General Kornilov to recall his troops and
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Issued the following command:
COMÏIADE SOLDIERS!
In these troubled days let no one come out on the street 
armed, unless called out by the executive committee. Only 
the executive committee has the right to give you orders.
Every order for the military to come out (except as a mat­
ter of routine) should be on a written blank of the executive 
committee, stamped with its seal, and signed by at least two 
of the seven men herein named: Chkheidze, Skobelev, Binasik,
Filipovskii, Skalov, Goldman, Bogdanov.
Confirm every order by telephoning to No. 104-06
The Executive Committee 
Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' 
Deputies
General Kornilov, perturbed by this interference into his prerogatives 
as a commanding officer, shortly resigned as military commandant of 
the capital and requested a transfer to the front. Tseretelli explain­
ed the Soviet's momentary usurpation of authority:
Normally, the leading majority of the executive committee
avoided assuming governmental functions. But at the moment 
the country stood on the brink of civil .war. The first 
bloody clashes between the demonstrators for and against 
the government had already occurred. Artillery mounted in 
the middle of Palace Square was bound to have an inflamma­
tory effect. It was this emergency that prompted the execu­
tive committee to appropriate government functions and to 
employ extraordinary measures in order to save the country 
from civil w a r . 33
While the Bolsheviks walked a path apart from the rest of the Soviet, 
they did not conspire to instigate the April demonstration. In his 
April theses Lenin had insisted that the Bolsheviks make no compromise 
with revolutionary defensism. From that time Leninist agitators had
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preached to the workers, patiently and persistently, that the war would 
not end until the overthrow of capitalism. Lenin had insisted from the 
first that the Provisional Government receive no support because, as 
government of bourgeoisie, it would follow an imperialistic program. 
Rank-and-file party members from the garrison regiments and factories, 
undoubtedly influenced by Lenin's April pronouncements, helped bring 
about the street demonstrations in the first place. The Bolshevik 
Central Committee, however, clearly did not become involved in the 
movement until after it was well underway. On the morning of May 3 
the central committee adopted a resolution written by Lenin that con­
demned the Miliukov note and suggested that immediate peace was pos­
sible only by transferring all power to the Soviet; the central commit­
tee, however, did not call party members to demonstrate in the streets. 
Only on May 4 did Lenin appeal for all Bolsheviks to demonstrate in 
protest. As in the "March days" more militant elements in the party, 
such as the Petersburg committee and now the Bolshevik Military Organ­
ization, agitated for the party to become more radical in its actions. 
Lenin, unlike Shliapnikov in March, strongly voiced his opposition to 
such tendencies in his statement of May 7 :
We did not know if in this troubled moment the masses would 
swing in our direction; the question would have been differ­
ent if they had swung sharply. We proposed a peaceful demon­
stration but some comrades in the Petersburg committee injected 
a different slogan. We annulled it but could not stop it in 
time, and the masses followed the slogan of the Petersburg com­
mittee. We acknowledge that the slogan "Down with the Provision­
al Government" is adventurist, that we cannot now overthrow the 
government. . . .  We wanted only a peaceful reconnaissance of 
our enemy's forces and not to give battle. But the Petersburg 
committee tok a position "a wee bit to the left" ... To move
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"a wee bit left" at the moment of action was inept. We 
regard this as a grave crime. . . We would not remain in 
the central committee for a minute if we consciously per­
mitted such a step. It occurred because of imperfections 
in our organizational machinery. . . Were there mistakes? 
Yes, there were. Only those who don’t act don't make mis­
takes. But to organize well— that’s a difficult task.34
The party endorsed Lenin’s position. The crisis, however, had borne 
out Kamenev's prediction that the rank-and-file would interpret 
such an appeal as a command to overthrow the Provisional Government. 
However, Bolshevik propaganda should not receive blame or credit for 
the initial troop response. The Bolshevik cadre organization in the 
Petrograd garrison was in embryo in April and the soldiers ’ outburst 
apparently native to them.
Street demonstrations in Petrograd lasted for two days and only 
the intervention of the Petrograd Soviet stopped them. In Moscow 
demonstrations also broke out for and against the government repeating 
the pattern of the capital. In the meantime, the Petrograd Soviet and 
the Provisional Government carried on negotiations to resolve the 
crisis. When the first disorders erupted. Prince L’vov asked Tseretelli 
to his home. There the prime minister and Nekrasov expressed surprise 
at the popular reaction to Miliukov’s note. L’vov threatened to resign 
if the Soviet withdrew its support of the government. Tseretelli ex­
plained that the use of slogans associated in the common mind with mil­
itant imperialism had aroused the masses. He even suggested to Prince 
L’vov that Miliukov's resignation would prove highly satisfactory to 
the Soviet. L’vov countered that Miliukov’s resignation would lead to 
the resignations of all the other Kadet ministers and the fall of the
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government. He suggested that negotiations begin at once between 
the Provisional Government, the Petrograd Soviet and the Temporary 
Committee of the State Duma.
The executive committee voted to begin negotiations but opened 
the question to full debate. Chkheidze charged the Soviet plenum to 
exhibit patience pending the outcome of negotiations. When a Bolshevik 
proposed that the Soviet take state power Into its own hands, V. B. 
Stankevlch responded that the problem was to govern, not take power:
. . .  If you find that no negotiations would be of any use 
and that the Provisional Government should be overthrown at 
once, then It should be clear that neither demonstrations 
nor violence are needed. The power, after all. Is In your 
hands. It belongs to you and to the masses behind you. You 
see that big clock on the wall, don't you? It shows fifteen 
minutes to seven. This very moment you can order the Pro­
visional Government to resign. Just convey this decision to 
the government over the telephone, and it will surrender Its 
authority within the next ten minutes. By seven o'clock the 
Provisional Government will have ceased to exist. Yet It Is 
open to question whether it would be as easy to give the coun­
try a new and better government. . . .35
The Soviet plenum voted to await the results of the negotiations be­
tween the executive committee and the government.
The negotiations led to a compromise In which no one triumphed. 
As the session opened. Prince L’vov again threatened to resign If 
the Soviet withdrew Its support of the government. The government 
was aware, he noted, of the growing distrust the Petrograd Soviet had 
of Its actions, but what had the ministers done to merit this? The 
ministers reported frankly and specifically the domestic difficulties 
they faced, stressing the great need of the support of the Soviet for 
the government. As for foreign policy, Nekrasov and Tereshchenko
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found no discrepancy between that advocated by Che government and the 
Petrograd Soviet. The Soviet leaders sympathized with the ministers' 
desire to minimize foreign affairs in their struggle with internal 
difficulties, but the socialists would not let the matter lie. Miliu­
kov too would not compromise external affairs for internal concerns.
He stated that his sole purpose was to dispel rumors abroad of a sep­
arate peace and would not send a new note to the Allies under pressure 
of street demonstrations. In a last ditch effort he read a note from 
a minor French diplomat that stated that while France sympathized with 
the revolution, unless Russia lived up to her obligations under the 
alliance, French economic aid might cease. France's plenipotentiary 
Albert Thomas, however, immediately disavowed Miliukov's trump card. 
Though the Soviet insisted on a new note to the Allies, Tseretelli 
explained that no one in the Soviet wanted to humiliate the government 
and even Kamenev claimed that most Bolsheviks (not Leninists) were not 
trying to overthrow the government. Nekrasov finally invited Tsere­
telli to help him redraft the note in terms of the April 9th Soviet 
declaration, thereby explaining away such obnoxious phrases as "decisive 
victory over the enemy." The phrase "guarantees and sanctions" now 
referred only to limitations of armaments, international tribunals, and 
similar objectives. Though a poor explanation, nevertheless it weather­
ed the storm. The government accepted it over Miliukov’s objections 
as did the Soviet plenum by a vote of two thousand to thirteen. Despite 
all the clamor, the government apparently never officially transmitted
the explanation to the Allies, though envoys of the Allies did receive 
36the note.
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The Petrograd Soviet leaders clearly sa« the results as a victory
for the "revolutionary democracy." Incredibly Miliukov interpreted
the results as a personal victory! In an interview with The New York
Times he asserted that "Our policy remains unchanged. We have con- 
37ceded nothing." He boasted to a dismayed Albert Thomas that he had
38won a complete victory. Britain's Sir George Buchanan agreed that 
Miliukov had won a victory in the purely moral sense, but found Tere­
shchenko's assessment essentially correct that the result was far from 
39a total victory. As Buchanan explained later: "L'vov, Kerensky, and
Tereshchenko came to the conclusion that, as the Soviet was too power­
ful a factor to be either suppressed or disregarded, the only way of 
putting an end to the anomaly of dual government was to form a Coali­
tion."^^ While Miliukov thought he had managed to get the whole matter 
passed off as a misunderstanding, obviously he overlooked the fact that 
the government had made concessions, that the rest of the cabinet had 
overruled him, and that the Soviet had overruled the government. Fur­
thermore, the Soviet drew practical consequences from its triumph. The 
government agreed that no major political acts would appear publicly 
without first notifying the executive committee and that the personnel 
of the Russian diplomatic corps abroad would undergo a radical shakeup.^^ 
The Soviet's stand made a mockery of Miliukov's position as Russian 
Foreign Minister. Under such conditions no minister could have long con­
tinued in office, and, if Miliukov resigned, a coalition had to follow.
If the triumph of revolutionary defensism meant coalition government 
and thus the compromising of the Menshevik theoretical position of
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non-participation in a bourgeois government, the Soviet had won only 
a partial victory. The only other possibility was to assume state 
power and chance civil war.
Not all Soviet leaders opposed coalition with the bourgeoisie.
In the first days of the revolution a number of rightwing socialists 
advocated a coalition government with members from the Progressive 
bloc of the State Duma. These men renewed their fight for coalition 
when, as a result of the "April crisis," new voices began to demand 
the creation of a coalition government. On May 5 a conference of 
delegates of regimental and battalion committees of the Petrograd 
garrison met at the Tauride Palace and added their support to the 
movement when the conference resolved that " . . .  the executive 
committee formulate its opinion regarding the formation of a coalition 
cabinet." Hundreds of letters and telegrams'from diverse parts of 
Russia, from army organizations, and from peasants' soviets, poured into 
the Petrograd Soviet's headquarters demanding the formation of a coa­
lition government. The Trudoviks, Popular Socialists, and a consider­
able number of SR's reacted affirmatively to this pressure. For the 
moment, however, the Soviet leadership refused to commit itself to 
more than palliatives to shore up the government, such as an enthusiastic 
endorsement of the ministers' Liberty Loan.
The actions of several members of the Provisional Government height­
ened the demand for the Petrograd Soviet to enter a coalition. The 
"Left seven" within the government openly expressed their feelings for 
a coalition. N. N. L'vov, the Procurator General of the Holy Synod, 
privately informed Tseretelli: "Up to now you have opposed it. How­
132
ever, the matter cannot be postponed any longer. It is Impossible to 
govern Russia without the Soviet Democracy. . . .Come to us with your 
programs; it makes sense; we accept it. But you must join the govern­
ment."^^ Following L'vov's personal appeal to Tseretelli, the govern­
ment publicly announced on May 9 its intention to include persons from
"those actively creative elements who have not, until now, had a direct
. 44part in the State administration. . . .  That same day A. F. Ker­
ensky, the nominal Soviet vice-chairman, gave urgency to the govern­
ment's appeal by announcing that his continued participation in the
government was impossible unless the leaders of the socialist parties
45in the Soviet agreed to send representatives into the cabinet. The
next day the prime minister made a direct appeal to the Soviet chairman
which repeated the essence of the May 9th statement and requested that
he "bring his matter to the attention of the executive committee of
the parties represented in the Soviet of Workers* and Soldiers' Deputies,
46of which you are president." The Soviet had no choice but to make a
formal reply to such an overt appeal.
The executive committee of the Petrograd Soviet received Prince 
L'vov's appeal with mixed feelings. A majority favored a response that 
would strengthen the authority of the government. Many members of the 
executive held back, however, from announcing that the Soviet as a body 
or its leaders as individuals would actually participate in the gov­
ernment. The Menshevik leaders who dominated the SR-Menshevik bloc 
in the executive committee were not willing to compromise with theory 
in order to solve the governmental crisis. Their position on state
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power therefore remained in May essentially the same as in March when 
the socialists refused power because the autocratic government had 
limited Russian economic growth to the point that the country in 1917 
was not ripe for a proletarian state. Just as the seizure of power in 
March would have caused the superstructure to rush far ahead of the 
actual economic base, the same condition remained true in May and 
could only create the illusion of a stable proletarian government and 
thereby lead to destruction of the revolution. The Menshevik organ, 
Rabochaia gazeta, reminded its readers on May 5 that Russia "has ex­
perienced a bourgeois revolution. . . .  It is not time for the soc­
ialist revolution: there still are not the economic conditions in
Russia, there is still not the level of culture and political develop­
ment in the majority of the population. Following this reasoning, 
the way for the democratic workers still is not to tie its hands to the 
management of the state." The Petrograd Soviet had to remain a pri­
vate institution outside of de jure government. Its function was to 
propose programs, not be instrumental in carrying them out. Bourgeois 
government in principle was a replusive institution to socialists. To 
participate in it was to lose one's socialist virtue; to lose totally 
the right to protect and demand reform. The Mensheviks had long ad­
vocated that a premature proletarian seizure of power would result in
4?another Paris Commune and consequent destruction before reactionaries.
The Soviet's theoretical position, however, had not matched its 
practice since the March days. Events before and during the "April 
crisis" had eroded the subtle theoretical position of the Soviet leaders
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with regard to state power and Soviet functions. The Petrograd Soviet 
had assumed governmental powers at SchlUsselburg Fortress and at Kron­
stadt when the Provisional Government had not controlled crises there 
in the first days of the revolution. During the "April crisis" it had 
dramatically exercised authority to quelm street disturbances. Reaction 
to such demonstrations of power was two-fold. Soviet leaders could 
hardly blame soldiers and workers, witnessing such exercises of power, 
for drawing the conclusion that the Soviet could wield power if it 
desired. Furthermore, such actions also increased the Soviet leaders' 
preparation for state power. Seeing that Kadet expertise in government 
was not as great as imagined surely reduced the Soviet leaders' fear
of their own incompetence in government beyond what such fears were 
48in March 1917. °
The Soviet position did not derive entirely from r^eory and its
practice. Voitinskii, Tseretelli's rightarm man, in retrospect noted .
that Soviet leaders were "accustomed to look upon government, courts,
49coercion, police, and other attributes of authority as evils." Stan- 
kevich observed that his colleagues in the Soviet "instinctively and 
habitually held a negative attitude toward the authorities which always 
seemed wicked, soiled, and destroyers of the principles of purity . . . . 
Such reasoning derived from individual experiences in dealing with tsarist 
police and courts. Law and order for Russian revolutionaries were part 
of the natural order of things and would somehow function without the 
efforts of the Soviet. Such an attitude apparently extended to the whole 
institution of government, for the Soviet would most likely have done noth­
ing if left to itself.
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The Petrograd Soviet leaders attempted to thrash out a unified 
Menshevik-SR bloc position on the question of coalition government.
The Mensheviks tried to keep the SR's harnessed to an orthodox marxist 
position. Despite token internal party opposition, the SR leaders 
had voted for coalition and now asked the Mensheviks to join them.
The Menshevik Chkheidze found that by "staying out of the government, 
the Soviet has acquired an authority that has enabled it to channel 
the mass movement into organized forms, and to maintain a democratic 
order in the country. . . .  If we join the government, we shall 
arouse expectations in the masses of something essentially new, which 
we shall be unable to fulfill. . . . Let our comrades, the Populists 
and Socialist Revolutionaries join the government, not as members of
the executive committee, but as representatives of the peasantry. This
would place the government on a firm foundation and give it a genuinely 
democratic character that would be a source of strength.
To the SR's this seemed sheer political expediency. Avksent'ev, a "Star 
Chamber" participant and SR leader, considered no coalition government 
was possible without the participation of the executive committee.
Gotz, the SR "Star Chamber" member, agreed and reasoned that "When any 
clash between the Soviet and the government jeopardizes the very exis­
tence of the latter, the participation of Soviet representatives in the 
government means, not the surrender of hostages to the bourgeoisie, but
the reaffirmation of the policy of the revolutionary democracy."
The Mensheviks disagreed. Skobelev doubted whether the masses would 
heed Skobelev, the cabinet minister, yet when he addressed the masses
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as an officer of the Soviet, they listened and obeyed. Bogdanov 
admitted the popularity of the plan for a coalition government among the
Menshevik rank-and-file but felt this enthusiasm rested "upon the 
illusion that a coalition government would be able to work wonders im­
mediately." If these expectations remained unfilled, the masses would 
lose all confidence in the Soviet and the Menshevik party. Tseretelli 
admitted that the most urgent task of the moment was to maintain the 
Provisional Government, lest the bourgeoisie fail and the socialists 
be forced into assuming ml 1 state power with inadequate support. He 
doubted that the inclusion of members from the executive committee in 
the cabinet would accomplish the desired result. He shared all the ap­
prehensions of his Menshevik colleagues but offered a possible solution: 
"Among the supporters of the Socialist Revolutionary party, as among 
our own supporters, there are many democratic elements with organiza­
tional links, not to any party nor to the Soviets, but to cooperatives, 
trade unions, and the peasantry. If the representatives of these demo­
cratic intelligentsia were to replace Miliukov and Guchkov in the cab­
inet, this would go far to ensure complete harmony between the policies
of the government and the Soviet, and would allow us to support the gov-
52emment with greater determination." The bloc came to no unified 
position, rather it had come close to breaking up over the question 
of coalition.
At the May 11 session of the executive committee the populists and 
the marxists officially went on record as split over the coalition prob­
lem. Trudoviks, Popular Socialists, and most SR's supported coalition; 
the Mensheviks almost unanimously opposed it; the Bolsheviks alone de-
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aanded that the Soviet take state power. The vote was 24 to 22 against 
coalition with eight members abstaining; a number of committeemen had 
simply stayed away rather than vote.^^ To keep the bloc from falling 
apart Tseretelli now proceeded with his proposed compromise solu­
tion and urged the prime minister to form a government to include soc­
ialists close to the Soviet officials. He suggested as likely candi­
dates the SR sympathizers Peshekhonov and Pereverxev and their Menshevik 
counterparts Prokopovich and Malentovich. Prince L'vov , althou^ greatly 
disturbed over the refusal of the Soviet to send its leaders into the 
government, welcomed the suggestion of possible candidates for a new 
government. The continued insistence of the Soviet leaders that they 
act as "watchdog" of the government in order to safeguard the rights of 
the toiling masses, however, did not please him. The Soviet would 
gladly change the words of its formula, postol'ku poskol'ku (insofar as),
Tseretelli informed L'vov, but not its meaning of cooperating with the.
54bourgeoisie except when detrimental to the toiling masses.
On May 14 War Minister Guchkov resigned and destroyed 1 pos­
sibility of Tseretelli's solution. If the executive committee still 
refused to participate in a government, L'vov now told Tseretelli, the 
Provisional Government would have no alternative bat to resign as a 
body. Chernov suggested that Miliukov take the post of Minister of 
Education but the liberal leader would hear nothing of it. Guchkov's 
resignation was a bitter personal defeat for the Foreign Minister, for 
he had counted on Guchkov's support to swing the question of coalition 
in his favor. Since his defeat at the hands of the Soviet on the ques­
tion of revolutionary defensism, the Foreign Minister had become in­
creasingly pessimistic. Paleologue, the French Ambassador, recollected
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later than Miliukov looked liked a finished man: "For the first time
Miliukov appears to me to be deprived of his courageous optimism, his 
confidence, and his fighting spirit. In his speech he affects the 
same assurance as before; but the hollow sound of his voice and his 
ravaged appearance clearly reveal his internal distress.
Guchkov's action took Miliukov completely by surprise. He was 
at General Headquarters when General Alekseev showed him a telegram 
reporting the resignation. Guchkov spoke publicly of "conditions which 
I have no power to alter and which threaten fatal consequences for the 
army, for the navy, for liberty and for the very existence of Russia. 
Guchkov's resignation meant coalition government; the coalition idea 
forced Miliukov's resignation. Though his Kadet colleagues, V. D. 
Nabokov and M. M. Vinaver, urged Miliukov to stay on as Minister of 
Education in a new government as he himself had confided earlier to them 
he might do. Miliukov now saw this as simply useless: "It was per­
fectly plain to me that changing the portfolio of Minister of Foreign 
Affairs for the portfolio of the Minister of Education would not free 
me from responsibility for those foreign policies which I have followed 
during the entire war and which are well-known to the whole world." 
Miliukov tendered his formal resignation on May 16, two days after
Guchkov's. Both men became determined to sabotage Tseretelli's 
plans; as Guchkov recollected later, "I had made it my aim— at whatever
C O
the cost— to liquidate the Soviet."
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Prince L'vov had presented the executive committee with a virtual 
ultimatum at the time of Guchkov's resignation; now most of the commit­
tee agreed that its members had no choice but to enter a coalition 
government. The Bund, however, came close to splitting off from the 
Mensheviks. While they adhered to revolutionary defensism to preserve 
the revolution from the German war machine, most Bundists opposed soc­
ialist participation in a bourgeois government. The Bund had gone on
egrecord in April against a coalition government with the Kadets. Rafes 
alone of prominent Bundist leaders apparently favored participation.
Raphael Abramovich, the sole non-defensist in the central Bund leader­
ship, knew, however, that the Jewish organization could not afford another 
split in the ranks of the working class parties. "We always tried to 
be the left wing of the Mensheviks," he stated at the time, "the 
revolutionary conscience of Menshevism. We knew that, were we to leave 
Menshevism, we would have to unite with the Bolsheviks. Are we ready 
to do that? No, because a great abyss separates usI Therefore, a split 
in the Menshevik party would mean only a weakening of the working class 
because we would have to build a third party. The Bund defensists.
Liber, Erlich, and Esther Frumkin, among others, for once found themselves 
in complete agreement with Abramovich. Thus the decision to join a 
coalition government with the bourgeoisie factionalized the Menshevik 
party further from Menshevik defensists and Martovist Internationalists, but 
now added a third faction within the party, the Bundists.
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Feverish negotiations and debates insued within the cabinet, among 
the various socialist parties, and between the Soviet, which repre­
sented these parties, and the Provisional Government. A. F. Kerensky 
and N. D. Avksent'ev acted as the principals in the negotiations be­
tween the government and the Soviet. At first the various socialist 
parties demanded the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of War, al­
though the Kadets and other conservatives unalterably opposed this de­
mand. The socialist also required, for purposes of negotiation, that 
they receive a total of seven ministries: foreign affairs, war, in­
terior, agriculture, labor, food, and social welfare, although they 
had agreed among themselves that they would settle for six of them.
The Kadets countered that they had to have as many ministries as all 
of the socialist parties combined. They would give up the Ministry 
of Agriculture and the newly crèated Ministries of Posts and Telegraphs, 
and of Social Welfare, but never those of Foreign Affairs and Interior. 
Kerensky maintained that Tereshchenko would pursue democratic aims in 
his foreign policy, even though the cultured sugar magnate was Miliu­
kov's hand-picked choice for the position. Kerensky also noted that 
as Prime Minister L'vov did not wish to give up the Interior Ministry 
and as he was generally friendly to the Soviet, the demand for that 
ministry should not be pressed. After long arguments, Kerensky pre­
vailed. As for the rest of the ministries, neither the Mensheviks nor 
the SR's wanted to put their top leaders in the cabinet. The Menshe­
viks particularly were nervous about becoming Bolshevik propaganda 
targets. Chkheidze insisted that Tseretelli not serve as he was ab­
l4l
solutely essential to the operation of the Soviet. At the same time 
the Mensheviks were most insistent that Chernov accept the Ministry 
of Agriculture post. Chernov, however, would not serve without Tsere­
telli and suggested that a lesser known SR receive the post. The 
Mensheviks and SR's were quick to assign the Trudoviks and Popular 
Socialists cabinet seats, though their numerical strength did not 
warrant it. Stankevich described the awful desperateness of the 
socialist intelligentsia during the coalition crisis:
The situation was becoming more and more hopeless with every 
minute. All conceivable combinations were exhausted. Every 
proposal entailed an already familiar cycle of difficulties 
and objections. Everyone was obviously marking time. The 
nervous tension had reached its highest limit and gave vent 
to extreme agitation and irritation. Questions were not even 
discussed any longer; everyone was simply speaking— or more 
exactly, shouting— from his comer. Chernov, disheveled and 
infuriated, was attacking little Peshekhonov, who was squeezed 
in a comer. Gvozdev was pronouncing some final words of in­
dignation on the confusion of everything that was going on.... 
Even Tseretelli lost his equilibrium, in spite of my fervent 
appeals for calm; he was shouting, I think, at Chkheidze... 
when all of a sudden Kerensky rushed in and announced that a 
solution had been found. The combination announced by Kerensky 
was, practically speaking, far from new and there was much to 
be said against it. But all were glad to be swayed by his mood. 
They no longer wanted to listen to objections; the dissatisfied 
were forced to stop speaking.
Once Tseretelli saw that no cabinet was possible without him, he accept­
ed the nominal sinecure of Posts and Telegraphs. Chernov became Minis­
ter of Agriculture, a trying position for the populist leader, where he 
could only break his political neck. Skobelev, Soviet vice-chairman, 
received the post of Minister of Labor with the responsibility of elim­
inating industrial chaos. Kerensky, nominal Soviet vice-chairman, be­
came Minister of War and Marine and Peshekhonov and Pereverzev, as
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Tseretelli had suggested. Ministers of Food and of Justice respectively. 
Numerically socialists and liberals equally made up the new government, 
but in point of fact, Tseretelli and Skobelev only lent their names to 
the new government, not their talents, while Chernov, Peshekhonov and 
Pereverzev were ineffectual or isolated from decisions. The government 
now more than ever came under the guiding influence of Kerensky, who 
now more than ever, attempted to stand above party as the nucleus for 
all factions.
Why did Tseretelli decide in the end in favor of a coalition
government? To save the country from civil war,he maintained. This
was his statement at the time of the "April crisis" and remained his 
62view in May. Continuing instability, he claimed, would lead to armed 
conflict. Revolutionary defensism had to triumph or civil war would 
liquidate them; this policy alone offered the possibility of a com­
promise between socialists and non-socialists. Except for Martov, even
Tseretelli’s opposition within his own party echoed the same opinion.
63Coalition was not necessary, Ermanskii explained, to solve the cab­
inet crisis, but to avert civil war. Martov offered no alternative to 
coalition but demanded to know how the Soviet leaders proposed to over­
throw the bourgeoisie in the coming socialist revolution if they were 
part of the government. Sukhanov alone offered a variant of coalition 
in which the socialists would dominate with a minority of liberals and 
radicals so that the former would have more influence concerning gov­
ernment decisions. The paper coalition of Tseretelli's left the Soviet, 
despite protestations of only nominal support, with partial responsibil­
ity for government actions and no more authority than the Soviet had 
before. Tom between theoretical purity and necessity the Soviet leaders
Iks
apparently saw no other choice open to him. To have seized power as 
Lenin demanded would not only have meant the destruction of orthodox 
Marxist doctrine, it would most probably have brought civil war.
Revolutionary defensism dominated the Soviet’s program for the new 
coalition. Essentially the program was twofold: first, the struggle
to open negotiations and conclude peace without annexations or contri­
butions, based on the principle of the peoples' right of self-determina­
tion; second, the strengthening of the army by democratization in order 
to prevent the defeat of Russia and its Allies, which could damage the 
cause of the people and the peace. The socialists did not even bother 
to debate the other hastily drawn points of the program; the struggle 
against economic disintegration, the defense of workers' rights, and 
the implementation of agrarian reform. The primary consideration was 
the formulation of a foreign policy for the new government; they de­
bated only what concerned the struggle for peace. The only objections 
raised were by the Bolshevik Zinov'ev who found that the initial de- 
calration contained no provisions for the immediate initiation of peace 
negotiations. Ironically when the communique of the new government ap­
peared, Prince L'vov had altered the text so that it essentially stated 
that the coalition would merely accentuate certain features of the pre­
vious government's policies.
In the end the fury over war was a pyrrhic victory for the Petro- 
grad Soviet. The Soviet leaders while victorious over Miliukov's for­
eign policy had compromised with the tenets of revolutionary defensism. 
Siberian Zimmerwaldism, in which Martov had taken so much pride for its 
'correct stand' on the war, had now become committed too much to defense
Ikh
and not enough to peace. The Soviet leaders had even committed them­
selves to the development of offensive as well as defensive military 
power, stating that this constituted "the most important task of the 
Provisional Government^^As for their "two-pronged".peace offensive, 
in which the government would put pressure on the Allies and the 
socialists through a unified stand hammered out at Stockholm, the Sov­
iet leaders had allowed the possibility of sabotage by the old tsarist 
diplomatic agents who remained abroad and by Miliukov's apprentice, 
Tereshchenko. Furthermore, the Soviet leaders had opened themselves 
up for attack by the right and the more radical left, thereby endanger­
ing the very policies they hoped to realize. While they attempted to 
join the government as individuals, the subtlety was beyond the reason­
ing of the popular masses who demanded results from those in office.
In the Petrograd Soviet a soldier deputy complained; "Comrade Tsere- 
telli has been a minister for ten whole days. What has been done for 
peace?" Lenin noted in Pravda the week the socialists entered the
government: "The coalition cabinet has brought no changes. The tsar's
68secret treaties remain sacred to it." The unity of the Menshevik-SR 
bloc left the more apprehensive no place to turn except the lone dis­
senters with an organized party center, the Bolsheviks. The formation 
of the paper coalition all but finished the Petrograd Soviet's 
practice of being watchdog over the Provisional Government. Now to 
criticize the government implied criticism of the Soviet leaders, 
something many socialists felt uneasy about doing. Though the Soviet 
leaders admitted that they had made a "great sacrifice," they neverthe­
less persisted in their beliefs, taking the next step toward their ful­
fillment by undertaking a quest for peace by calling an international
11̂5
socialist conference at Stockholm.^^
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CHAPTER IV 
THE QUEST FOR PEACE
The Petrograd Soviet probably made the most notable effort
toward peace in World War I. Upon the return of the Siberian Zim-
merwaldists the Soviet undertook a "two-pronged" peace offensive in
which international socialists would pressure their governments
through a unified peace stand hammered out at Stockholm, to be
followed by diplomatic pressure by the Russian government at an 
1
Allied conference. Until the triumph of revolutionary defensism 
over Miliukov's pro-war stand, Tseretelli limited Soviet peace ef­
forts mostly to propagandizing and negotiating with visiting foreign 
socialist delegations. If the Petrograd Soviet leaders hesitated to 
involve themselves in domestic governmental functions, they were much 
more ready to assert themselves in international affairs. Most 
Russian socialists were unknown quantities, many had never travelled 
outside of Russia, and, of those who had, they had usually concentrated 
on Russian conditions and knew perhaps only an idealized Western world. 
Novices to a man in international diplomacy, they naturally made un­
warranted assunptions and decisions . Perhaps beyond a blind faith 
in the influence of their revolution, the Soviet leaders probably 
never realistically appraised their chances for success in obtaining 
peace.
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The Russian Revolution gave European socialists the necessary 
inspiration to increase their efforts to obtain peace through a 
reunified Second International. From Swiss exile the veteran Men­
shevik Paul B. Akselrod first broached the subject of reconvening 
the International in a letter in the Menshevist organ, Rabochaia 
gazeta, on April 10. Though no one apparently took much notice of
Akselrod's proposition, two days later M. I. Liber, speaking be-
2
fore the All-Russ ism Conference of Soviets, suggested that an in­
vitation to an international socialist conference conclude a resolu­
tion then under debate. Tseretelli, however, sidetracked this motion 
by suggesting that such an invitation become the subject of a sepa­
rate resolution. Embroiled in controversy with the Russian Foreign 
Minister over war aims, a month passed before the Soviet acted.
In the meantime the Soviet leaders received peace missions from 
the well-known Swedish socialist, Hjalmar Branting, and the Danish 
socialist leader, Frederick I. Borgbjerg. The Swede warmly approved 
of the Petrograd Soviet's peace policy of no annexations and contri­
butions as announced in its March 27th manifesto. Branting suggested 
to Tseretelli that the Soviet alone could sponsor the reconvocation
of the International, as the Entente socialists would never respond
3
to an invitation from the Dutch or the Danes. The Menshevik Inter­
nationalist lu. Larin found that the situation required more radical 
measures, e.g., an ultimatum to the belligerents to end hostilities 
and conclude a peace settlement on the demand of the Russian Revolution. 
Tseretelli brushed this aside, maintaining that only a united revo-
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lutioasiry force at the front and rear put to the service of peace
might overcome all difficulties. In time the Georgian defined
this more precisely as strengthening the army and the government’s
adoption of the Soviet’s position of revolutionary defensism combined
with the "two-pronged" peace offensive.
As for Borgbjerg, German State Secretary Alfred Zimmerman and
Dr. Alexander (Parvus) Helphand, a Russian-born, naturalized German
citizen, collaborated to get the Dane and the German Social Democrat
5
(SPD) leaders together to send a peace offer to the Russians. The
SPD leaders knew of Borgbjerg’s official backing, yet were ready
to have him carry the message to Russia that Germany wished peace
without conclusion, that the formula of "no annexations" covered
everything except some frontier rectifications and the difficult
Balkan situation, and that the Germans would not undertake an of-
6
fensive against the Russians. The SH) pleaded for peace so that
7
the German working masses could return home from the trenches. On 
May 6 Borgbjerg presented the Soviet executive committee the SPD
8
peace program along with a proposal for an international conference. 
The'committee found the Dane’s proposal unsatisfactory and rejected
9
the SH) program, branding it an offer for a separate peace. Even 
the Bolsheviks denounced the Danish socialist as "directly or in­
directly" "an agent of the German inperialist government"; an ironic
point as Helphand was instrumental in Lenin’s return to Russia through 
10
Germany.
The revolution also brought Allied socialists to Russia. On March 
26 British Labour Secretary Arthur Henderson reported to his colleagues
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in the War Cabinet that representatives of the French Socialist 
party were travelling to Petrograd to persuade Russian socialists 
to bring the war to a satisfactory conclusion. His Majesty's Gov­
ernment promptly consented that the well-known labourites, Will 
Thome, James 0'Grady, and W. S. Sanders, should accompany the
French representatives, Msirius Moutet, Marcel Cachin, and Ernest 
11
Lafont. Though the Bolsheviks and Menshevik Internationalists
considered the Entente socialists as "lackeys" of their governments,
Tseretelli and the majority of the "revolutionary democracy" re-
13
ceived them warmly. Belgian, Italian, and American delegations
also came to Petrograd. Emile Vandervelde, Louis de Brouckere,
and Henri de Man came for the Belgians; Arturo Labriola, Orazio
Raimonda, Giovanni Lerda, and Innocenzo Cappa for the Italians;
and Elihu Root, Charles Edward Russell, and James Duncan for the
Americans. Noticeably absent from all of these delegations were
14
minority or defeatist representatives.
The Entente delegations accepted as incontestable the Soviet 
peace formula of no annexations and contributions based on the 
self-determination of nations. They did, however, require a more 
precise definition of the formula. If this meant a return to the 
status quo ante-belli, what of Alsace-Lorraine, Poland, and the 
Slavic provinces of the Austrian Enpire? What of their self-de­
termination as free peoples? As for contributions, who would pay 
for the damage done by invaders? While Tseretelli had the greatest 
sympathy for the Alsace-Lorraine question and considered that the 
representatives of the working classes ought to elaborate a repa-
12
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ration plan for the populations devasted by invasion, he maintained 
that the immediate task was to reconstitute the International which 
could then deal meaningfully with such questions in a democratic 
peace. No preconditions or acceptance of guilt should precede the 
conference, except the general agreement to the formula of "no annex­
ations or contributions" based on the self-determination of nations; 
otherwise the conference would never convene. Even the goal Tsere­
telli envisioned for the conference was challenged by the Entente 
socialists, as they did not wish to liquidate the national union with 
"their imperialist governments." Of these delegations only the 
French became so overwhelmed by the revolution’s spirit (particularly 
after witnessing the April demonstrations) that they returned to 
France and swayed their party in favor of attending the proposed 
international conference on the basis of the Soviet's formula
Some of the Allies also sent socialist or labor representatives 
who were members of their governments. The Entente had until mid- 
spring underestimated the influence of the Petrograd Soviet in Russia.
The French had sensed something of its influence when Premier Ribot sent 
the socialist Minister of Munitions, Albert Thomas, to Petrograd 
to ascertain whether to recall Ambassador Maurice Paleologue. On May 11 
the Soviet’s importance became more discernable when the French, British, 
and Italian governments received the following request from Foreign 
Minister Miliukov:
The Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers’ and 
Soldiers' Deputies expresses the hope that the French, 
English, and Italian governments will accord all of their 
aid to facilitate the departure and travel to Russia of
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the following delegations, invited to Petrograd by the 
executive committee; the delegation of the Italian 
Socialist Democratic Party; the delegation of the Eng­
lish Independent Labour Party; the delegation of the 
British Socialist Party; the delegation of the opposi­
tion French Socialist Workers' Party, directed by M. 
Brizon and Longuet. The executive committee awaits an 
affirmative Jgply from the French, British, and Italian 
governments.
This message left little doubts in the minds of the Allied leaders 
of the inportance of the Petrograd Soviet. If any doubts did re­
main, the entrance of socialist leaders into the Russian govern­
ment on May l8 should have removed them. The British prime mini­
ster quickly reversed his previous decision and on May 23 asked 
Arthur Henderson to undertake a mission similar to that of Albert 
Thomas, i. e., urge the Russian socialists to bring the war to a
satisfactory conclusion and replace Sir George Buchanan as ambassador 
17
if he saw fit. As Thomas and the Belgian minister Vandervelde had 
already arrived in Petrograd, they had only to await Henderson's 
coming to work out a unified Allied position to present the Soviet.
In the meantime initiatives to convene an international socialist 
conference at Stockholm went forward on three fronts. After Borgbjerg 
had left for Petrograd, the Danish socialist minister Thorvald 
Stauning had met with SID leaders in Copenhagen and with their sup­
port demanded that the secretariat of the International take action 
to reconvene the organization. As the members of the permanent com­
mittee were either in exile or occupied territory, the coopted Dutch 
members, P. J. Troelstra, Hendrik Van Kol, F. Wibaut, and J. W. Al-
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barda met with the permanent secretary Camille Huysmans on April 
15 at Laren, Holland. Their plan of action was to go to Stockholm, 
form a committee with the aid of the Dutch and Scandinavian socialist 
parties, attempt to obtain the collaboration of the Russian socialists, 
call for an international socialist conference, and then ask for the
18
assistance of the secretariat of the Second International. On 
April 22, however, Huysmans in spite of reservations about a unilat­
eral action, invited all affiliated sections of the International to 
attend a conference at Stockholm on May I5. Two days before Huys­
mans* action, Branting had reasserted his opinion that the Petrograd 
Soviet alone, not Troelstra could issue such an invitation. He told 
Albert Thomas that he had not given any encouragement to the Dutch
19
initiative. The British, French, and Belgian majoritite socialists 
immediately contested the Dutch action.
The Bolsheviks initially supported a conference at Stockholm but with 
certain qualifications. Lenin on his return to Petrograd from Swiss 
exile stopped at Stockholm on April I3 and discussed the calling of 
an international socialist conference. Before leaving Switzerland 
he claimed to have communicated with left socialists in Ger­
many, France, and England. The Germans and some French socialists 
had accepted proposals for a congress at Stockholm, but the English had 
refused. Lenin declared that he would return in a fortnight to 
Stockholm at the head of a Russian peace delegation. He was certain 
that he had public sentiment at Petrograd behind him and would win 
over Chkheidze, the Soviet chairman, without difficulty. On April I6
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Lenin arrived in Petrograd but did not return within a fortnight with
a delegation to Stockholm. Branting, commenting on Lenin’s statement
at Stockholm, remarked that the conference being organized by Lenin
was in opposition to the International conference and had as its
20
object a German-Russian separate peace. Indeed, within a month 
Lenin had pushed through the Bolshevik Central Committee a denunci­
ation of the Stockholm "patriotic" conference, though the Internation­
al Socialist Committee (the executive of the Zimmerwald and Kienthal 
socialist conferences) partially nullified this a day later on May 10
by calling on socialists to meet at Stockholm to decide on what posi-
21
tion to adopt toward the Dutch-proposed conference.
The Petrograd Soviet now attempted to seize the initiative in
calling an international socialist peace conference for Stockholm.
Branting, Liber, and Akselrod had urged the Soviet to undertake such
an effort and on April 2k the two-week old Soviet department of .
international relations received instructions to make preparations
22for such a meeting. On May 8 F. I. Dan introduced a motion 
in' the executive committee to call a socialist conference in a neu­
tral country ta discuss peace terms. T̂ ie following day and again on
23
May 15 the Soviet issued declarations to this effect. The formal 
invitation circulated as a diplomatic note only after May 27, but 
the foreign press reported it abroad one day before the appearance
2k
of the International Socialist Committee's invitation.
In this appeal the Petrograd Soviet declared it had "decided 
to take the initiative in calling an international conference of all
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socialist parties and fractions of all countries." The Dutch- 
Scandinavian Committee, however, had already undertaken 
the initiative to such a conference. Then inexplicably and in spite 
of the fact that the Soviet had just issued a statement calling an 
international conference, the Mensheviks sent greetings to the com­
mittee at Stockholm "who have taken the initiative Q.talics min^ 
in convoking an international socialist conference at Stockholm and
we are all ready to participate there and to collaborate energetical-
26
ly to its success." Why such contradictory action occurred is not 
clear as I. G. Tseretelli was the chief Menshevik leader as well as 
the prime-mover in Soviet foreign policy (though he had declined
27
the chairmanship of the Soviet's committee of foreign relations).
While the Dutch-Scandinavian Committee expressed a willingness 
for cooperation, the Petrograd Soviet continued to set the prelimi­
nary conditions of the conference without consultation and did not
28
hasten to "participate suid collaborate" with the Stockholm committee. 
Instead the Soviet set up a commission on May 21 to work on the con­
ference and assume the exclusive initiative in convening the confer­
ence, though allowing for Dutch-Scandinavian assistance and that of 
29
other socialists. On June 2 the Soviet summoned the conference at 
Stockholm for July 8 and specified, as in the May 9 and 15 declar­
ations that only organizations should attend which (l) accepted 
"peace without annexations or indemnities founded upon the self-de­
termination of nations," (2) accepted the binding decisions of the
conference, and (3) terminated the party truce between socialists
30
and their imperialist governments. The Soviet justified the neces-
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sity of this manifesto because the revolutionary situation re­
quired urgency, the Dutch-Scandinavian Committee and the Inter­
national Socialist Committee represented only segments of inter­
national socialism, and because the initiative of both organizations 
had, for the most part, met rejection from non-neutral socialists.
As leaders of the Russian Revolution, they felt that they alone 
had the prestige necessary to convene an international socialist
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peace conference.
The socialist-balanced reorganization of the Provisional Gov­
ernment and the Petrograd Soviet * s May 9 and 15 appeals for an 
international socialist conference gravely concerned the British 
Prime Minister. Was the Eastern Front in danger of folding? Lloyd 
George had accepted as a matter of course the British and American 
labor and French and Belgian socialists' rejections of Stockholm 
but now the initiators of the appeal were members of the Provision­
al Government. Though the American, French, and Italian governments 
within days were to refuse passports to socialists travelling to 
Stockholm, Lloyd George had an open mind concerning the Soviet 
proposition as of May 21 when he cabled Albert Thomas;
I should be very glad to know what you think as to the 
desirability of French and English Socialist Delegates 
attending Stockholm Conference.
I understand that German Socialists of both sections are 
to be there, and also Russian Socialists. I am afraid, 
that, unless the Allied cause is represented also, bad im­
pression may be produced on Russian Socialists. Our case 
is, from a democratic point of view, very strong. . . .  As 
far as war aims are concerned, I do not think there is any 
great difference between those of France and England and 
those of Russia. We could accept the declaration of the
i6o
new Russian Government. . . that. . .a general peace 
should not tend toward either domination!, of other na­
tions or the seizure of their national possessions, 
or the violent usurpation of their territories, and 
that it should be a peace without annexations or in­
demnities and based on the rights of nations to de­
cide their own affairs, provided that by those nhrases 
it was not intended that the French and British should be 
bound to restore to Turkish or German aisgovernment the 
populations in Africa and Mesopotamia wkich they have 
rescued from it, and also that it was understood that 
the provinces which have been tom from France by Ger­
man militarism should be restored to her.
If this case were put properly, it adgirt produce an 
important effect not only on Russian, but even on Ger­
man opinion. . .if Socialists from France and England 
axe prevented from attending, conclusions will be over­
whelming that their Governments are afraid to allow 
them to speak freely to their Russian Allies. . . .
It would no doubt be proper to see that none of the 
delegates were anti-patriotic, or in favor of peace at 
any price or any separate peace by Russia, but subject 
to that, it would probably be necessary to allow French 
and British Socialists to be represented by those whom 
they might select.^
This cautious, but pro-Stockholm stand remained the British Prime 
Minister's position until the late July meetings of the Allied 
powers revealed the possibility of Russia's military defection 
from the war.
Three days after Henderson arrived in Petrograd, the British 
Labour Secretary telegraphed Lloyd George that Thomas, Vandervelde,
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and himself agreed that the Soviet had to define its peace formula. 
Thomas and Vandervelde had informed the Soviet that they could ac­
cept the formula only if "it does not exclude deliverance in accor­
dance with the wishes of inhabitants or reparations." As for Stock­
holm, the duo insisted on "the exclusion of German and Austrian
l6l
majorities so long as they continue to tolerate their Governments." 
Henderson, Thomas, and Vandervelde also insisted "that before con­
sidering the Stockholm Conference there should be Allied Confer­
ence in London to prepare joint policy and settle conditions of 
participation." On June l6 Henderson telegraphed Lloyd George 
that the Soviet had a tendency towards meeting their views, but 
the true Russian position was: "Conference will be only success­
ful if Socialists regard themselves not as representatives of in­
dividual movements of belligerent factions but as representatives
of the individual movement of working classes towards a common
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goal of universal peace." Though Tseretelli finally consented 
to sending an observer to the proposed Allied conference in London, 
he feared it might prejudice the Soviet's role of arbitrator between 
socialists of the two belligerent coalitions. Tseretelli explained 
the Soviet's peace strategy in clear terms:
All previous attempts to reestablish the International 
were destroyed as a consequence of a ferocious mutual 
hostility of two blocs of socialist majorities created 
in the two belligerent coalitions. Only from the moment 
when the appeal to recreate international socialist uni­
ty was made by the Russian Revolution did the convocation 
of a conference become really feasible. This happened 
because the Russian Revolution, which received the sympa­
thetic feeling of the whole world democracy, showed by its 
actions that its international policy was free from the 
nationalistic passions borne of the war. We wish to pre­
serve this position at the conference, in order to appear 
as the conciliatory force between two hostile blocs and 
promote that agreement that one could reach only at the 
close of a war: at the same time the refusal of socialists
from both belligerent coalitions to support their imperi­
alist governments. If in the place of this, the representa­
tives of the Russian Revolution would go to the Stockholm 
conference as part of the socialist bloc of the Entente 
states, bound by the decisions of the bloc in all basic
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questions, the independent role of the representatives 
of the Russian Revolution would be reduced to nothing 
and thus would be lost the opportunity to use the pres­
tige of the Russian Revolution for the creation of a 
unitary, international socialist democracy.
Tseretelli maintained that the true enemy was imperialism. To
destroy the power of imperialism was to resolve the war and al 1
future wars. For the working masses and their socialist leaders
to direct their hostilities toward one another,.French, English,
and Russians against Germans and Austrians, when they should be
directing them toward the handful of imperialist in their own
countries was insane. Why accuse the German or French working
masses of war guilt, when the imperialist were the obvious guilty
parties? All socialists united on equal footing and participating
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in harmony could mount an all-out assault to destroy imperialism. 
While Tseretelli agreed that all Entente socialists functioned in 
democratic societies, had sent representatives into their govern­
ments, had supported the policy of defense, and had discouraged 
the imperialist cravings of their respective bourgeoisie, the
Russian socialists alone had entered their government to seek a
38
general peace without annexations and indeimities.
While Henderson and Thomas relaxed their position, Vander­
velde "obstinately resisted, and remained to the end inflexibly 
opposed to peace talks with the Scheidemaims, Davids, and Noskes." 
The Georgian Soviet leader almost broke down into tears when the 
Belgian socialist remained intransigent. Even Henderson remarked
to Lloyd George that he did not "feel much good would be done by
40
trying to establish much more intimate relations at present."
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Nevertheless Henderson desired to accommodate the Soviet leaders 
and yet not damage the Allied cause. On his way home 
Henderson gave an interview at Stockholm on July 17 that showed 
his open mind to a meeting there; he had not, however, dropped his in­
sistence on a consultative conference (as opposed to a binding
one) and for a more precise definition of the Soviet's peace for- 
1̂1
mula. Albert Thomas thought if his ministerial colleagues de­
cided to issue passports for Stockholm, he must go to the con­
ference even without obtaining any of the desired pre-conditions
(e. g., German admission of war guilt, the return of Alsace-Lor- 
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raine, etc.). As the French government had no intention of allow­
ing French nationals to journey to Stockholm, Thomas* position 
allowed him to accommodate his fellow ministers and the pro-Stockholm 
stand taken by his party as well as the Soviet. For Tseretelli the 
only hope was that the Soviet peace offensive would gain enough mo­
mentum to sway the British government in favor of the conference 
and thereby the rest of the Allies.
As of June, however, the Soviet and Dutch-Scandinavian init­
iatives still lacked coordination. On June 2 the latter asked
the Petrograd Soviet to send a delegation to Stockholm as a pre-
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liminary to the plenary conference. The Dutch-Scandinavian 
Committee had arranged nonbinding, preliminary audiences between 
the committee and the separate national delegations and hoped that 
the national delegations from neutral countries and from both bel­
ligerent camps would meet face to face in a "plenary conference"
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before June 10. The committee had not wished this, but the Bel-
^ans felt that separate interviews with different sections of
the International might develop the basis on which to convoke
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the full conference. Branting, who had come to dominate the 
Stockholm committee, found the Russians blatantly independent, 
ignoring the existing organization of the International. This 
echoed Vandervelde*s view that the Russian socialists "believed 
that the prestige of their revolution would put them in a position 
to impose their peace formula on the other socialist parties, in­
cluding the German majority socialists," To realize even this 
would have been remarkable, but the Soviet leaders denanded more: 
"You socialists of all countries must force your governments to 
state definitely and clearly that the platform of peace without 
annexations or indemnities on the basis of the self-determination
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of peoples is also their platform . . . ." Though the ill-defined 
power relationship between the Petrograd Soviet and the Provisional 
Government had allowed the "realization" of such a demand in Rus­
sia, no such division of state power existed in other countries. 
Branting criticized the Soviet invitation for regarding the main 
object of the conference as the liquidation of the party truce 
between socialists and their belligerent governments and for demand­
ing that those attending the conference carry out unfailingly al 1
46
conference decisions. Vandervelde, Henderson, and Thomas had criti­
cized the invitation along the same lines, now the Dutch-Scandinav­
ian Committee’s position meant probable conçromise for the Soviet’s 
stand.
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On July 2 the first part of the Petrograd Soviet's delegation, 
Iosif P. Goldenberg, E. Smirnov, and V, N. Rosanov (Mensheviks) ar­
rived in Stockholm followed a few days later by the Bundist Henrik 
Erlich and the SR N. S. Rusanov. The Soviet delegation fused 
with the Dutch-Scandinavian Committee on July 11 and two days later 
the new joint body published an invitation to a plenary conference
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at Stockholm on August 15. The invitation led off with "Proletar­
iats of all nations, unite your forces" and announced that the pre­
sent call came from the Petrograd Soviet, sanctioned by the All- 
Russian Congress of Soviets, and supported by the "effective co­
operation" of the Dutch-Scandinavian Committee. The provisional 
agenda was (1) the World War and the International, (2) the peace 
program of the International, (3) the ways and means of carrying 
the aims into effect. The summons was a compromise between the 
proposed objectives for the conference of the Soviet delegation 
and the Dutch-Scandinavian Committee. The Petrograd Soviet had 
called on all socialist parties to liquidate the peirty truce; now 
the policy was to induce the parties to do this. Although the 
binding character of conference decisions remained, this now meant 
that each socialist section would fulfill "without hesitation or 
deviation" general conference decisions, "insofar as they are in 
conformity with its principles jitalics min0 . . . ." The 
questions of war guilt and reparations, though raised in the meet­
ings, remained unsettled, as the Russians opposed placing war guilt 
on the agenda and argued that reparations had to come from a tax
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levied on wealth as the rich bore the greatest war guilt. As all 
all of the socialist sections of the Internat tonal had learned of 
the various programs submitted in preliminary audiences, the Rus­
sians opposed drafting a proposed peace formula based on the pre­
liminary reports that the committee had heard. The Soviet dele­
gates considered predigested decisions, even If only a basis for
49deliberation, only something to complicate matters. The Rus­
sian view prevailed.
Following their "better late than never" success at Stockholm 
the Soviet delegation minus Rosanov, who remained at Stockholm 
with the rest of the committee, set out for consultations with 
the British, French, and Italian socialists. As the Russians 
had difficulty in obtaining passage to London,the British gov­
ernment flattered them by placing them on an official government 
shlp.^^ The British action-, however, was probably more than it 
appeared, for on June 29 the Foreign Office had telegraphed 
Henderson, then in Petrograd preparing to return home, that the 
F. 0. "wished to know when Soviet delegates «111 arrive in 
England so as to prevent them from falling into wrong hands.
Thus perhaps more than mere coincidence saw t-h*» Russians and Hen­
derson on board the same ship that sailed from Bergen. Rusanov 
found Henderson impressed with the ideals of the Russian Revolution
but disturbed with the leadership's "impractlcality," i. e., their
52unbusiness-like character and political incapability in general.
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Henderson continued to insist on a consultative conference and
a more precise definition of the Soviet peace formula. The
Soviet delegates arrived in London on July 24 and the next day
the British Labour Executive, despite all their arguments,
53adopted Henderson's position. The Russians met some success as
Lloyd George cabled Henderson his approval for the Allied soci- 
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alist conference. In the meantime the Russians along with Hen­
derson, Ramsay MacDonald, and James Wardle went to Paris for
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a meeting scheduled with the French socialists.
In Paris a committee of six, Erlich and Goldenberg for the 
Russians, Jean Longuet and Pierre Renaudel for the French, and 
MacDonald and Henderson for the British, set about on July 30 
to work out differences raised in opening discussions with the 
full French Socialist party. In a July 31 published declaration 
the six endorsed the invitation of July 13, delayed the confer­
ence from August 15 to September 9-l6 at Stockholm, and arranged 
for an inter-Allied conference at London on August 28-29 to 
precede the general conference. Representatives going to Stock­
holm would include both pro-war majoritites and defeatist minor- 
ItlCes. Finally, while the socialist sections were to reveal 
at the conference the manner in which they proposed to carry
the general decisions of the meeting into effect, they were not
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bound to any specific action in their respective countries.
The Soviet delegates’ tour of Italy from August 4 to 15 
was a minor triun^h. Only the small prowar minority that had 
supported Italy's entrance into the war was skeptical of the
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proposed Stockholm Conference. The majority position was 
antiwar and emphatically pro-Stockholm. The Russians received 
acclaim in Florence, Milan, Rome, and Bologne and articulated 
their position in precise language. On August 4 Goldenberg 
declared before a highly excited crowd of 40,000 workers at 
Turin that "The Soviet has issued this call because it is pro­
foundly convinced that the day that autocratic governments will 
have disappeared from the world, the International of liberty 
and peace will not only be an aspiration but an accomplished 
fact." The prowar faction came around to the Soviet position 
after Goldenberg rejected the prospect of a separate peace be­
tween Russia and Germany and proclaimed his complete faithful­
ness to the Zimmerwald peace formula, adding: "The influence
of the Soviet, however, is not limited to the war. It has 
politically transformed Russia by seeing to it that the govern­
ment, under its pressure, promulgates a series of laws which 
are assuredly the most liberal in the world." Following this 
declaration, Filippo Turanti, the founder of Italian soc­
ialism, hailed the Russian delegates as "true patriots," who 
were attempting to align the destiny, the interests, and the 
defense of their country with those of the majority of Russia’s 
citizens. On August 6 the delegates arrived in Rome and the next 
day reached an agreement with the Italian Socialist party re­
garding the scope and program of the Stockholm Conference.
The leader of the majority party, G. M. Serrati, centered his
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concern mostly on tactics to keep the conference from breaking 
np over the inevitable question of war guilt. Though the Ital­
ians insisted on the reunion of the Italian-speaking sectors of 
Austria with Italy, they did agree to "accept and apply the de­
cisions in the spirit of socialism and internationalism in order
to achieve the union of the workers by joint action directed to-
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ward the hastening of the conclusion of the war."
In the meantime the Allied War Conference of July 25 and 
26, which revealed the near-total collapse of the Rus­
sian army, doubtless made Lloyd George more than skeptical about 
the Stockholm Conference. According to the prime minister, how­
ever, what turned him against Stockholm was the action of the 
socialists at Paris. The point of a consultative or a binding
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conference was as important to Lloyd George as to the socialists.
The July 31 socialist press declaration showed that Henderson
had allowed himself to drift from a consultative towards a bind- 
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ing conference. Perhaps Lloyd George reasoned as did Premier 
Ribot: if the Allied socialists would allow themselves to drift
from their principles before Stockholm, what might they agree to 
at Stockholm? The prime minister’s rejection of Stockholm, how­
ever, came at 5:30 P. M. July 30 before the socialists had come
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to a decision on Stockholm. The question of a consultative or 
binding conference at that time therefore was probably not the basis of 
Lloyd George ’ s rej ection , though he may well have reasoned that this 
aspect of the meeting had moved in that direction. Nevertheless, 
with British, French, and American popular opinion against the con­
ference, most of the British Parliament and the War Cabinet, and the U.S.,
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French, Italian, and Belgian governments, mo wonder Lloyd George 
finally dropped Stockholm when he learned <of status of the Rus­
sian Army.
Between August 1, the day Henderson returned from Paris, and 
August 11, the day he tendered his cabinet resignation, a compli­
cated chain of events occurred that led to the destruction of 
the Soviet peace program. The British Foreign Office cabled Sir 
George Buchanan, H. M. G.'s Ambassador to Sussia, on August 1 
concerning the Stockholm Conference: "The main arguments in its 
favour are that Russian Government desire it, that our refusal 
to attend would be put down to some sinister imperialistic mo­
tive, and that if only Russian, Neutrals, and Germans took part
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in the proceedings, latter would dominate the situation." On 
August 2 Buchanan urged a pro-conference stand:
So far as I know non-Socialist members of the Gov­
ernment like Minister of Foreign Affairs would much 
prefer that the Conference should not take place, as 
they are afraid that any talk about peace might have 
a bad influence on the army. They wiü, however, 
place no obstacle in the way of the attendance of the 
Russian Socialists, though they will not consider 
themselves in any way bound by any decisions which 
the conference may take. They much hope Socialists 
(of) other countries will attend conference so that 
Russia may not be the only country represented at it. 
Socialists on the other hand are al 1 in favour of 
conference though I am informed that their 
expectation of its results have fallen very much of 
late. . . . Intimate friend of Kerensky to whom I 
spoke about conference today said that he earnestly 
hoped that British Socialists would attend conference 
as a refusal to on our part would expose us to attack 
in Socialist circles here and be attributed to motives 
which you mention.
I do not feel myself competent to express opinion 
but my personal view has been always that it would be
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a mistake for us to leave the field clear to Germans 
and to render our attitude liable to misconstruction 
here. As we have no intention of being bound by its 
decisions I do not see how attendance of British Soc­
ialists can cause any prejudice to our interest.
Again on August 4 Buchanan telegraphed the Foreign Office and
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argued for the conference. In light of Allied opinion as a
whole, however, the F. 0. discounted Sir George's view. The
minutes of the F. 0. for August 5 also reveal that its anti-
Stockholm position resulted in part from an anti-Soviet stance:
"It looks more and more as if participation in the Conference
will merely serve to strengthen the hands of the ' Soviet ' as
6h
against the Provisional Gov't."
Lloyd George, however, needed some justification if the British 
government refused to issue passports for Stockholm— in effect 
reject Stockholm. It came unexpectedly the next day in a note 
from the Russian charge d'affaires in London, Konstantin Nabokov. 
Nabokov's note of August 8 was nothing more than a truism but
65it carried a terrific impact:
Urgent & Strictly Confidential.
London, 8th August, I917.
Your Excellency,
In a telegram I sent to the Russian Foreign 
Minister three or four days ago I gave him an account of the 
statements made in the House of Commons by the Prime Minister 
and Mr» Henderson concerning the letter's visit to Paris, as 
•well as of Mr. Bonar Law's statement regarding the Stockholm 
Conference and of the discussions which were taking place in 
the different labour Organizations of Great Britain as to the 
desirability of sending delegates to Stockholm. I also drew 
the Russian Foreign Minister's attention to the reply given
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by the American Federation of Labour to the French 
Confederation Generale du Travail. Ha conclusion I 
said the following; "I consider it absolutely neces­
sary, with a view to safeguarding the stability and 
closeness of our union with Great Britain where the 
majority of public opinion is adverse to the Confer­
ence, that I should be in a position to declare most 
ençhatically to Mr. Balfour that the Russian Govern­
ment, as well as His Majesty’s Government, regard this 
matter as a party concern and not a matter of state, 
and that the decisions of the Conference, should it be 
convened, would in no way be binding on the future 
course of Russian policy and of Russia’s relations with 
her Allies."
In reply to this message I have just received the fol­
lowing telegram:- "I entirely approve of the dec­
laration to be made to His Majesty's Government in the 
sense suggested by you, and you are authorised to inform 
the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that, al­
though the Russian Government do not deem it possible 
to prevent Russian delegates from taking part in the 
the Stockholm Conference, they regard this Conference 
as a party concern and its decisions in no ways binding 
upon the liberty of action of the Government."
I hasten to lay before you the above information as 
I fear that the ingression has hitherto prevailed that in 
the words of one of the London newsp«ç>ers "Russia ardently 
desired the Stockholm Conference", and this argument has 
been put forward in order to influence British public 
opinion in favour of the Labour and Socialist Parties of 
Great Britain participating in the Conference.
I have the hour to be.
Your Excellency’s most obedient, humble Servant,
(Signed) C. Nabokoff.
The Rt. Honble. Arthur James Balfour, P. C. , M. P., 
etc. etc. etc.
Essentially the Nabokov document deals with two points: differ­
entiating between a "party concern" (the Soviet parties) and a 
"matter of State," and en^hasizing the nonbinding character of 
the conference. These two points are precisely those that Hender­
son also stressed and which Lloyd George and the War Cabinet knew 
as his stand. Neither Nabokov nor Russia's Foreign Minister
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Tereshchenko stated that the Russian government did not desire 
the conference's convocation, but Nabokov did present Tereshchen­
ko's reply in such a way that allowed the British Foreign Office 
to read this into the note. That the F. O. did read the communique 
this way is clear from the F. 0. minutes for August 8: "This
shows, to unexpected degree, how far the influence of the Soviet 
has declined within the last few weeks. . , reply that H. M. G.
welcome this further proof of the identity of view which exists66
between the two Governments." Henderson, was immediately sent a 
copy of Nabokov's note as was Lloyd George.
On August 10 a telegram from Albert Thomas to Lloyd George 
strengthened the British izzpression that the Kerensky government, 
which had assumed office only on August 6, concurred that the 
conference should not meet. Thomas had received word from Eugene 
Petit, his close associate in the French Embassy in Petrograd,
N ^7that "Kerensky ne veut pas de Congres." Henderson, while wait­
ing at No. 10 Downing Street to see Lloyd George, heard of this
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telegram from Paul Mantoux of the French Embassy staff in London.
The following afternoon the French charge d'affaires, M. de Fleurian,
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officially informed the Foreign Office of the telegrsim. Paul
Gambon hinted later that Thomas had seen the handwriting on the
70
wall and had by late July conformed to the wishes of Ribot.
Only two days after sending Lloyd George the "Kerensky" telegram,
71
Thomas publicly spoke out against the proposed Stockholm Conference.
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The two comnruniques did in fact reflect Kerensky's and
Tereshchenko's private positions concerning the conference;
they could not, however, admit this publicly. A dispatch
from Ambassador Buchanan to the Foreign Office on August 12
confirms this; "Both Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign
Affairs admit that they would rather it not meet but that as
they could not prevent Russian Socialists going to it they
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would like other Allied Socialists to go too." The F. 0. 
minutes in response to this read: "Russian views on the sub-
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ject appear to vary from day to day." The British govern­
ment thus took the communiques from Nabokov and Thomas at 
face value. They did not understand the position of the gov­
ernment in Russia in relation to the Petrograd Soviet, and 
therefore they assumed that they could strengthen the Provision­
al Government against the Soviet by repudiating the conference.
Lloyd George's memoirs as well as the writings of Lord Milner and
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others in the War* Cabinet at the time confirm this. The Lloyd 
George government, however, was ready to accept what it wanted 
to hear and was deaf to sage advice from its ambassadors. Sir 
Esme Howard in Stockholm and Sir George Buchanan in Petrograd.
The F. 0. made no attempt to confirm through its ambassador to 
Russia that such was indeed the position of the Provisional Gov­
ernment. Britain would never have committed such a demarche 
against another of her wartime allies.
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Lloyd George hoped that his government would not have to
confront the issue and that British labour itself would kill 
75
the proposition. He heid tried to make clear to Henderson in 
an August 8 cabinet meeting that the government was not about 
to allow the British socialists to take part in the conference. 
Henderson's position, as Labour Party Secretary, however, was 
that British labour would make a decision independent of out­
side agitation; he would not serve as Lloyd George's instrument 
within the Labour Party Conference.
When the Labour Party Conference opened, Henderson and 
Lloyd George had clearly drawn the lines. The prime minister 
had tried his best to influence Henderson to a neutral position, 
if not one in opposition, to the Stockholm Conference. Upon 
hearing that the labour minister at the opening of the party 
conference had passionately (to Lloyd George's mind) endorsed 
the Stockholm Conference, the prime minister sent a further copy
of Nabokov’s note with the request that "he would communicate
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it to the Conference" (en^hasis mine). Henderson had already 
made reference to Nabokov's note when he stated that the Russian 
government (August 6) had recently changed;
We are bound to recognise that there has been a tre­
mendous change. The Provisional Government then in 
power is no longer in office. It has been replaced by 
an entirely new Coalition under the leadership of that 
brave soul, Kerensky. I admit that such evidence as I 
have, thou^ it is very slight, suggests that there has 
been some modification of the position of the new Govern­
ment as compared with the old, on the question of the 
proposed Conference.
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Henderson spoke of Nabokov's note as slight evidence, because 
it essentially confirmed his position that the Stockholm Con­
ference was a party affair and nonbinding on the government.
He therefore had no reason to make a special point of the note, 
Lloyd George, however, wanted the note ençhasized and attempted 
to force Henderson to influence the voting of the labour con-
78
ference through it. Labour voted 3-to-l to attend Stockholm.
Defeated, Lloyd George now mounted a personal attack a-
gainst Henderson which resulted in grave damage to the Russian
cause. By discrediting Henderson, the prime minister hoped to
block the Stockholm Conference. Therefore, towards evening of
that same day, the prime minister asked Nabokov if he had any
objections to H. M. G. publishing in a letter to the press the
"gist of your government's message to you" concerning the
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Stockholm Conference. No sovereign government would ever al­
low another government to publish the "gist" of a matter within 
the context of an open communique. Furthermore, no charge d'af­
faires has such a license; the request was a clear breach of 
diplomatic protocol. At the same time Lloyd George formulated 
this request of Nabokov, the Thomas telegram arrived. The War 
Cabinet minus Henderson discussed.the entire affair, along with 
the Nabokov and Thomas notes that same evening. Lloyd George
presented a letter for public release to force Henderson's resig-
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nation which the cabinet quickly approved. About 7 P. M. 
Henderson learned of the Thcxnas telegram, %diile waiting to see
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the prime minister. Lloyd George, however, did not mention the
telegram to Henderson during the course of their discussion
81
that night but clearly vented his displeasure. The next morn­
ing Henderson sent Lloyd George his resignation which the prime 
minister promptly sent along to the press with a long covering 
letter in which he asserted that Henderson had deceived the
Labour Party Conference, misled his colleagues in the War Cabi-
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net, and opposed the wishes of the Russian government. The
government had informed the press of everything as the accounts
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contained a wealth of detail. Essentially, the newspapers
stated that the Russian government was against the Stockholm
Conference and Henderson had knowingly withheld this information.
The Daily Express , surprisingly, told its readers that
"M. Kerensky and his colleagues are entirely indifferent to the 
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conference."
On August 12 at 9 P. M. a telegram from Sir George Buchanan 
arrived at the Foreign Office, stating the true position of the 
Provisional Government toward the Stockholm Conference. Surpris­
ingly, the Lloyd George government did not refer to this communi­
que and reveal the correct position of the Russians during the
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heated debate in the House of Commons on August 13. On August
13 Kerensky's denial that he was against the conference appeared
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in the London newspapers. When Ramsay MacDonald questioned 
the government about this, Bonar Law responded that the initia­
tive in disclosing the real attitude of the Russian government was
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Russian. The Kerensky message contained in the Thomas tele­
gram and the Nabokov were therefore differientiated, and while 
the former was repudiated, the Nabokov note was not. Nabokov 
issued no new statements and only received a sharp reprimand ftom
89
Tereshchenko, yet he continued to hold his post— thus his note 
continued to support the Lloyd George government. Kerensky and 
Tereshchenko issued denials to the press that they were against 
the conference and attempted through Sir George to gain redress
90
through the British government. On August 15 Buchanan cabled 
the F. 0. that Kerensky begged the British not to refuse passports 
for the Stockholm Conference; that Nabokov had made a grevious
91
"gaffe." The minutes of the F. 0. concerning this telegram 
read: "I scarcely think M. Nabokov’s note quite merits these
strictures. If his translation is accurate, the phrase, ’although 
the Russian Gov’t do not.deem it possible to prevent Russian del­
egates from taking part’ - the words of the Russian Gov’t., not 
M. Nabokov - is open to the inference that they do not want them
92
to take part." The F. 0. replied to Buchanan on August 17 that 
neither Lloyd George nor Nabokov ever stated that the Russian gov­
ernment did not want the conference, but that the new Russian
government was not promoting it and could not prevent delegates
93
from attending it. The F. 0. found that Lloyd George and Na- 
bokov had acted with perfect propriety. On August 20 Buchanan 
again wired the F, 0. that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
continued to insist that the denial of passports for Stockholm was
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a grave error. The Russian minister stated that he took no ex­
ception to his official telegram being quoted but objected to 
Lloyd George quoting Nabokov's covering letter; "If correspon­
dence of this kind were made public in connection with internal 
political controversies His Excellency did not see how frank and 
confidential intercourse between two governments was to be carried
95
out." The F. O.'s response to this was: "An exaggerated im­
portance appears to have been attached to M. Nabokov’s letter.
96
The matter may be allowed to drop." Indeed, Lloyd George had 
attached an exaggerated inçortance to Nabokov's letter on August 
9-13- What was the results of the British prime minister's 
fast and loose play for Russia?
When the Russian messages released by Lloyd George ap­
peared in the press, a storm of controversy erupted in Petro­
grad. The announcement appalled the Soviet delegates promoting
the Stockholm Conference in visits to London, Paris, and Rome.
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They immediately telegraphed Petrograd for an explanation. 
Kerensky's first denials appeared in the London press on August 
13 and two days later he released an official statement:
The Provisional Government considers that the solu­
tion of questions affecting war and peace appertains 
exclusively to it, in union with the Governments of 
the Allied countries, supported by the Allied democr­
acies .
The Socialist conference at Stockholm, as the Russi­
an Government has pointed out on various occasions, is 
a conference of particular political parties, and, as 
such, can lay no claim to formulate decisions which 
could in any way bind the Government.
i8o
The Government has always been far from intending 
to refuse Russian Socialists passports for Stockholm, 
its view being that it is useful that questions con­
cerning war and peace should be submitted for discus­
sion to the Socialist Internationale, and in the per­
son of the Prime Minister as well as of the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, has similarly informed the Allied 
Governments that it considers it undesirable to raise 
any obstacles whatever to the partie^ation of Social­
ist organizations in the Conference.^
When a journalist asked Kerensky directly,"that M. Albert Thomas 
declared you said that you personally are opposed to the Stock­
holm Conference," Kerensky responded: "Nothing of the sort
. . .  I have insisted again and again that any opposition of­
fered to it by the Allied Governments. . .is sinçly playing into
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the German's hands." The next day Tereshchenko commented fur­
ther that his statement was reported out of context and had 
been in response to a specific request from Nabokov. The posi­
tion of the Provisional Government had not changed from that of 
May 1st when Tereshchenko first took over the position of Minister 
for Foreign Affairs. The Russian government had communicated 
none of the comments or interpretation communicated by Nabokov 
to the British government. Finally, Tereshchenko emphasized
that Kerensky did not send a telegram respecting the conference to
100
Thomas or anyone else.
The official Russian responses to what had happened in Lon­
don somewhat calmed the nervous socialists in Petrograd. Izvestiia 
reported on August 17 that the revolutionary democracy felt as­
sured of the intentions of the government in carrying out the 
foreign policy goals of "revolutionary defensism." The following
I8l
day the Menshevist Rabochaia gazeta accused the Allies of using 
"naked force"; that their action constituted a breakup of the 
"union sacre"; that the in^erialist bourgeoisie had declared 
war against the entire socialist proletariat of Europe. The 
Bolshevik organ, Rabochii i soldat, accused their Russian social­
ist opposition of being two-faced in their criticism: "What is
101
this? Brazen insolence or pitiable confusion?" Rech*, the 
Kadet newspaper, saw Tereshchenko as finally having liberated 
himself from the Petrograd Soviet. They took his response that 
the conference was a party affair and not binding on the govern­
ment as a major depature from previous policy, and praised it.
Tereshchenko, the liberals felt, now sounded and acted somewhat102
like a foreign minister.
The Petrograd Soviet leaders immediately grasped Kerensky's
protestations as their newspapers' pronouncements indicate.
Within the SR party only the Petersburg organization took action
against the government by censuring the socialist ministers in
the cabinet for not performing their duty better. Beyond this
reprimand, however, they suggested nothing more than a drastic
103
shakeup of the diplomatic corps. Livshits and Bur stein led
the floor fight in the Soviet plenum to cut off debate on the
question when Martov demanded an investigation of the entire 
104
affair. Martov had from the start no trust in the Tseretelli- 
Dan "two pronged" policy of a conference of socialists at Stock­
holm followed by a conference of Allied governments in London.
182
He reportedly said of Stockholm that socialist delegates would
"go there as commis voyageurs of external affairs" for the 
105
government. Concerning the Allied governments' conference, 
Martov insisted that they were in^erialists who would under­
stand only a real ultimatum. He and Lenin alone offered alter­
natives to the Tsereteli! peace program.
While the majority socialists in the executive committee 
were able to close the debate momentarily, they were unable 
to do anything apparently about the growing clamor that soon 
raged outside the forum of the Petrograd Soviet. The demise of 
the Stockholm Conference left them without a peace program. As 
they refused to engage in a separate peace, this opened the 
masses, who desired peace at all costs, to mobilization by Lenin 
and his cadres. The quest for peace had assumed priority in 
all revolutionary policies. Had the leadership gambled everything 
on obtaining peace through the Tseretelli-Dan strategy? What 
economic, social, and political reforms had they undertaken to 
insure that internal war did not break out while they undertook 
the quest for peace?
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CHAPTER V 
THE SOVIET AED INTERNAL AFFAIRS 
I. The Economy
Though the revolutionary parties had long advocated economic re­
form, none of them had a definite economic program <:t the time of the 
outbreak of the revolution. Only E. E. Sukh-.nov and V. G. Grom an of 
the members of the Petrograd Soviet's executive cct.m.ittce had any 
real knowledge of economics and Sukhanov admitted that he had forgotten 
v;hat hc: usud to know and "fi.l t like a comp i et.e dii-,muante in mudi mat- 
ters . Grom.x! , ! ;ov;ccc r, as e.mrly as ka rch 17, i.nt/mm-d Suithancv oi; 
a defir:‘e organizational scheme for the Russian eco.:o::y that he had 
formulated long before the collapse of the autocracy. Essentially, 
all branches of the economy had to be regulated by tire state. "The 
state must undertake . . . the de facto organization of the national 
economy, and thereby also the distribution of manpomcr. So I now
propose that a committee for the organization of the national economy
2
and labor be set up," hc stated. The acute shortage of grain had 
largely prompted Groman's theory of regulation. The supply 
problem could not be corrected, according to Gromaii, without an im­
mediate bread monopoly, and a bread monopoly could not be introduced 
in isolation without regulating all other branches of the economy and 
fixing prices. S. N. Prokopovich, the well-known contemporary econo-
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mist and moderate Social Democrat, agreed with Groman but maintained
3that the weak Provisional Government could not realize such a program.
While the Petrograd Soviet initially attacked the economic prob­
lem on human rather than theoretical grounds by purging reactionary 
bureaucrats engaged in carrying out the economic program of the late 
regime, other forces in Russian society sought to mold economic policy 
to their advantage. The commercial entrepreneurs wanted no state reg­
ulation and maintained that the revolution brought freedom from even 
the minimal tsarist wartime economic policy. The industrialists, how­
ever, maintained that if commerce had a free liand, the industries work­
ing for the war effort would come under unfavorable conditions. They 
therefore proposed tlie elimination of the commerci.:: 1 middleman and 
state cent rol Lo r i a t pr.ivh.cer.a a .d ccam ua.ers i a L': a in no t c.r .tac t.
The cooperative socioa.'les also do:, .ntded the curtei::. ant of commercial 
interests and at a:ended state intervention lo help th-take the place 
of private commerce as the cooperatives should be e: er.pt from state 
controls. The workers too demanded control but th.: s usually meant 
joint determination by labor and capital in each enterprise, not gov­
ernmental supervision. A. I. Konovalov, Minister of Trade and Industry, 
agreed to institute state control of production as well as distribution. 
He supported limiting the profits of capital, nationalizing Russia's 
underground riches, and passing broad social legislation for labor. 
Konovalov maintained that capital-labor control of production would




The Petrograd Soviet leaders added their efforts to those of Kono­
valov to place the nation's economy under state control. TiiCy maintained, 
as did Konovalov, that state control was necessary to avert internal war 
between capital and labor and save the economy and thereby the revolution 
from ruin. When the Soviet leaders joined the coalition cabinet in mid- 
May, doubtless they understood that responsibility for the economic fate 
of the nation lay, in the eyes of tlie masses, partially with the ruling 
Soviet majority. Therefore upon its formation the n-uw coalition govern­
ment at the insistence of its socialist meiu.bers issued a forceful state­
ment concerning the economy: "The Provisional Cover;.: ent will consistently
and resolutely combat ti.e économie confusion in the cr n t ry by ttio syste­
matic enforcement of state and public control over iiv.l j.n try, transport,
cc.mmerco. and t.he distribution j;rodnct s , and if in. oerr.ary 'nil. I lia'ce
5
recourse to the organixe.tlcn of prod no t Lon . " Tills leoed dec la rat : eii, 
threatening control of production in addition to tiia-: oi distribution, re­
quired a n.ore precise definition to become operataL'lo, Within days the 
economic department of the executive committee of the l’etrograd Soviet sup­
plied the essentials for a broad program of state regulation of the econo­
my. "For branches of industry," read this program, "the time is right for 
the formation of regulating state trusts (coal, oil, p.ctals, sugar, paper); 
and finally, for almost all branches of industry currunt conditions demand 
a regulative participation of the state in the distribution of rav; materials 
and finished products, and also in the fixation of prices. . . . Simultan­
eously with this is the necessity of placing under control . . . all credit
194
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institutions." On May 29 the executive committee adopted this program, 
addressed it to tlie Provisional Government, admonishing tlie Liberal seg­
ment of the cabinet that the non-fulfillment of the economic task had 
destroyed the old regime and resulted in the reorganization of the now 
government. That same day M. I. Skobelev, Soviet vice-chairman and 
Labor Minister, reported to the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, "We 
have convinced the Provisional Government of the necessity of such
7
decisive intervention by state power" in struggling with economic chaos.
The Petrograd Soviet's economic position was Largely only the logical 
outcome of measures resorted to by the old regime. T.'.e socialists regarded 
vigorous state intervention in the economic life or. the nation as typical 
of wartime- policy in all belligerent countries. In Tn"land this took the 
form of state control, in Germ m y  of a mixed and unc"r:ci.':I o r , r  : t ion
of supply an..; of con i. U; so ;:y synci i.ca *'icui. Artinii Ur lo:' ; r-mci, Rrltish l.a h-ou r. 
Party Secretary and War Cabinet Minister, expressed ideas of the Petro­
grad Soviet leaders as well as iiis own, when he st.ate .l before the Moscow 
Trade Exchange Committee: "You should know that all industry, all work
for supplying the army has been brought under strict supervision by the 
English government, and there are almost no conflict.-: with the workers. . . 
The interests of the state must come first. . . . Do not think that this
is socialism. This is merely a temporary necessity, for the state is
t'
fighting for its very existence, for its integrity." Skobelev echoed this 
when he declared: "When we speak of energetic intervention of the state
in production with the idea of regulating and controlling it, we do not, 
of course, mean sociaListproduction nor state socialism, but the minimum
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of measures which is necessary in national business Life, and which has
9
already been realized in England.” While Soviet leaders did concur with 
Henderson's view on state control, tliey, unlike their capitalist counter­
parts, did not see economic reforms as inconsistent with the spirit of 
such a position.
In response to the Petrograd Soviet's demands a conference of repre­
sentatives from the ministries of labor, trade and industry, and finance 
drew up a program for state regulation of the economy. They advised the 
supervision of industry and the banks financing it through government 
commissars delegated to take part in tlie management of, the various enter­
prises. The conference recommended a state monopoly cf coal and petroleum 
along with the complusnry syndication of all other cu' rpri_ses under state 
control and considered Wiorc s t r iro,ent statu i nt urvcn ; i n desired in mining, 
smelting, and textiles. State control I't production rin.d distribution was
to be effected through the intermediary of the existing committees of sup- 
10
ply.
On May 31 Konovalov resigned, destroying tiio united front of i iie Soviet 
and the ministers against excesses by capital and by labor. Tseretelli 
recollected later that Konovalov was a man who desired to make headway, but 
that he had no will-power and feared his fellow industrialists. In the 
middle of his last speech before the cabinet, he suffered a nervous breakdown 
and sobbing said: "Control over industry under the circumstances our rev­
olution hasdeveloped, will become the uneducated worker's tyranny, and it 
will ruin Russian industry." The cabinet prevailed upon him without success 
to understand that a democratically organized state control would protect
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industry, not destroy it. "This scene made an all the more pitiful
impression," recounted Tseretelli, "since Konovalov, a weak and harmless
being, stood in crying opposition to the political sabotage which had
been forced upon him by his milieu, the blind and egotistical bourgeois
11
autocratic exertion of power. . . Konovalov had indeed been caught
in a cross-fire. Only days before his resignation, the industrialists
liad accused him of treason to his class for sidinu with Tseretelli,
12
Chernov, and Skobelev over government demands. On Kay 24 Skobelev had
carried the argument to the Petrograd Soviet, calling f o r  the confiscation
of 100 percent of the capitalists' excessive profits over the- pa.s t two 
13
yeais of the war. Tseretelli admitted later that th; "revolutionary
democracy" did try to nlcce trie p̂ -j't.iry burden on \;e:lt!i, but at the same
time tile So \ let also tried to maire I he am riie; s u;;d, r ■ m.d tiiut sac.rif ices
by labor we iv in order: incessant s: ri.kt's and a rbit tr ry ! owcr in,, of
output by workers menaced ail efforts at re juv ena Lii';■ t he nation's economy.
With Konovalov's resignation Tseretelli and his supporters were faced
with a dilemma. As Chernov explained: "Should they give the coalition
with tlie political representatives of commerce and in.lustry, or, for the
sake of coalition, renounce the extensive program of reconstruction which
15
they had laid down? They flinched and gave way, a fatal retreat!" Tsere­
telli had entered the coalition to avert civil war, to leave it meant he 
would face tiie same prospect. It appeared that the Sjviet leaders had no 
choice but to compromise with the "political representatives of commerce 
and industry" and hope that they could persuade the working class to relax 
their demands. As a result, the special declarations prepared by Skobelev
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and Stepanov, Acting Minister of Trade and Industry, were sacked. The
government had proposed to syndicalize private enterprises in the chief
16
industries under state supervision; now this was dropped. The Provis­
ional Government now contemplated only limited state intervention in 
the national economy. The Petrograd Soviet still suggested chat substi­
tuting the state for private owners would eliminate one of the causes 
of the conflict--the workers' conviction that the owners made excessive 
profits. Even before, Konovalov's resignation, the government, however, 
doubted that such a transfer would increase output and distribution, 
first, because of tlie government's financial embarra s sment, and secondly, 
because of tlie difficulty tlie governm nt would have in dealing with tiie 
organs of labor control that had do facto sprung up in th.ese industries.
The Provisional Covci.-nment, c iiere "o rc , d<i:cid_d to in L ,..bo, e only a
state monopoly in tiic t rade of fuel and a more rigor on r contre.J. over
17
the distribution of metals. The government also cc.ntemplated instituting
IS
controls over cotton and leather goods along the same lines as those in 
metals and fuels respectively. Though the Petrograd mevict on May 29 had 
demanded state monopolies of meat, salt, and bread and a state trust in 
sugar, the Provisional Cover ment enacted only a monopoly of grain and of 
sales in sugar.
On July 6 the All-Russian Congress of Workers' a .id Soldiers' Soviets 
adopted a resolution of the Petrograd Soviet, spelling out the fiscal 
demands of the "revolutionary democracy": (1) limit the issuance of paper money,
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(2) reform the income tax and tax on war profits (removing tax loopholes),
(3) enact a !iigh extraordinary property tax for emergency expenditures,
(4) radically reform death duties and tax unearned increments and luxuries,
19
and (5) exact no indirect taxes on articles of general consumption.
The government's response to these fiscal demands resulted in the draft­
ing of legislation to reform tire income tax, the war profits tax, and 
death duties, and tlie enacting of an extraordinary income tax levy and a 
general property tax. The general property tax and death duties reform 
never passed into law and only the implusive spirit of the revolutionary 
period compelled the government to sanction the extraordinary income tax 
levy. The most effective argLuuent for its introduction was the immensely 
popular idea among tiie representatives of tlie Petrograd Soviet of confis-
20
eating onc-fi.fti: of a 11 private property for the honor i t of the troa sury.
Despite Soviet opposition, the governr ont did introduce hi glier indirect 
taxes on such consumer items as tobacco. To eliminate tiie necessity of 
issuing more paper money, the government lioped to float loans at home 
and abroad. Though considered by the socialists a tax on future gener­
ations, the Petrograd Soviet on May 5 openly supported a "Liberty Loan" 
to utilize some twelve billion rubles of free funds in banking institutions.
On July 11 the All-Russian Congress of Soviets pleaded for support of the 
"Liberty Loan," at which time only three of the twelve billion free rubles 
had been subscribed. Through contributions from the soldiers and workers 
the Petrograd Soviet subscribed more than 400,000 rubles. Moscow Jewish organi­
zations alone gave 20 million rubles. As for the capitalists, the moderate
socialist organ, Den', complained: "On the minister's first list, the upper
21
bourgeoisie is conspicuous by its absence."
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The Petrograd Soviet demanded not only a new economic program
but insisted that the success of any program depended on a complete
reorganization of all existing administration. The Soviet leaders
required that the makeup and functions of the economic administration
accord with the ideas of the revolutionary socialist parties. They
maintained that unofficial as well as state institutions, such as
the war industries committees, the zemstvos and town unions, etc.
needed reorganization. The Soviet leaders also suggested the
creation of new bodies to settle questions not dealt with before the 
22
revolution.
In response to the Petrograd Soviet's call for reorganizing the 
nation's economic administration, the government reconstituted and 
tlio/'ougjiiy reorganized the work methods of tiir cci'-"'.: revs of su.ppi.y, 
the pr'n.ary i :: terme diary to effect state control. K-■ : r e sc n ta t iv :• a of 
labor organizations, cooperative societies, and the democratic intel-
ligentsia r.iatle up the new memoership. Supplementing these coiraiitteeE, 
controlling tlie several branches of industry and finance, were general 
committees or councils of supply to deliberate on general economic pol­
icy and coordinate the work of all the committees. A supreme economic
committee supervised all these committees, controlling labor conditions
23
and the economic policy of the nation as a whole.
The supreme economic committee and its subcommittee, the economic 
council, grew out of the May 29th Soviet resolution calling for a high 
government organ to deal with questions of economic control and planning
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Upon the recommendation of M. I. Skobelev, the Menshevik Labor Minister
and "Star Chamber" representative, the government approved of the two
economic organs on June 9. Skobelev and five other cabinet members
drew up the legislation and on July 4 the government established the
economic council and the supreme economic committee. The economic
council only began its work in August, and then dissolved after only
eight sessions. Because of its diverse class and party composition,
debates in the council, on almost every subject, emerged in sharp
controversy, and as the debates were of a very general and theoretical
character, the practical \.'ork bocan:e concentrated in the eight minister-
24
member .supreme economic committee.
Did the efforts of the Petrograd Soviet and the provisional Govern­
ment }icld an} positive rcsnlis? The gove rnm.m t hoped to re.,:0'.'c ti.e 
existing abus.s in feel and metal distribution, abolish profiteering, 
and put an end to the excessive rise of prices on the open market. The 
introduction of the fuel trade monopoly and the stricter supervision of 
metal distribution, however, did not seriously alter previous practices 
of distribution and supply. The special council had already forbidden 
private purchases without its permission, and in theory the state directed 
all distribution, as permits for the sale and transport and assignment 
of each quota to each category of consumers rested wli.ii the government.
By the regulations of 1916 the special council had tlie right to declare 
fuel and metals state property, yet the council did rot avail itself of 
this right before August 1917. The law did what the special council might
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have done on its own authority. As for the fuel trade monopoly, it 
related only to Donetz coal and did not apply to other kinds of fuel,
25
such as petroleum and wood, or even to coal from other mining districts. 
Cotton and leather goods controls were similarly unsuccessful. Possibily 
the only commodity that yielded any practical results from the grain 
monopoly decree of April 7 was in the cereals industry. Owing to the 
shortage of sugar and the consequent necessity of regulating the distri­
bution of local supplies, a quasi-state monopoly of sugar existed prior 
to March 1917. A central office controlled the purchase price of raw 
sugar and enforced an equitable distribution among the refineries. The
pressing need for more revenue after March 1917 led to the making of
26
sales in sugar a state monopoly. As for taxes, besides being nigh
impossible to collect, the extraordinary income tax died in postponements,
while the popular masses were unable to pay increased regressive taxes
because inflation had reduced their purchasing power by half. True the
depreciation of the ruble had by this time reached such a low that had
the government increased the rates of 1913 five times, receipts would
have only equalled those of 1913. Prices, however, rose faster than
27
wages, even if taxes did not increase as rapidly as wages. Never­
theless, Torgovo-Promvshlennaia gazeta repeated a highly popular cap­
italist argument in its August 15, 1917 issue: "The increase in scales
of indirect taxations by no means corresponds to the increased nominal 
purchasing power of the population, especially of the working class."
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Finally, while not a complete failure, the "Liberty Loan" was by no
mpans sufficient to arrest the monetary crisis and the government had
no choice but to issue more and more paper currency.
The results of the economic efforts of the Petrograd Soviet and
the Provisional Government were negligible. The attempt to establish
state control and implement a democratic financial policy failed. At
the All-Russian Congress of Soviets in July, Groman, the architect of
state control for the Soviets, angrily denounced capital as the cause
of the failure, adding that "the industrialists' opposition to govern-
28ment intervention must be crushed." The Petrograd Soviet leaders urged 
a forced loan on capital, but the government suggested the freezing 
of funds first to allow the enterpreneurs to come around and rally to 
the government. The working class, however, had had enough of indus­
trial lockouts and entrepreneurial sabotage, real or imagined, had 
never understood the Petrograd Soviet's support of state control as 
opposed to workers' control, and knew only that their economic con­
dition had worsened. The effect of price increases between May and
29
August 1917 alone halved real wages.' The result was the revolt of 
labor.
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2. The March of Labor
The Petrograd Soviet of Workers' Deputies in 1917 was ostensibly 
the organ of Russian labor. It stood for the immediate social and ec­
onomic improvement of the toiling masses and the establishment of trade 
unions as labor economic organs. The leaders of the Petrograd Soviet 
attempted to organize and lead politically and economically from "above." 
The majority of Russian labor, unskilled and undisciplined, however, at­
tempted to create organs from "below," as they had in 1905 when the
30
Petersburg Soviet emerged from a strike committee. In the first montlis 
of the revolution Chose bodies generally cooperated to promote the wel­
fare of Russian labor, t!ie portent was that the factory committees would 
eventual clasl; with, the soviets and trade unions.
The "Star Cha .ber" usually wjidujd L!irougi'. Skobelev, booeanov, and 
Gvozdev to solve labor problems. Lcgdanov was completely at home in the 
political problems of the labor movement. From the moment he arrived 
from Kresty prison to help organize the Soviet, he tore into the work of 
setting up links with the factory workers. While Bogdanov delved into 
organizational matters, Gvozdev worked directly with workers' delegations 
that came to the Soviet or went directly to factories to settle disputes. 
Skobelev planned and coordinated the Soviet's labor program. Tseretelli 
and the rest of the "Star Chamber" did not usually become directly in­
volved in labor matters. Tseretelli recollected later how he observed 
the efforts of Soviet personnel, the socialist parties, and the labor 
unions to secure the greatest possible gains yet direct the proletariat
20k
toward attainable goals. In practice this consisted primarily of ap­
peals to calm and prudence against demagogical promises, and of explana­
tions that persistent work would lead to t.he formation of a class or­
ganization and state apparatus that would restore the war-ruined indus­
try and thereby also the workers' lot. As Tseretelli knew: "Tiiis was
the only road, a slow but secure one, on which the necessary social re-
31
forms could be achieved."
From the first days of the revolution the Petrograd Soviet was 
deeply involved in the economic life of the capital. The executive 
committee handled numerous srec i fic requests from labor for tiic restor­
ation of public facilities and operation of private enterprises. On March 
18 the Soviet issued a general appeal for Petrograd laborers to return 
to w:>rk. This did not ncv.n,  ̂x' C 1 : d , that i;;x: wo r lier was r. o t
to promote proletarian aspirations while ccmeacting by his daily labor the 
economic threat to the revolution:
Simultaenously with tiie resumption of work the Soviet. . .calls for 
the immediate establishment of all types of workers' organizations 
and for the strengthening of existing organizations for the purpose 
of consolidating the positions gained and achieving further gains.
These workers' organizations will act as the base in the further 
revolutionary struggle for the complete liquidation of the old re- 32 
gime and for the realization of the class ideals of the proletariat.
On March 20 Izvestiia was more specific about local labor organization
and the demands labor should make of capital. Workers were to demand pay
for the days in the streets fighting for the nation's freedom, collective 
agreements, control of factory and shop administration, shift work to
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avoid excessive and exhaustive Labor, division of work to halt unemploy­
ment, regulation of women's and children's work, workers' militias to 
guard factories and mills, and the takeover of production under proper 
direction if employers for personal reasons ordered work stoppages. The 
Petrograd Soviet endorsed the formation by workers of factory and shop 
committees and sanctioned their control of factory and shop administra­
tion, of the proper organization of v;ork, and of the proper dispensation 
of labor forces as well as control of working conditions. The Soviet 
empowered the committees to takeover production only with the supervision
of a Petrograd Soviet commissar and approval of a trade union deputy and
33
the district party organization.
The Petrograd Soviet's endorsement of factory committees did not
necessarily mean that the body favored factory commit toes. The Soviet
considered itself the political organization of tne workers and looked
forward to the organization of trade unions a , the economic organs of
labor. The Petrograd Soviet, led by Mensheviks who were trade unionists,
only sanctioned the existing fact of the committees in hope of ordering
them toward Soviet goals. As craft unions, initially organized by trades
and only later on a mass line, were slower to develop tlian the easily mass
organized and numerous factory committees, the Petrograd Soviet had no
choice but to recognize the committees. Eventually, the Soviet hoped that
34
the trade unions would absorb the factory committees. The Soviet's re­
cognition of the factory committees, however, was not always enough to 
overcome the employers' opposition, with the result that violence occurred.
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On March 22 the Soviet admonished both capital and labor about work 
stoppages. While the overwhelming majority of workers had returned to their 
jobs, announced Izvostila, misunderstandings and conflicts h.ad arisen. Workers 
who had not received proper redress from their employers concerning their 
demands were not to stop work but to strive toward their realization through 
factory and district committees, the trade unions, and the Soviet. Workers 
were not to resort to violence. The Soviet promised to present as soon as 
possible a list of general economic demands to the manufacturers and the Pro­
visional Government on behalf of the workers. Obstinate employers were
threatened with the municipalization of their enterprises or their takeover
35by workers organization^.
Petrograd manufacturers,heeding the rising tide of separate worker
demands,sought to obtain a general agreement with the Soviet. On Mardi 23
the Petrograd Assoc in l ion of Mannfnctmvrs react.ed an accord with th.e Soviet
on the immediate introduction of an eigiit-iniur working day (overtime for more
3b
hours), tlie establishment of factory committees and chambers of conciliation. 
The Soviet promised that administrative personnel would not be removed without 
the examination of chambers of conciliation and then never forcefully. By this 
agreement factory committees were to sanction any overtime, to represent the 
workers in relations with the government and other public institutions, 
formulate questions oi the workers' socioeconomic life, settle interpersonal 
problems of workers, and represent workers before the factory management. The 
committees were not empowered to take over factory production. Furthermore, 
they were to settle all disputes between management and labor in chambers of 
conciliation consisting of equal numbers of workers and management members. 
Central Chambers of Conciliation consisting of equal numbers of Soviet and
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representatives of the manufacturers' association were to settle all 
disputes not settled in the local chambers. While the factory committee 
role was clearly limited by the agreement, the workers gained the general 
acceptance of the committees and of the eight-hour day plus a procedure 
to settle disputes with capital other than through violence. The Bolshe­
viks attempted without success to persuade workers to reject the agree­
ment and refuse to return to their jobs. By the end of March, however,
over 30u Petrograd enterprises had introduced the eight-hour dav and
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every plant had a factory committee. According to the SR leader Viktor 
Chernov, "This important conquest. . .gave the Soviet unprecedented pop­
ularity among tlie workers and strengthened its authority for a long time 
33
to come. . . . "  The agreement, however, had a major flaw: how to come
39
to terr.is on a standard \.'a ge and irrr.ecli ate increase i ' ,:.:y. According
to Tseretelli, the industrialists acknowledged ti;e t.-eed for an increase
in wages, as wages at the time of the outbreak of the rcvelutlon were
a little less than three rubles a day (with a purchasing oowc-r equivalent
40
to that of one gold ruble). The Moscow daily, jit r ̂ rossi i, found that
workers would have had to receive double their wages to recover their
purchasing power of the early war years and tripled i iui.m to receive a
41
higher standard of living. As this condition was not cleared up even 
later, the basis for industrial conflict between management and labor re­
nia ined.
Not all employers were willing to abide by the Soviet-Association of 
Manufacturers' agreement. Any number of manufacturers did not like the 
eight-hour working day or the factory committees, bui only some tried to
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sabotage it by claiming that the workers were ''Living like gentlemen"
42
while Russian soldiers were dying in their trenches. Newspapers of 
tlie tenor of Rcch ' (the Kadet organ) and Russkaia voLia repeatedly pub­
lished unconfirmed reports that workers were only concerned with their
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own interests and were "ruining the cause of defense." The Social 
Democrat, Sukhanov, described the result of this agitation:
One could see workers and soldiers, in the last stages of 
irritation, Linked in a fierce battle of words. . . .
Of course, the workers were accused of excessive demands, 
of absolute unwillingness to work and of ignoring the inter­
ests of the front. The starting point of the irritation was 
. . .the eight-hour day. Fishers in troubled waters were
speculating on the inability of tiie muniii k (peasant) in the 
soldiers' gray cloak to understand this proletarian demand. 
There is no such standard of work at the front or in the 
village. Yet here were factory loafers, unwilling to work 
longer hours, enjoying a frçe and easy life by other people's 
sacrifices in tiie trenches!''
Delegations of soldiers from the front went to the capital to check on 
the workers. Soviet representatives met these delegations, conducted 
them to the factories where the workers won them over, and then sent the 
deputations back to the front for propaganda. Occasionally, reported 
Izvestiia, factory committees even promised the soldiers to deduct a
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day's pay from the salary of each worker to aid the men in the trenches 
The attempt to sour relations between the soldiers and workers heightened 
the tension between capital and labor.
Some workers expanded the terms of the Soviet-Association of Manufact­
urers' agreement. A few of the more powerful factory committees in Petro­
grad introduced preliminary measures of workers' control over certain
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phases of production and distribution. Some committees assumed a role 
in the formulation of work rules and the hiring and firing of workers 
(rabcc.hii or blue-collar) and employees (white-collar). In some cases 
control arose as the result of managerial personnel having temporarily 
abandoned factories in the uncertainty of the first days of the revolu­
tion (particularly high-ranking officers in charge of government arma­
ment plants). In others the factory committes clashed openly with man­
agement. The executive committee of the Petrograd Soviet admonished 
the factory committees that it "emphatically opposed improvised--espec- 
ially anarchist--demonstrationsand urged the workers to comply with 
the decisions of the local soviets. The Bolshevik organ, Pravda, on 
April 7/20 denounced worker sabotage which could only "foster an anarch­
ical spirit." The Soviet, liowever, took no action as most of these
committees understood "control" prior to November IflT o.s "joint de te r-
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mination," not the. "domina tion" of their factories.
On May 24 the labor section of the Petrograd Soviet, in response
to declarations by the Conference of Petrograd Factory Committees of 
State Enterprises and from the Provisional Government, issued new work 
rules to the factory workers. These rules were much closer in spirit to 
the Provisional Government's decree of May 6, but did allow a small de­
gree of the control provided by the factory committee conference. Fol­
lowing the Petrograd Soviet's suggestion, the majority of the workers 
adopted a position somewhere hetireen the hold factory committee conference's 
stand and the modest ^r.gram of the government. The Petrograd Soviet's
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list of factory committee functions included;
participation in formulating work rules and in seeing that they 
are observed; participation in surveying the sanitary conditions 
in the enterprise and in the implementation of measures for the 
protection of labor; participation in the management of infir­
maries, schools, and nurseries located in the enterprise.
Until early September, when the Menshevik Minister of Labor issued two
restrictive circulars on workers' control, Petrograd Soviet leaders took
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no further action with regard to the factory committees.
When several prominent members of tlie Petrograd Soviet in mid-May 
joined a coalition government of socialists and liberals, the Soviet 
leaders focused their attention on moving the government toward con­
cessions for the popular masses. M. I. Skobelev, Soviet vice-chairman 
and "Star Chamber" trouble-shooter, attempt, J to institute through his 
Labor Ministry po.st wiu.t really amounted to the ret.vv, ad Soviet's May 29th 
labor program. The government was to undertake tl;c regulation of the 
labor supply over the entire country, for each district and every branch 
of industry. To this end Skobelev proposed a general obligatory labor 
conscription. The state would fix wages; the vovet'rr'vnt would set a 
minimum wage and control the terms of collective cont rets between 
employers and employed for whole branches of industry. Lastly a board 
of conciliation in every industrial enterprise working for the civilian 
population would adjust all disagreements and conflicts between workers 
and employers; and in some cases, a court of complusory arbitration would 
make adjustments in those enterprises engaged in military work. Despite 
sharp objections on the part of manufacturers, Skobelev, nevertheless.
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took this program as the guiding principle in his work and endeavored
48
by every means to give it effect.
Tseretelli recounted later how the decision to regulate conditions 
between capital and labor occurred. Industrial magnates from the Donetz 
Basin demanded that the government intervene energetically against the 
outrageous demands of the workers. Tseretelli with the full support 
of his fellow cabinet members called upon the "kingdom: of manufacturers" 
to abandon methods that would result in "making the evil worse." Poor 
wages and a soaring cost of living, he noted, contrasted sharply with 
the considerable profits of the magnates. Tiie ministers could not for­
cibly demand restrictions upon the laboring classes, iie remarked, without 
exacting from capital the necessary concessions of placing production 
under democratic control. Rather than maximalist mr. s - ce'sands , Tseretelli 
found the workers making sincere efforts to reach ren n.iblc siilittions, 
e. g ., that capital increase wages in reverse proportion to the wage
scale. The innate hostility of the magnates to the previously illegal
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labor unions made government intervention a necessity.
To implement the Soviet program Skobelev formed a central committee 
in July for the distribution of labor supplies; the Minister of Labor 
presiding over representatives from various government departments and 
public organizations. This committee, really nothing more than the old 
Special Committee for the Preliminary Drafting of Labor Legislation, now 
at least had a socialist minister for its head. It consisted of eight 
representatives from the Petrograd Soviet, eight from the employers, one 
from the Union of Zemstvos, one from the Town Unions, and two from the 
War Industries Committee. The Department of Labor Supply of the Ministry
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of Labor became the executive of the central committee. A represent­
ative of the employers, the industrialist V. A. Auberbach, viewed the 
work of this committee as a battle ground between employers and labor:
The Ministry of Labor was definitely Menshevist in its direct­
ing personnel, and drew strictly Marxist scholars into its work 
. . . . With their wide erudition the latter with remarkable
ease reenforced their arguments by reference to laws and customs 
of all countries, to the resolutions of congresses, etc. The 
reports which preceded examination of draft bills were carefully 
and sensibly prepared. It was obvious that everything had been 
thought out and arranged. Our avowed enemies, the members of 
the workers' faction of the committee were armed to the teetii. 
When, at the first session, we were showered with formulae, 
quotations, persons, and cities, and all of this with unusual 
ease and even grace we seemed absolutely routed before tlie battle 
began.
Auberbach reveals how the employers were able to make a comeback and fin­
ally defeat the workers: ’’Carefully concealing our uc spondence, but
realising our lack of preparation, we tried to make '-p for it by elo­
quence and ingenuity." When the workers brought up their recommendations, 
the employers labelled them as "inopportune" during wartime. "In this 
way the moment of decisive struggle might be delayed, but it could not be 
averted or escaped without defeat." The Council of Congresses of Industry 
and Commerce organized a special labor section to collect materials, draw 
up reports, memoranda, etc. And finally:
We felt ourselves sufficiently armed. Nevertheless, we, of 
course, could not hope to overtake our opponents who had spent 
years in preparation. We had to educate ourselves so that the 
explositions of shrapnel, crammed with formulae, citations, 
names, should not start a panic in our ranks.
All projects introduced by the delegates entailed considerable 
expenditures for the treasury. The employers started to demon­
strate what each improvement won by the revolution would cost 
the country. Their calculations panicked our opponents. . . .
213
Even on questions wliich were incontestable, such as 
sickness insurance, old age insurance, we just shrugged 
our shoulders asking how they could proceed at the nation­
al level without upsetting the whole economy.
The employers were willing to concede nothing more chan the setting up 
of committees to study the workers' questions. Inasc.uch as they came
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to nothing, Auberbach labelled these committees, "sterile victories."
As a result, the attempt of the Petrograd Soviet to promote change 
from above through the government met defeat, leaving the workers with 
no alternative but to use traditional labor weapons to gain satisfaction. 
The militant language of Auberbach, envisioning the situation as inter­
nal war, reveals that no other alternative was left to the workers, 
particularly as the Soviet had no intention of destroying the coalition 
and t hereby plunging the countr\- into immed ia tc civil n: r.
Failing to gain concessions from "above" throngi, .:i.o government,
Che Petrograd Soviet attempted to .gain them from "bel'.-e.;", by channeling 
the workers' discontent into trade unions that would ii.ipose econo.mic 
sanctions on capital. The means would assume a non-vioi.ent form of 
economic pressure, rather than political pressure. The SR-Menshevik 
bloc leaders of the Soviet therefore directed their efforts through the 
trade unions which they dominated in the pre-November period. While the 
All-Russian Trade Union Council consisted of equal ncibers of Bolsheviks,
Mensheviks, and SR's, the political union of the latter two allowed them
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to dominate the Bolshevik members, Shliapnikov and Riazanov. True the 
secretary of this council, A, Lozovskii, shortly became a Bolshevik, but
2ih
with no resources or organization he managed to send only one organizer
to the provinces and publish two issues of the monthly journal. Profes-
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sionalnvi vestnik. At the first congress of trade unions in January
1918, a Menshevik delegate stated that for the past six months the
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council "has done absolutely nothing." Though the. efforts of the 
council were feeble, the Mensheviks and SR did gain a majority among 
the rank-and-file of the trade unionists. At the July 1917 All-Russian 
Trade Union Conference the Mensheviks and SR's on the basis of their 
strength in local trade union organizations gained a majority of the 
representatives. At that conference tlie trade unions resolved that they 
"wholeheartedly and in every way support the actions of th.e Soviets of 
Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies," and that the trade unions and the 
Soviet must liave "one single commen banner"; notl'.irg; ;.t:SS tiu-rcfore tiian
5 Û
a total endorsv':v:ent of the Menshcvik-SR bloc tiie a d.ir. inn ting the Soviet.
The conference branded as enemies those who were attcm.pting to splinter
the working class movement, a reference to time Leninists, labelled
the factory committee movement as "economic anarchy" and called upon
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them to become organs of a centrally determined trade union policy.
On June 12 Skobelev had appealed to the First Conference of Petrograd
Factory Committees to support state control and preserve trade unionism.
He had based his argument on Marx's stages of history, declaring: "We
find ourselves in the bourgeois stage of revolution. The transfer of
enterprises into the hands of the people would not at the present time
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assist the revolution." Peaceful unionism and settlement of differences 
by arbitration between labor and capital was the only real solution to 
the problem that confronted the Russian worker. At tne trade union con­
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ference in July several speakers echoed Skobelev's words. V. P. Grinevich,
a Menshevik trade union leader, again pointed up the Marxist framework
of historical development: "For us it is very important to know that we
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are acting in a period of bourgeois revolution." The Menshevik N. 
Cherevanin agreed that the revolution was not yet ready to progress from 
the bourgeois to the socialist stage of development, P. A. Garvi, the 
well-known trade unionist, added that only "if the working class comprised 
half of the population" could the workers properly t a Ice control of indus­
try. . . the organizations of control must be such as . . .  to speak and
act in the name of the entire revolutionary democracy of Russia. . .and
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not of only one interested portion--the workers." Grinevich added that 
if labor was to represent all the working class and r.ot simply separate 
enterprises of workers, then tiie factory committees i.ad to come under 
trade union coi-rrol. While the Menshevik-SR bloc received the support 
of tlie All-Russian Trade Unions, in Petrograd the factory committees re­
mained the strongest local labor organization and they were Bolshevist in 
their outlook and activity. Therefore in actual practice, tiie trade unions
were not able to give the Petrograd Soviet leaders much support beyond
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verbal expressions.
With the failure of the Petrograd Soviet to move the government 
toward labor concessions (lest the coalition split c,p) and the inability of 
the weak trade unions to assume the leadership of economic sanctions 
against capital from "below," the workers began to Cake action on their own 
initiative. On June 30 the Bolshevik dominated Central Council of Petro­
grad Factory Committees called for workers to demand transfer of state
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power to the Petrograd Soviet. Two weeks later tfee July days" (July
16-18) forced the Bolsheviks to support a movement that they did not want 
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to head and brought the factory committees and industrialists, as ex­
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claimed by a speaker at the August 20 Second Conference of Petrograd
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Factory Committees, to a state of industrial warfare. Employers 
asserted that they were forced to curtail production or close shop 
because of workers' control and shortages of fuel anzl raw materials.
The workers replied that the employers were resorting to lockouts, shut­
downs, and large-scale dismissals of employees. Beth arguments had 
merit, but differences could not be reconciled. The employers, however, 
following the "July days" rarely tried to undermine the factory commit­
tees; they did vigorously try to curb workers' control. They pointed 
out that the May 6 decree had only legalized the committees and had not 
given them power to control production. In mid-July therefore, the
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Petrograd Society of Manufacturers declared workers' control illegal. 
Even \.J til rr.a iia g-nvnt and labor at odds, outrée ht sei:-’"re of factories 
by tlie corniittees wan only sporadic before the Tolsii.ivii: coup. Wide­
spread tactics sucii as r'ne dismissal of administrative personnel in­
cluding engineers was quite common to the degree thai workers found 
themselves incapable of operating enterprises which tiniy had taken over.
Despite the Petrograd Soviet's admonition to halt violence and 
lockouts in industry, economic chaos increased rapidly after the "July 
days." In July 1917, 206 factories closed and 47,754 ceased work. In 
August and September 1917, 231 enterprises closed and 61,000 left their
jobs. The factory closures of these months compare with 125 closures
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in June, 108 in May, 55 in April, and 74 in March. In addition, the 
number of workers put out of work during this period from March to May 
was small compared to the period after June. Closures were highest in 
Moscow and Petrograd, regions where the factory committees and the
66
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Largest industries predominated. The number of closures was higlily 
significant as 7 5 percent of the total 420,000 workers employed in 
Petrograd was in 12 percent of the total 1158 enterprises of the region, 
and as 55 percent of the workforce in the Moscow area held jobs in 7 
percent of the enterprises of that city. Most of the workers in Petro­
grad were employed in the metal industry where workers' control was 
strongest and Bolshevism most prevalent. It is perhaps significant 
that pig-iron production in 1917 compared with previous years declined 
considerably in the post-July period (compared with 1916 a decline of 
16 percent in the pre-July period but 35 percent in tlie post-July months).
Conditions did not improve. Clashes between the forces of labor 
and management increased in violence outside of the capital. The news­
paper, Rus.-d e 1 a voila, reported c:i October II that tiic Donetz basin 
raged with anarchy. By tiie time of th.e Bolsiiuvik coop the Donetz was
threatened by a general strike which seemed likely to assume aspects of 
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civil war. On September 13 the French Embassy vigorously protested
the "threatening character" of the laboring masses toward enterprises
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in which the French had invested capital. Russki '/e domes t i declared
on October 2: "There is no government in Russia, no lew, no political
actions. . . . With the new upsurge of the Bolshevik wave in Petrograd,
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the number of outrages and excesses in factories and mills has arisen." 
Inasmuch as the Petrograd Soviet was powerless to direct the workers in 
the capital and in the nation as a whole, such disturbances only tended 
to detract from its claim to be the national voice of the workers and 
soldiers.
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3- The Peasant Colossus
The Petrograd Soviet in the weeks that followed the March overturn was 
tlie beneficiary of revolutionary exhilaration and often received the enthusiastic 
support of the peasantry. To the peasant the Soviet was initially either a 
vague adjunct to the government offering moral support, or more frequently, an 
agent for observing and controlling the government's actitities. This latter 
conception of the Soviet reflected both a suspicion of government in general 
and a strong belief in the class nature of government. The same belief was 
expressed in resolutions that singled out A.F. Kerensky as the representative of the 
"revolutionary democracy" in tlie cabinet. The identification of democracy with a class 
was not too pronounced in the first weeks of the revolution. Although often 
viewer! witii so pic ion, t'.ve Provisional Government was considered euore or less 
representative of the nation. The following selections from peasant resolutions 
present tlie peasant attitude toward the.Soviet, the war, and the government in 
the first period of the revolution.
Early in March a volost'(county) assembly resolved, "To recognize the 
authority of the Provisional Government and to submit to all its 
directives."
A volost' executive committee voted to send a delegate to the 
peasant congress in Petrograd, "entrusting him to express the 
following desires: 1. The war must be carried through to a
conclusion without annexations or contributions; there cannot 
be a separate peace . . .  3. To support with every effort the
new free order."
Peasant representatives of nine villages agreed, on the question 
of war. "to join the voice of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers'
Deputies of Petrograd and Moscow to demand that the Provisional 
Government declare that we are conducting the war without aim of 
conquests or contributions and we demand the earliest possible 
cessation of the war and a peoples' peace."
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A delegate at the first Congress of Soviets said, ''Dear comrades, 
one of the speakers said that here the voice of the lower ranks is 
not heard. I, a peasant, in my turn will speak of how the peasantry 
talks and expresses confidence in, and regard for, the Provisional 
Government. The peasantry entirely joins with the Provisional 
Government."
A volost' assembly sent a telegram expressing confidence in the 
Provisional Government and the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers'
Deputies. The telegram added, "May God help the valiant Russian 
warrior to bring the war to a satisfactory end, witbout pursuing 
plans of conquest".
The revolution in Petrograd created a feeling of expectancy in the village. 
Habit and a lack of confidence among the peasants created a feeling of 
dependency on Petrograd. A journalist who travelled through; the provinces 
found great enthusiasm for the revolution everywhere. At tf.e same time the common 
people lacked political experience, and so tlvere \:as a diffurlon of authority 
and a lack of self-confidence. "Let someone come to us f ro:o Perrc'grad, if 
only for a day or t\.’o," they said to him in Veiikie Luki, P.. tov Province. He 
found that "city" representatives were met with undisguised joy and grati­
tude. At the summons of a "city" representative the people of .m entire county or
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volost ' would gather immediately. Peasant emissaries even '.mude special 
trips to tiie cities to get a speaker to explain the revolution to the peasants. 
According to the Bulletin of the All-Russian Soviet of Peasants' Deputies, many 
inquiries revealed that peasants in the provinces were anxiously awaiting general 
directives or a statute on local administration, particularly in the organization 
of volost' government.
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The initial response of the city revolutionaries to the peasants' expecta­
tions was negative. The city did not take the initiative- but merely reacted 
to events in the village, particularly to disturbances. The revolutionary 
intelligentsia called for restraint, for order, for legality. When the first 
rural violence flared up in Kazan Province on March 22, the urban response was 
repression, though Petrograd acknowledged " . . .  that the- use of arms at the 
present time in the suppression of agrarian disorders is inadmissible." The 
"rioters" were, however, to be held "criminally responsible".^^ Tlie Kazan 
peasantry was dumbfounded and the provincial congress of peasant deputies 
raised a strong protest. As disturbances often resulted from garbled stories 
and rumors carried by deserters from the front, the Soviet, leaders granted five 
per cent of ti-e garrison troiips in Petrograd short leave ro carry r.ews t.o tlie 
villages. When rumors of tlio revolution were quickly cor.firmed or denied by 
some sort of authority, the transition in the village was usually peaceful.
The Petrograd Soviet leadership understood the import mce of land reform, bu1 
peace held first priority. As Sukhanov tells us, "Land--this was the age-old, 
unchanging cry of the 'lord of the Russian earth', the peasantry, the over­
whelming majority of the Russian democracy . . . yet if the revolution didn't
finish the war, the war would strangle the revolution . . .; deprive the people
of bread, land, and the whole revolufion . . The S-.'viet did not entirely
neglect land reform for the peace effort. Resolutions on the land question 
were plentiful, but the Soviet itself took no practical steps toward land re­
form. Sukhanov recollected later how this affected the peasant:
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The Government was atill keeping secret its opinion about the 
foundations of the future reforms. Were they being prepared?
How was work proceeding, and along what lines? All this was 
unknown, and it disturbed the peasants. . . land speculation
was beginning . . . Wholesale deals . . . began to be made.
In these circumstances, there wouldn't be much left of our 
land resources in a few months' time. This alone was enough 
to upset the peasants. Swarms of emissaries appeared in the 
Ex. Com.--asking, demanding, threatening. Immediate guarantees 
of land reform and immediate^steps to preserve our land resources 
from pillage were essential.'*^
Despite peasant demands, the Petrograd Soviet leaders, however, took no steps 
toward land reform. Instead Izvestiia warned on April 8:
It will not be by means of violence, or fires, or murders and 
arbitrary measures that the free people will achieve its will, 
but, by the authoritative voice which will be heard from behind 
the walls of tiie Constituent Assembly, elected by all the people.
In this way, too, will the land question be resolved.
The capital lovist organ did demand, in this same editorial, tin: t L iie gove rnmunt 
do more than me rely "cvnsld.jr" tiie la,id probi om; that it openly declare 
immediate1\ that "the people will receive all of the land without
redemption and without new taxation, that _he hour draws near when the free
tiller will till free hand!'' A Menshevik lesolution adopted on April 16 at the All- 
Russian Conference of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies repeated Izvesllie's warn­
ing on land seizures. The conference implored the peasantry to await the 
Constituent Assembly's division of the land. Such verbal sentiments did not 
satisfy the peasant long. While the Soviet contemplated using violence 
during the April crisis to force its peace program on the government, it did
little more than urge land reform.
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The Soviet's inaction on land reform partially derived from divergent views 
on the agrarian question in the Menshevik-SR bloc. The Mensheviks tailored 
agrarian program to a more rigidly conceived outlook on the course of Russian 
history titan the populists. Anticipating an interlude of capitalist development 
after the bourgeois revolution, they accepted the necessity of political cooper­
ation with the more democratic elements of society while conditions ripened for a 
transition to socialism. As a result, the Menshevik program shared certain 
characteristics with the liberal Kadet or Constitutional Democratic program. It 
too called for expropriation of private holdings above a certain norm, and for the 
transfer of this land along with that of churches, of monasteries, and of the 
imperial family to public ownership. The most distinctive feature of the 
Menshevik program was "municip-;: 11-.a t ion", i.e., the transfer of large land parcels
to autonomous local agencies for distribution among the peasantry, or for use in
7.9
the public interest as locally determined. Regional authorities were to determine, 
on the basis of local conditions, the norms above which land would be appropriated. 
All communal land and individual peasant holdings below the norm were to be in­
alienable. The Mensheviks feared that an attempt to nationalize all land would 
propel the peasants into the ranks of the counterrevolution. To prevent the 
accumulation or reconstitution of large holdings they proposed in 1917 to restrict
Q P jpurchase of peasant lands to public agencies. The Menshevik progiam 
stipulated that peasants pay rent for the use of confiscated land at locally 
established rates to state and local organs (zemstva) to provide for social needs
Q 1
such as schools and hospitals: The state was to assume outstanding obligations
of the confiscated lands-- a progressive income tax to absorb the cost. On
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the question of halting sales and mortgages on land the Mensheviks opposed, 
the Kadets and joined their socialist colleagues, the SR’s and Bolsheviks.
An All-Russian Conference of Mensheviks in May 1917 called for an immediate 
government decree on the prohibition of all private land transactions, exceot 
for those authorized by the land committees. The Mensheviks lie Id the land 
committees responsible for regulation of gentry-peasant relations, normalization 
of rents and wages, establishment of conciliation chambers, and for arranging 
the rental and cultivation of unworked gentry lands. In addition, the Mensheviks 
expected the committees somehow to carry out their designated functions in 
preparing materials and projects for land reform to present to the Constituent
O 9
Assembly. “
The SR agrarian program, proposed in essence by the ïcudovik delegates in 
the First and Second State Dumas (the "Project of the ! O'; " and its successors), 
was the socialization of the land and tlie elimination of private property iu
Q O
land. Land was to be redistributed on egalitarian principles and on the basis 
of consumption norms (i.e., in amounts adequate to provide for the basic 
necessities of life) to those who worked it. The extra la id in holdings above 
the consumer norm was to be taken from its owners without compensation and redis­
tributed by the communes. The commune was a gangway from contemporary bourgeois 
society to the future socialist society. Several weeks elapsed after the March coup 
before the party formulated a clear policy. A conference of the Moscow party 
organization on April 2-3 came out against lane seizures and recommended the 
organization of "committees of rural deputies as revolutionary organs of Local 
state authority" to prepare for the land reform and to settle disputes The con­
ference also recommended the cessation of transactions in land and the enforce­
ment of the Stolypin laws. A conference of the Petrograd party organization on April 
18 passed similar resolutions, but suggested the establishment of land committees 
with broad powers instead of the less definite committees of rural deputies.
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The SR Third Parly Congress of June 8-17 issued a definitive stand: "Convinced that 
all property in land must be destroyed and that the land must become general 
people's property vithout redemption payments for equal use on the basis of a 
labor norm, the Third Congress of the Party of Socialist Revolutionaries 
believes that the fundamental law on land, which shall firmly establish 
these principles, must be promulgated by the National Constituent Assembly.
The resolution condemned land seizures and demanded the transfer of all 
land to the control of land committees, although it hedged in regard to 
large specialized fanns.
As with the workers and soldiers, the peasants did not wait for the 
direction of the Petrograd Soviet or seme other urban soviet, but set 
about to solve their problems on their own initiative. Three fairly 
distinct types of organization mace their appearance in the countrysice: 
the executive co.md.ttee, the soviet of peasant deputies, and the Peasant 
Union. As with the factory and soldiers' committees, the Petrograd 
Soviet sanctioned de facto situations but attempted to limit their 
activities, Soviets of peasant deputies were usually established later 
than executive committees, and it was often difficult to organize them 
at the volost' level.^ Sometimes the executive committee w'as subordinate 
to the sc-'/iet, but very often the two types of organizations existed side 
by side. The soviets had their own executive committee, which, however, 
did not usually compete with the county or volost' executive committees.
The soviet concerned itself with organizational work and proselytizing, 
not with day-to-day administration» The same organizations were 
found at the provincial level as at the county level, but provincial
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capitals were strongholds of soviets of -workers' and soldiers' deputies 
and peasant influence therefore weak. Peasant organizations obtained 
representatives in the workers' and soldiers' soviets and executive 
committees but they always played a secondary role. Peasant congresses, 
formed late in the spring or summer, more and more approximated political 
party conventions as they lost their non-partisan character and became •
8sdominated by the Socialist Revolutionary Party.
In Petrograd the Soviet leadership often forgot or ignored the
practical purposes of local peasant organizational work. For the
political parties and quasi-political organizations of the capital, the
primary goal in agrarian affairs was control of a national All-Russian
Soviet of Peasant Deputies. On March 28 the chief ccimiiteee of the
All-Russian Peasant üricn annow ?ed with the permission of the prime
minister and the Petrograd Soviet of torhers' and Soldiers' Deputies
that it would initiate the organization of an All-Russian Soviet of 
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Peasant Deputies. On May 6 the SR organ, Delo naroda. stated that ''The
slogan of the moment is to organize the vrorkers' toiling democracy of the
village I Organize it into Soviets of Peasants' Deputies which will
join as a third section the existing Soviets of Soldiers' and Workers'
Deputies." VThen the Congress met on May 17 of the 1,115 delegates
a plurality were SR's, along with a large number of non-party and unlcnov/n 
90party delegates. The SR's consolidated their victory in the executive 
committee which included Kerensky, Chernov, and Avksent'ev, among others.
Those who were defeated in the elections to the executive indicates the
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overwhelming strength of the SR's: Lenin, Gorky, PLekhanov (Russian marxism's father) 
Peshekhonov, Mazurenko and TseretelLi. Mazurenko was the most active and
prominent member of the Peasant Union, while Tseretelli, though dominant in
91the Petrograd Soviet, was rebuffed by the peasantry. The SR's, however,
had not gained their strength between March and May, 1917, but more so because
of their long association with the peasantry as the party of the agrarian toiler.
The peasant soviet congress like those of the workers' and soldiers' was 
dominated by a revolutionary intelligentsia attempting to lead and organize 
from above. As with the workers and soldiers, the intelligentsia were to 
find their efforts frustrated b} the ever more urgent demands of the masses 
from "below". The SR V, la. Gurevich has characterized the executive 
cornrJ.ttee of the peasant congress as ir.en wanting to:
organize an auhhorized renrczennttive center that vac to defend
keeping it within definite hounas. he thought t::i the disorderly 
seizure of the lands of t’ne nobility would lead he the ruination 
of the project for the socialization of the lands; would break the 
peasants' front; would lead to conflicts among the peasants them­
selves and between the peasants and the landlords.
Politically this All-Russian Peasants' Soviet
would represent the majority of the Russian people ; would have 
close relations with the arr.iy; would secure the support of the 
majority of the Russian people for the Provisional Goverixcent; 
and would create a counter-weight, in case of necl, to the 
Soviet of Workers-' and Soldiers' Deputies and straighten their 
line of conduct.
The peasant congress executive gave primacy not to land reform but to prepar­
ations for elections to the Constituent Assembly as that body would solve 
the land question.
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Events soon proved that the well-intentioned members of the intelli­
gentsia, who led the SR's and the Feasants' Soviet, lost out because they 
tried to compromise, because they supported policies which, while they 
represented the wishes of the peasants, postponed any definite settlement 
of the agrarian problem until the convocation of the Constituent Assembly.
To the Russian peasant no Constituent Assembly was needed to overthc’ow the 
tsar, so why was one needed to get the land due them? Disappointed in 
the leadership of the SR's, the mass of population listened to agitators 
and extremists. The peasants took matters into their o ™  hands and seized 
the land. According to a critical analysis by the î oderate Popular Socialist 
S. P. Kel'gunov, "The agrarian movement reached its climax in July with 
1122 violations. Then it starts to oiodsh with 69I violations in August 
and C:2j violations in .lentex.ber. Tnesc susrs u'ics will be clearer if s:e 
refer to the headings: e. g., Demolition of Estates— 236 in July; iCO 
in August ; and 112 in September."^^Expropriations were usually conducted 
by volost' committees, not by peasant mobs, and extreme violence was 
generally avoided. One might have e:p)ectecl the land question to lead to a 
more or less equal distribution of violence tliroughout central Russia, the 
area of the greatest concentration of population. In fact the sacking and 
burning of estates occurred in only a few areas. Since the peasants, in 
the absence of police or organized opposition, could take the land with 
impunity, extreme violence usually required an incident— incitement to 
violence by a soldier (deserter) or a provocative act by a landowner-- to 
give direction and purpose to the general feeling of resentment, frustration, 
and despair?^ The Soviet's all or nothing support of revolutionary defensism 
cost the intelligentsia the goodwill of the peasantry that the March coup 
had genera Led.
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4. The Destruction of the Military
The Petrograd Soviet was active in Russian military affairs from 
the first days of the revolution. Initial Soviet actions, however, 
were primarily responses to the activities of the garrison troops of 
the capital, and later, only part of a design to bolster the revolu­
tionary diplomacy of Siberian Zimmerwaldism. As the revolution owed 
much of its success to the rebellious Petrograd garrison, the workers'
Soviet took on the function of being a soldiers' organ and addressed 
itself to reform reform. Military reform, however, if it meant weak­
ening the defense of the nation, had to be weighted against the more 
vital demand of protecting the revolution from the German war machine.
Soviet leaders believed that until tint war could bt liquidated through 
its peace program, the soldiers' will could be stre hcnecl only by 
military reforms. Being largely political oriented in their thinking,
Soviet leaders conceiwad this reform as the démocratisation of the 
military. Intellectual prisoners of the French Revolution, in this 
regard, they fought for democratization in an effort to transform the mili­
tary into an effective fighting revolutionary force as had the French with their 
forces in 1792-1793. The SR leaders Viktor Chernov confirms tl;is:
"There was a chance to unite the field officers and the mass of pri­
vates . . . Through this union alone could the old army have been 
recreated as a revolutionary army. Trust the field officers, who have 
lived the same trench life . . .  ! Promote capable field officers 
boldly . . .  ! With this slogan the leaders of the French Revolution 
had reorganized the royal army."'’̂ Working against democratization was
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the General Staff which felt that the process was tha root cause of the 
disintegration of the military. Did democratization bring about the 
destruction of the military or was it as Chernov insisted in his memoirs 
of not carrying the process far enough? A case of the army being de­
voured by mutual distrust between lower and upper ranks and the field 
officers left in the middle "between hammer and an^ril"? Or was the 
disintegration caused by something else? the tragic July offensive?
The offensive to democratize the army opened roich the March days. 
The process began the moment the revolutionary intelligentsia called 
on the rebellious garrison troops to elect representatives to a Soviet. 
The Workers' Soviet became also a SoJdiers' Deputies soviet and soldier- 
repreaentatives were coopted into its executive c o : r t e e  .
Tlie Soviet elections led to the formation of polit t...1 organizations 
and groups within the army and navy units of the t-.. trograd military 
district. A few military committees, as with the factory committees, 
appeared even before the appeal for their formation.. Where commit­
tees had not been organized, the Soviet soldier-depjties called for 
their formation in Order No. 1. These soldier-depm*les demanded and 
received from the revolutionary intelligentsia the sanctioning of 
social equality for the Russian private. For exam- le, the private 
had been forbidden, prior to Order No. 1, to smoke on the street, to 
ride inside street cars, to attend public meetings or entertainment, 
and even to read books or newspapers without his commanding officer's 
consent. The importance of these political and social actions is to 
understand that they needed no urging from the revolutionary intelli­
2 3 0
gentsia to swell up from the ranks. From the first socialist leaders 
struggled to give leadership to the soldier masses and attempted to 
order them behind the Petrograd Soviet; from this struggle came con­
cessions in the form of democratization.
The response of the High Command to the democratizing actions of 
the Petrograd soldiers was immediate and dtpining. Thinking that the 
newly organized liberal Provisional Government governed in Petrograd, 
the General Staff condemned Order No. 1 and censured communications 
from the Petrograd Soviet. General Alekseev demanded that all orders 
be transmitted through Stevka (Russian G. H. Q.) and furthermore that 
"only orders of the government can be valid for the army, whereas the 
orders of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' 
Deputies, w’hich is uiilmowri aaci does not belong to tbs framework of 
governmental authority, are not valid and will not le. announced to the
„97
troops. General Alekseev immediately arrested aid court-mar­
shalled disruptive elements. The Petrograd Soviet responded with a 
blistering attack on Alekseev in the March 21st issue of Izvestiia, 
declaring that the "spirit of the bloody tsar lives on in the Chief 
of Staff." Attempting to head off a crisis. War Minister Guchkov now 
confessed to Alekseev the weakness of the Provisional Government be­
fore the Petrograd Soviet and begged the general to compromise: "The
Provisional Government does not have at its disposal any real force, 
and its orders are carried out only to the extent permitted by the 
Soviet . . . which possesses the most important elements of real power 
. . . .  One may say directly that the Provisional Government exists
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only so long as the Soviet permits it. Especially in the military
sphere it is possible now to give only such orders as do not definitely
9 8conflict with the orders of the above mentioned Soviet." The Gener­
al Staff was so ill-informed of events in Petrograd that Guchkov's 
message came as a great shock. Alekseev faced with no alternative but 
compromise, sent a coded secret communique to all commanders on March 24. 
The orders of the government, he explained, were transmitted only with 
the Soviet's consent. "Everything is based on compromise" and it there­
for became "unfortunately" necessary for the army "also to move along 
the path of compromise," he stated. Among the menbers of the Soviet, 
Alekseev noted, were moderates "who recognized the necessity of contin­
uing the war to victory, preserving the army, discipline, and order, 
and supporting trie commanders." He advised that soldiers' committees 
already formed should be allowed to continue and that officers should 
be introduced into them in order to influence them toward discipline 
and order. Not only were company and regimental formed, but division, 
corps, army committees as well. Completing the structure was a series
99of army and front congresses from mid-April to mid-May.
Though the High Command could not prevent the formation of com­
mittees in the army and navy, the General Staff did attempt to set 
their operational limits. On April 12 General Alekseev ordered that 
the committees could mediate between soldiers and their commanders on 
all questions of internal military life; military questions and train­
ing, however, were beyond their competence. All elected committeemen 
were freed from active duty while they served on the committees. Com-
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mittee chairmen were given the right to use all means of communication 
and printing at the military's disposal except where it would inter­
fere with military operational work. Finally, Alekseev ordered that 
all committees were to be composed of one officer for every two s o l d i e r s . ^^0 
On April 29 Alekseev's order was superseded by one from the Minister 
of War. Guchkov, under pressure from the Petrograd Soviet, ordered that 
the number of officers on committees be reduced and declared that the 
committees now had the power of taking "rightful measures against abuses 
by commanding officers in the respective units." Furthermore, regiment­
al commanders could appeal but not suspend decisions made by regimental 
c ommittees.Though Guchkov withdrew this order, on the demand of 
Stavka, nevertheless it led to additional confusion as Stavka, War 
Ministry, and illegal co:. ii trees now er.Lsted.
The Mensheviks and SR's received the full sentiments and loyalty 
of the leadership of the army and front congresses. By decisive major­
ities the congresses endorsed the Menshevik-SR position on the war and 
pledged support of the Provisional Government "insofar as" its actions were 
in line with Soviet policy. Regimental and company committees were some­
what variegated, being sometimes officer directed or more sympathetic 
initially to the government than to the Soviet, and frequently lacking 
a clear cut party or ideological orientation. SR's and Mensheviks, 
however, usually dominated even the regimental and company committees even 
in the first weeks. The social composition of the committees contributed 
to the SR-Menshevik influence. While the Southwestern Front Committee 
consisted only of army organizations, on the Northern Front and Western
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Front workers' and peasants' deputies participated with soldiers in 
electing committee members. Articulate dissidents, where present, 
found election fairly easy, as the political education of the masses 
of soldiery, ignorant, illiterate men that most of them were, was so 
low that they grasped for any straw in the wind that promised salva­
tion. These dissidents initially, however, were not very outspoken 
for radical party causes, even where they had strong support, as did 
the Bolsheviks in the Western Front Committee (five members out of nine), 
the Eleventh Army Committee (Ensign Krylenko and several supporters), 
and the Special Army (three members of perhaps ten) . Some dissidents
even had to conceal their party affiliations, so a s not to appear dis-
102loyal to the authority of the Petrograd Soviet.
Though the Petrograd Soviet easily attracted rhc- leadership of 
the committees in the army, the establishment of a regular channel of 
information to the soldiers in the trenches was slow to appear. The 
Soviet organ Izvestiia was seldom seen there in the early weeks, ex­
cept on the Northern Front which lay near Petrograd and no regular 
system to distribute the newspaper was ever put into effect thereafter. 
For information of the revolution soldiers had to rely on liberal 
newspapers or the organs of the respective army committees which began 
publication of their newspapers late. Despite the high rate of il­
literacy in the Russian army, the demand for socialist newspapers, 
official Petrograd Soviet publications, and pamphlets on political and 
social questions outran the readily available supply. In the absence 
of propaganda appeals by organized parties the soldiers at the front 
in March and April— except in sectors close to the northern urban 
centers— reacted primarily to political events rather than socio-economic
23h
concerns. Yet the Petrograd Soviet failed to take advantage of this 
response to political matters to build a mass soldier-supported politi­
cal base. The Petrograd Soviet issued only one appeal to have an im­
pact on the frontline soldier, Order No. 1, and this decree was not
even intended for the soldier in the trenches.
Order No. 1 made the name of the Petrograd Soviet well-known to
all frontline soldiers, yet the frontline soldier more than likely 
could not clearly distinguish the Soviet from the Provisional Govern­
ment. The Petrograd Soviet and the Provisional Government both repre­
sented revolutionary authorities which commanded equal authority. 
Furthermore Duma deputies, not Soviet representatives toured the front
to normalize relations between officers and men and explain the revo-
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lutionary events in the capital. They minimized tin role of the 
Soviet as an auxiliary body which "supported" the government. They 
emphasized that the army was now under the command cf the new revolu­
tionary government and urged the soldiers to observe discipline toward 
their superiors. The soldiers’ committees and new titles for officers 
( "Mr. Captain," "Mr. Doctor," "Mr. N. C. 0.") they endorsed and induced 
the officers to accept such innovations as well as the disposal of 
tsarist emblems. In contrast Petrograd Soviet envoys accepted the role 
of trouble-shooters in northern garrison cities (Helsinki, Kronstadt, 
Reval, and Vitebsk); from the local soviets of these places their ap­
peals reached the front only indirectlyi^^ The non-socialist press 
did all within its power to promote the government at the expense of 
the Petrograd Soviet. As the Soviet neglected to supply propaganda to
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the contrary, the soldiers were left with a one-sided picture.
The end result of the anti-Soviet propaganda campaign did not 
enhance governmental authority and the command structure at the ex­
pense of the Petrograd Soviet and the army committees. Allegations 
that the workers were slacking in war production, the Petrograd Soviet 
was destroying the authority of the new revolutionary government, the 
Petrograd garrison soldiers were celebrating the revolution rather 
than preparing marching companies for the front, the peasants hoard­
ing grain, resulted in the soldiers in the trenches sending delegations 
to the rear to investigate the situation. These delegations, often 
with Kadet-oriented officers at their head, arrived in the capital com­
plaining that the Petrograd Soviet was undermining the government and 
not using its authority to line up the, workers and peasants behind the
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war effort. Soldiers toured factories and barracks in Petrograd to 
see for themselves every instance of "sabotage" cited by the non-soci­
alist press. The result of their personal contact with Petrograd Soviet 
leaders and with factory workers and garrison troops convinced the front 
delegations that organs such as Rech' and Russkiia vedomosti had de­
ceived them and slandered the name of the Petrograd Soviet. While the 
non-socialist press had hoped to create the psychology of a levee en 
masse as had France in 1792: "war to full victory" and "soldiers to
the trenches, workers to the benches," the front delegations now saw 
this as an attempt to split workers from soldiers, the front lines 
from the rear. Before the delegations returned to the front, they made 
certain that the Petrograd Soviet and the workers and garrison troops
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supported defense; they now understood this, however, to mean not a war 
of conquest, but one in defense of the revolution while liquidating the 
war: the Petrograd Soviet's position of "revolutionary defensism."
The failure of the anti-Soviet press campaign resulted in April 
in a flood of pro-Soviet resolutions from the frontlines. Many empha­
sized that the Provisional Government would receive the support of the
soldiery only "insofar as" it carried out the specific obligations
1q3
undertaken in agreement with the Petrograd Soviet. The First and
Second Infantry divisions of the Guards regiments even went so far as
to tell the roving Duma deputies, Maslennikov and Shmakov: "If the
Provisional Government does not work hand in hand with the Soviet of
1 Q 9
Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, it will be abolished . . .
Many resolutions expressly condemned the campaign of the bourgeois 
press to slander tlie workers and declared a "boycott" of such puor.'- 
cations. Attempts by officers to force the issue of endorsing the old 
slogan of "war to full victory" only led to their exclusion from com­
mittee work and a deepened distrust of officers as such. During April 
the newly complete i hierarchy of the soldiers' committees became fully 
mobilized in support of the Petrograd Soviet, which they regarded as 
the "watchdog" of the Provisional Government. Although this concept 
penetrated the rank-and-file with varying degrees of intensity, it 
became most fully assimilated by the less aristocratic junior officer, 
the more educated type of non-commissioned officer or soldier, and the 
"army intelligentsia": doctors, clerical workers, etc.^^^
While the Petrograd Soviet gained the support of the leadership
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of the soldiers' committees, the common soldier primarily continued 
to follow his own instincts. He welcomed the revolution primarily 
because it offered a ray of hope of an early end to the war and a new 
life back in the villages. His new "freedom" he interpreted basical­
ly as a de-legitimization of all the authorities who formerly had 
oppressed him and inflicted indignities. For a while the revolutionary 
fervor of March continued to linger and compel him to defend his new 
freedom against the German war machine and to maintain faith in his 
officers and carry out military commands. However, when he came to 
the conclusion that his superiors were taking advantage of him to con­
tinue the war and learned that the Petrograd Soviet had to police the 
Provisional Government, appeals to discipline fell on deaf ears and 
the common soldier rohelled against being manipulated by patriotic 
speeclimaking in t'le name of the revolution. The Fifth Army military 
censor registered in early February three ojitimistic letters to each 
pessimistic one, in March and early April the ratic- had changed to 
four to three and thereafter pessimism set in. Coincidentally, in­
stances of soldiers arresting their officers and collective refusals 
by troops units to executive orders sharply increased in the month 
of April. More damaging was the massive fraternization with the enemy 
which began with the Easter holidays in April.
Spontaneous fraternization had occurred at Easter time the pre­
vious two years, but in 1917 the German High Command decided on a 
full-fledged campaign to promote the breakup of the Russian front. 
Intelligence officers, sometimes posing as Social Democrats and revo­
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lutionaries, were well supplied with small gifts and propaganda leaf­
lets and even a Russian language newspaper, Russkii soldat. One pamph­
let hailed the Petrograd Soviet's "Manifesto to the Peoples of the 
World," noting that Chancellor Bethraann Hollweg had spoken favorably 
of it before the German Reichstag. The Germans claimed that Russian 
officers were concealing from their men Germany's peaceful intentions. 
One after another the company and regimental committees took a stand 
against fraternization, even committees dominated by Bolsheviks init­
ially. Fraternization nevertheless continued and the committees began 
to swim with the tide so as not to lose influence over their constitu­
encies. Lacking guidance from the Petrograd Soviet, fraternization 
appeared to many soldiers as a way to realize the strategy of the 
Soviet manifesto that the "peoples" must force peace on their govern­
ments. A number of military reports from the field blamed fraterni­
zation and the general decline in discipline on the influence of the
Petrograd Soviet's peace formula, and some even pleaded for the send-
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ing of Soviet agitators to clear up the "misunderstanding."
Although a pacifist mood overtook the men in the trenches, the 
committeemen at the corps and army levels called for vigilance against 
the German General Staff's attempts to subvert the "revolutionary army." 
The All-Russian Conference of Soviets, they emphasized, required that 
until the Germans accepted the Soviet peace formula the army had to 
maintain its fighting capacity. During April the mood of the committee­
men, especially at the upper levels, became increasingly defensist.
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The chairmen of the Fifth and Twelfth Armies committees even appeared 
before the executive committee of the Petrograd Soviet and bitterly 
accused the body of vacillation and demanded a clear-cut policy on 
fraternization. As a result, a special proclamation to the front ap­
peared on April 18, denouncing as treason fraternization with the en-
114emy and failure to promote the revolution. This declaration and
the work of Soviet commissars appointed to the front resulted in a 
precipitous decline in fraternization. Nevertheless, some committees, 
most notably that of the Second Army, inclined in the other direction 
and "declared that the array would fight to the end only on the condi­
tion that the actual intentions of the Allies were made knovm, and
Russia given a guaranty that the war was not being waged for capital- 
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ist gain. Not until the formation of the first coalition govern­
ment in May and the adoption of clear revolutionary defensist reso­
lutions at array and front congresses did the committee structure as 
a whole become united behind efforts to restore discipline and make 
preparations for a defensive offense. Such efforts clearly cost 
them much of their prestige with the soldiery: e.g., as a naval of­
ficer recounted later, "With every day that passed, the members of the 
committee were noticeably moving to the right, but at the same time
there was an obvious decline in their authority among the soldiers 
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and sailors." The added degree of discipline and morale in response 
to the cooperative efforts of officers and committeemen varied greatly 
from unit to unit, but the committees enjoyed and exercised authority 
only as adjuncts to the Petrograd Soviet rather than any inherent con-
2h0
viction of the need to do so.
Confronted with such problems, the Petrograd Soviet leaders de­
cided to launch a campaign to halt the disintegration of the army.
This campaign also became one of the main policy goals of the new 
coalition as Tseretelli, Skobelev, and Chernov were members of the 
cabinet and Kerensky War Minister. The Soviet opened its campaign on 
June 12 with a fervent appeal to the army to take precautions against 
fraternization. The appeal reminded the troops that chances for a 
democratic peace would fail if the Russian army proved incapable of de­
fending the nation. "The country and revolution are in danger" was the 
cry that echoed across the country. Delegations from the front arrived 
at plenary meetings of the Petrograd Soviet with sacks of gold and sil­
ver medals to aid the nation's defense fund. Their speeches before the 
Soviet deputies were fervent as they pledged their lives to the defend 
the nation. Soviet deputies in turn visited a number of military con­
gresses in hopes of raising the morale of the common soldier. Kerensky 
became the mouthpiece of the Petrograd Soviet at these congresses. Though 
he did not share the Soviet's principles regarding the reorganization of 
the army, he was in complete agreement with the efforts of Tseretelli and 
his colleagues to strengthen the army and the defense of the nation.
"You will carry peace, justice, and truth on the tip of your bayonet," 
he told the soldiers. At this hour, Tseretelli maintained later, Kerensky
stood as one with the Soviet, the military committees at the front, and
117the common soldier.
The prospect of a new slaughter, however, dampened these verbal
2hi
campaigngand deep anxiety set in among the troops. Unit after unit 
took their officers as hostages, deliberately sabotaged technical pre­
parations, and openly declared their Bolshevik sympathies inasmuch as 
Lenin alone openly opposed an offensive. On every sector of the front 
Bolshevik newspapers began to appear in great numbers, their pages 
filled with marked hostility to the thought of active operations. Com­
munist authorities cite the phenomenal figure of 300,000 items being
118distributed by 30 Bolshevik newspapers during June alone at the front. 
Even making allowances for communist statistical distortions the fact 
that the command structure and the soldiers' committees failed despite 
great efforts, to cut off this propaganda flow, reveals some degree of 
the volume. The Bolsheviks used no regular distribution mechanism, 
such as the mail, to convey their literature to the front; their conduits 
were the marching companies of the reserve units in urban centers and 
from soldiers returning from l e a v e . T h e  reserve trainees had attended 
Bolshevik troop rallies in the cities and absorbed elements of Bolshevik 
propaganda. Some of these men became party agitators as the result of 
their regular attendance at courses and lectures operated by the mil­
itary organizations of the Bolsheviks in Petrograd and Moscow. At the
front these replacements seriously undermined efforts to increase dis- 
l20cipline. Ironically the Petrograd Soviet was responsible for send­
ing these radicalizing forces to the front, as the socialist leadership 
decided on May 1 to resume sending combat replacements to the front from 
the Petrograd garrison. Voitinskii, the trouble-shooter of the "Star 
Chamber," found it increasingly difficult to dispatch these troops to
2k2
the front and that each dispatch turned the Petrograd garrison more and
12Lmore against the Menshevik-SR leaders in the Soviet.
Discipline at the front was by no means uniformly bad. Cooperation 
between committeemen and the more flexible commanders had achieved some 
notable successes, mainly through exhaustive speechmaking. The Soviet 
sent out teams from the rear of workers, students, and political figures 
who toured the units to see to it that offensive spirit did not falter. 
Commanders sometimes noted that units markedly improved after such vis­
itations, but more often than not the troops initially responded enthus­
iastically to dynamic oratory, applauded vigorously, and then settled 
back into a state of demoralization. The famous "lashka" Bakchareva 
organized women's battalions of death and sent them to the front in an 
attempt to shame tiie men into fighting. "The League of Personal Example" 
toured the front, working diligently to restore discipline and morale 
in the rank-and-file. Shock battalions made up exclusively of volunteer 
civilians appeared to prove the support of the rear to the men at the 
frontlines. The Bolshevik cry, however, that the coalition government
had compromised itself to the imperialist aims of the Allies cut very
122deep into such efforts.
Soviet envoys and soldiers' committees hierarchy in committing 
themselves to the offensive, sacrified their influence among their 
constituency. They allowed themselves to become fire brigades and 
police forces to bring dissident units back into line and purge them 
of dissident Bolshevik or anarchist elements. The front commissars of 
of the Petrograd Soviet whose position was transformed into a coappoint-
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with the War Ministry by Kerensky, were obliged to carry out a number
of sensational police actions against Bolshevik regiments on the eve
of the offensive, in which the latter were surrounded by loyal cavalry
and artillery units and forced to lay down their arms and to surrender
their dissident agitators. These actions utterly failed to restore
order and morale, as the men remained demoralized with or without the
agitators. In retrospect the Petrograd Soviet leaders staked their
entire political fortune on a successful offensive, the failure of which
was alienate their soldier constituency at the front. The hollow shell
of the committee structure that remained became after the collapse of
the offensive in July the prey of reactionary Kornilivite officers who
heaped the entire responsibility for the failure on them. The Bolsheviks
even suffered in the post-July reaction, particularly after the failure
of their Petrograd fiasco (July 16-18). The great mass of soldiers
were thoroughly tired of high-flown slogans and promises and kept their
123thoughts to themselves. Why did the Petrograd Soviet leadership
commit itself to an offensive in the summer of 1917?
The Petrograd Soviet leaders came out openly for strengthening the 
army following the disastrous defeat at Stokhod in late March when ten 
thousand prisoners were taken and the Russian forces were thrown back 
several miles by the German troops. At the All-Russian Conference of 
Soviets Tseretelli declared the Petrograd Soviet in favor of defending 
the revolution by strengthening the army and approving the possible nec- 
cessity of active operations. The Conference approved Tseretelli's mo­
tion by the overwhelming majority of 325 votes to 57 against. At the 
same time decisions determining tactics and strategy in the field were
2kk
124left in the hands of the military. The strengthening of the army
did not mean that the Soviet leaders had forsaken democratization of
the army; they expected both. As General Denikin recalled later,
"Chkheidze and Skobelev advocated full democratization of the army
. . . and in private conversation they admitted the necessity of rig-
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id military discipline. . . . "
The Petrograd Soviet leaders, while admitting the possible neces­
sity of active operations, refused to sanction an offensive until cir­
cumstances at the front and in the government forced them to do so.
To meet the French offensive in April, the Germans shifted troops from 
the Eastern to the Western Front. Not acting to counter this German 
move, Soviet leaders found, was tantamount to accepting a separate peace, 
a shift in policy the Menshevik leaders would not accept. In order to 
maintain their policy of a general peace, the Petrograd Soviet leaders 
therefore had to change their attitude toward offensive operations.
Then in May the Soviet leaders joined a coalition government. As members 
of the government they had to take responsibility for the offensive. In 
view of developments at the front and in the government, the executive 
committee therefore, led by Tseretelli, gave overt approval to "pre­
parations for an offensive." The Mensheviks had not changed their prin­
ciples because of internal party developments, but because of extra­
partisan events. The Menshevik desire for a general peace without an­
nexations and indemnities was as strong as ever:
The question became if not peace by diplomacy or interna­
tional appeals, then how? The answer was war. If Bethmann- 
Hollweg had forgotten about the Russian front he had to be 
reminded. If the language of peace in international diplo­
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macy was only for show then Russia had to correct this. It 
was necessary to show Russia was strong. It was necessary 
to make the soldiers understand that the path of peace rested 
through the enemy trenches. A victory was necessary to com­
pel foreign powers to listen to Russia and the voice of its 
democracy, ^ ^ t i v e  operations were not only permitted but 
necessary.
Any thought of a separate peace was simply out of the question. A 
separate peace Tseretelli maintained would lead to destruction of the 
Allies and "the destruction of the Allies would be the beginning of 
the destruction of the Russian armies. And the destruction of the 
military power of revolutionary Russia would lead to a common grave, 
bringing death to the revolution, death to freedom, and death to Rus­
sia." In June the Petrograd Soviet reminded Germany that "Russia was 
interested in uniting all democratic peoples in the belligerent coun­
tries for the struggle against imperialism. And this would be rendered
impossible if the German imperialists used the striving for peace in
127order to obtain a separate peace to destroy the Allied armies." Rev­
olutionary defensism once more had conquered and now meant the gambling 
of the army on an offensive. The new line was so strong that when op­
position to the change in policy appeared in Izvestiia, the Soviet organ,
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new editors were immediately selected who supported the Soviet leaders.
The Menshevik party even developed a split between the Martov internation­
alists and the revolutionary defensists as a bloodless purge of the for-
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mer took place at party and editorial posts.
The Petrograd Soviet leaders staked their peace efforts on an 
army that they themselves did not ascertain was combat ready. First, 
the government had destroyed the chain of command just three weeks before
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the offensive was to open. On June 5 Kerensky replaced the Supreme 
Commander, Alekseev, with Brusilov, a rapidly promoted front comman­
der. On June 14 the War Ministry replaced the chief of staff along 
with four of the five front c o m m a n d e r s . T h u s  none of the new front 
commanders knew their subordinate commands or their officers. Equally 
disastrous, Kerensky created a number of new regiments and divisions 
out of old divisions. These new formations were never trained for 
their new assignments; officers and men remained unknown quantities to 
one another. The command conducted no offensive training exercises, 
nor tested any of the offensive operations in mock battle. Most dis­
astrous of all, the command changed the operational plans for the of­
fensive more than once in quick succession. As Alekseev pointed out, 
Brusilov's initial plan of battle was not militarily sound, and, as 
finally modified, allowing each commander "a free hand in starting
operations as the armies would be ready," was a strategic blunder of 
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the first order. The Germans, aided by their railway network,
found it easy to defend themselves against these disorganized attacks. 
The plan of battle, as it unfolded, in and of itself doomed the of­
fensive even without taking into account whether the morale of the 
troops was sufficient or not. Yet Tseretelli, Kerensky, Nekrasov, 
or Tereshchenko never thought to question the soundness of the stra­
tegy, though briefed fully on the Brusilov operation. As Tseretelli 
related later:
The offensive plan accepted by us . . . was tuned to the 
conditions of our army. It is impossible to expect that 
the army, tired from the long war and not yet recuperated 
from the losses it suffered, would suddenly go through 
enemy lines in an irrcstible march. We decided to begin
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action gradually on all fronts, slowly pushing a path 
forward first on one part of the front, then on another, 
then on a third, etc. This tactic would make it possi­
ble for us to utilize our numerical advantage over the 
enemy, depriving him of the possibility of concentrating 
forces in order to strike at any one p o i n t . ^^3
In point of fact precisely the opposite happened. As Alekseev had 
warned, the Germans, without pressures on other fronts, quickly re­
inforced the Austrian lines on the Southwestern Front (the first front 
to attack) and through use of superior communications and railway net­
works moved to crush other fronts as they developed. The July offen­
sive turned into a complete fiasco. Beyond the immediate military con­
sequences, the Allies simply wrote Russia off. On July 14 General Foch 
sent a memorandum to representatives of the Allied governments, meeting 
in Paris, noting the possibility of Russia's defection from the war. 
England's David Lloyd George, previously receptive to the Soviet's plan 
for an international peace conference, now turned against Stockholm and 
gave it its coup de grace. The offensive in the name of revolutionary 
defensism to save Russia from a separate peace came too late after the 
disastrous April French offensive to justify it on that ground in July. 
By July it became a gamble justifiable only on the basis that it would, 
first, reverse the disintegration of the Russian army by raising troop 
morale— at the time a highly debated proposition— and secondly, ful­
fill a modicum of obligation to the Allies by keeping the German forces 
tied down on the Eastern Front. As Stankevich knew: if Russia had no
strength left to wage war, it had still less power to impose interna­
tional peace— only now the July fiasco had revealed the former and thus 
134doomed the latter.
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5. The Nationality Question
On March l6 Izvestiia, the organ of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers and Soldiers,
called for the Provisional Government to grant "all nationalties the right
of nationality and cultural self-determination." While many minorities of
the old Russian Empire welcomed this statement, in reality the definition
of nationality came to mean Poland, Finland, and possibly the Ukraine (this
last according to SR definition), not VIhite Russians, Moslems, Jews, and
other non-Russian peoples of the empire. Indeed the problems of the national
minorities did not even rate a special commission in the Soviet, even though
fl35)
60 percent of uhe population was non-Russian in l^lf. Only out of a sense
of fairness did a majority of the Soviet vote to admit a solitary Armenian 
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delegate. While initially largely sympathetic to the problems of the national
minorities, the Soviet leadership became fearful that the war would conquer
a divided nation and thereby the revolution and reacted negatively to minority
demands. Only when the nationality movement grew to such proportions as to
appear to threaten revolutionary defensism did Soviet leaders focus their
attention on the problem and attempt to resolve it. The SR leader, Viktor
Chernov, admits in his memoirs that the pressure of the national minorities,
"which could have been a constructive force, was transformed into a destructive 
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force." As with all other questions, except war and peace, the majority of 
the Petrograd Soviet leadership tried to relegate all decisions on the 
nationality question to the Constituent Assembly.
Only the Poles and the Jews initially received any real redress to their 
grievances. On March 28 the Petrograd Soviet sent greetings to a Poland
2 l + 9
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completely "independent in national and international affairs." The
Polish problem was solved by the German occupation of the country and 
therefore the Provisional Government, following the lead of the Petro­
grad Soviet's declaration, proclaimed itself in favor of an independent(135)
Poland on Mardi 30. The 5,600,000 Jews of the Russian Empire, who
had no regional territory of their own and thus were no threat to the
territorial integrity of the nation and its defense, were freed from
many of the tsarist discriminatory acts by a proclamation of equal rights
on April 1. Though the government abolished some 650 discriminatory laws
against Jews, anti-semitism did not disappear, but on the political level
it became a monopoly of the most reactionary elements (which were on the
defensive). The proclamation was a half-hearted response to the Soviet's
March 16th call for "cultural self-determination" and, according to P. M.
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Miliukov, was in answer to Jewish claims. Clearly the decree applied
primarily to the Jews, as Leon Trotsky noted: "The proclamation of equal
rights meant nothing to the Finns especially, for they did not desire
equality with the Russians but independence of Russia. It gave nothing to
the Ukrainians, for their rights had been equal before. . . .  It changed
nothing in the situation of the Letts and Esthonians. . ; did not lighten
. . . the fate of the backward peoples and tribes of Central Asia, who had
been held down. . .not by juridical limitations, but by economic and cultur-
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al ball and chain." While equal rights might satisfy the politically dor­
mant petite bourgeois Jewish majority, the demands of the 1,400,000 working 
class Jews remained essentially the same after April 1. The Bund, the ma­
jority Jewish socialist party, welcomed the equal rights decree but supported
2_li2the Soviet view of settling minority demancÈ at the Constituent Assembly. ' The
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Bundists called for "national-cultural autonomy" which would united the
Jews throughout the whole nation around schools and other institutions.
This program, however, in the words of Leon Trotsky, "melted in those
143
first days of freedom like wax under the sun's rays." The other ma­
jor Jewish socialist party, the United Jewish Socialist Workers' Party 
(a union of Zionist-Socialists and the Jewish Socialist Labor Party after 
May), advocated a Russian federation similar to that of the U.S.A. which 
would have "national-personal" autonomy derived from a central govern­
mental organ to deal with education and the social welfare of Jews, Poles,
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or Letts, or Tatars wherever they happened to reside in Russia. The
majority of Russian Jews voted for tlie largest political group, the 
Zionists, who, concerned with building a home in Palestine, played a 
less active political role in 1S17 than their socialist counterparts.
In the case of neither the Poles nor the Jews were the Petrograd intell­
igentsia overly enthusiastic about minority rights, lest they encourage 
other nationality demands.
The Finnish question was the first of the nationality problems to 
blow into the open. The Finns were not completely satisfied with the 
March 20th manifesto of the Provisional Government. The manifesto nulli­
fied imperial ordinances and decrees relative to Finland since 1890, am­
nestied all Finnish political prisoners, and guaranteed the right of self-
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government to the Finns. Finns wanted independence from Russia; in the
beginning both the socialist majority of the Finnish Sejm or Diet as well as
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the non-socialists opposition agreed on this point. Russian socialists in
the Soviet hierarchy saw Finland as an independent state. Russian socialists
felt that only the Constituent Assembly, however, could come to an agreement
with the Finnish Sejm as to whether Finland would become a member of tlie
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Russian federation, an ally or merely a neighbor. The Menshevik faction
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urged this view in April and in June chided the government for its iner-
1 L O
tia. The SR’s in May agreed to independence for Poland but not for Fin­
land, because some SR’s suspected the Finns of being pro-German, but the 
propositions primarily were adopted because most SR’s were preoccupied other-
lliQwise and they adopted Vishniak’s proposal out of haste. Only Lenin of 
all socialists urged that the Finns be granted their maximum program. As 
C. Jay Smith has pointed out, however, Lenin’s ultimate aim "was to achieve 
a voluntary union of Russia and Finland, made possible through the triumph 
of socialism in both c o u n t r i e s . I n  the midst of the July uprising in 
Petrograd the Soviet found itself not only confronted with a crisis in the 
capital but also in Finland where the Sejm was preparing to enact a law 
to exercise supreme power in Finland. The Soviet leaders attempted to 
mediate between the Provisional Government and the Sejm. A Finnish 
delegation pledged its wor^ to Vilitor Chernov that if the Provisional 
Government accepted without change a draft law enlarging the rights of 
the Sejm, they would not present any ne-w demands or offer more difficulty 
before the meeting of the Constituent Assembly. The government sent the 
proposal to its grave by referring it to the juridical c o m m i s s i o n . T h e  
Soviet chairman Chkheidze went to Helsingfors with a delegation to persuade 
the Finns to be calm but failed in its e f f o r t s . A s  a result on July l8,
the Sejm voted to assume all powers in Finland except for matters of foreign
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policy and military affairs. The Provisional Government under its new 
Minister-President Kerensky ordered the Sejm dissolved and new elections to 
be held, though the socialist ministers in the government insisted the move
15^was a mistake. While the Menshevik organ, Rabochaia gazeta, protested the
move, the Soviet organ, Izvestiia, and the SR organ, Delo naroda, endorsed
155the government’s action. Fortunately for Petrograd the Sejm in a split 
decision voted to promulgate the dissolution order and the new elections 
returned a non-socialist majority siding wtih Kerensky. The national question 
• in Finland now became secondary to an internal struggle for Finnish power.
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Ironically, two days before its fall to the Bolsheviks on November 7,
the Provisional Government issued a decree recognizing "in principle"
the independence of Finland except in military and foreign affairs;
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precisely what the Finns had demanded in July. The Petrograd Soviet 
had been party to a policy that had turned the Finns from a constructive 
force into a destructive one for revolutionary defensism.
The Ukrainian nationality movement was even more deadly for the 
Soviet cause of revolutionary defensism than the Finnish. Inasmuch as 
the cities of the Ukraine were considerably russified by 1917, two oppos­
ing organizations arose, one dominated by Russians, the Executive Ccnmiittee 
of the Council of Combined Social Organizations (IKSOOO), and the other 
organized by Ukrainians, the Ukrainian Central Rada (Council). The Kiev- 
Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies was a member of the IKSOOO and 
largely a "Great Russian” institution in sympathy. 'The Rada, while 
founded by an association of intellectuals of moderate political views, 
became inclined to pursue a program of national aspirations. VJhile initial­
ly willing to wait for the All-Russian Constituent Assembly to ratify 
officially the right of Ukrainians to self-rule, the Rada, under pressure 
of Ukrainian soldiers and peasants, found itself com-mitted to an ever more
radical national program, one which brought it into direct conflict with
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Petrograd and the Russian revolutionaries. Wiiile syrigjathetic to Ukrainian 
rights, the Petrograd Soviet leaders were adamant in their opposition to 
granting significant nationality rights before the Constituent Assembly.
The Mensheviks maintained that "this national movement showed nationalist 
and bourgeois qualities wherein bourgeois and peasants were fighting the 
Soviets. Further, federalism found allies there Uleraine among reaction­
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aries like A. Shiil'gin." The SR's developed a contradictory position:
while national autono^iy, they maintained, should always he encompassed
within the bounds of federation and never develop into separate statehood,
nevertheless, the Ukraine should have a separate coinage and postal system
and even homogeneous Uki'ainian regiments, etc. (such separate institutions
being obvious temptations for the Ukrainians to strive for independence).
The SR program, however, was completely nullified by that party's position
that a proportional representative All-Russian Constituent Assembly (not
autonomous Ukrainian representation) would decide which points of the SR
program should become law. As the American historian Oliver H. Radkey
has noted, "Whether even Vishniak's Poland would have gotten through those
gates is a moot question," much less the Ulirainian program.
Tne Ukrainian question exploded over demands of Ukrainian troops in
the Russian army. Ulerajjiian soldiers upon nearing of the March overturn
of tsarism began to speak their native tongue and form organizations of
Ukrainian soldiers. With the establishment of the Rada in Kiev many of
161these men recognized only orders of the Rada. In Kiev Ukrainians 
demanded the formation of separate Ukrainian units and a Ukrainian Rational 
Army. The formation of eight Latvian Rifle Regiments in 1916, the organ­
ization of a Polish Corps under General Dovbor-Musnitski, and the government's 
approval on April 2l, 191? for a Czecho-Slovakian army encouraged the
Ukrainians to demand a separate army for the 99^,300 Ukrainian soldiers in 
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the Russian army. At first only units made up exclusively of volunteers 
were allowed, and then approval was given to 4,000 men who "deserted" to
25U
form a Ukrainian regiment. During the July offensive Ukrainian soldiers
refused to move up to the front unless under the blue and yellow Ukrainian 
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flag. This movement was reenforced by the actions of the First Ukrainian 
Military Congress which voted to negotiate with the Petrograd Soviet on 
the formation of Ulirainian units in the army. Already the executive com­
mittee of the Petrograd Soviet had informed the congress that the question 
of national troop units was being discussed by a special commission (assist­
ed by the general staff and the nationalities organizations) and that 
the proposition would be placed on the agenda of the First All-Russian 
Congress of Soviets. In the meantime the capital Soviet leaders asked
the military congress to refrain "from arbitrary, unauthorized action"
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pending the decision of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets. As early
as April 2 the Petrograd Soviet had rejected the formation of national
units in favor of the formation of a revolutionary arm;'. They still
opposed in early June the formation of Polish units, as they would be "an
instrument of reaction to stifle Polish freedom after the liberation." The
existing Latvian Rifle regiments were to be the only exception. Thus with
much emotion "in the midst of yelling" the Petrograd Soviet rejected the
Ukrainians' demand for autonomous regiments (partially because the Ukrainians
had informed the Provisional Government ' s right-wing that the regiments
would be devoid of Bolshevik elements and that they would fight a "War to
the finish"). "We were socialists only in name," admitted one of the
Ukrainian delegates, V. K. Vinnishenko. "In reality, we were democrats,
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republicans, not socialists." The Petrograd Soviet was not fooled about
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their politics, and insisted that demands be introduced along party, not 
national lines.
The Provisional Government then heightened the conflict. On June l4
War liinister Kerensky declared the forthcoming Second Ukrainian Army
Congress "inopportune" and was supported by the Petrograd Soviet as well
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as the Kiev Soviet and the IKSOOO. Nevertheless, the Ukrainians
declared that the congress would be convened on June l8. On June 17 an
angry crowd of 3,000 persons protested against Kerensky's prohibition on
the congress. At the Petrograd Soviet the Ukrainian Rada was accused of
double-dealing for attempting to justify its action as nothing more than
the sanactioning of an expression of national feeling, when in fact the
Rada was the source for inflaming that nationalism. Finally, on June 23
the Rada issued its first Universal declaring that the Ukrainian people
would henceforth decide tneir œ m  fate, but without separation from Russia.
Although this '"Supreme Law" announced that the leaders in Kiev would not
declare an independent Uliraine, and would abide by the decisions of tne
forthcoming All-Russian Constituent Assembly, Petrograd rejected the
Universal on June 30, appealing to all Ukrainians for cooperation at a
time When the army was engaged in the July offensive. The Rada persisted 
168in its position.
Tseretelli, the chief architect of Petrograd Soviet policies, now 
developed a compromise that saved the Ukrainian situation from worsening; 
at the same time, however, it opened the opportunity for the Kadet ministers 
to bring down tne coalition, Tseretelli and Tereshchenko, for the government.
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went to Kiev to induce the Ukrainians to moderate their demands. On their
own initiative Kerensky and Nekrasov (with Tereshchenko a triumvirate in
the cabinet) joined the delegation. The Rada was transformed into a regional
preliminary parliament based on proportional representation for non-Ukrainians
-and Ukrainians alike, while the secretariat of the Rada became the local
agent of the Provisional Government. Though not definitive until sanctioned
by the Constituent Assembly, the Ulcraine by this agreement would act as
an autonomous unit but within the framework of the "revolutionary front of
the nation-wide democracy." On the military question Kerensky was adamant
in his opposition to the territorial formation of troops, as it would have
meant weakening the army by a massive reorganization program. "Closer
national union" of Uiirainians would be allowed only where "technically
feasible and not injurious to the ariry's fighting powc: . " The Rada approved
the agreement 100 votes to 70 but with many abstentions. In Petrograd
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the Kadet ministers rejected the compromise.
Tseretelli tried to save both the agreement and the coalition of 
socialists and liberals that he had entered only under the threat of civil 
war. If the Kadets resigned, the coalition might well be doomed; on the 
other hand, if the compromise with the Ukrainians were not accepted, the 
results could be equally disastrous, especially for the military in the 
midst of the July offensive. The Kadets asserted that the agreement per­
mitted too much autonomy for the Uliraine, autonomy not based on a decision 
made in the forthcoming Constituent Assembly. Furthermore, the negotiators
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had exceeded their authority, as granted hy the rest of the cabinet.
Tseretelli insisted that the agreement was not a surrender to the Ukrainians, 
but the very best compromise possible under the circumstances. The Ulirainians 
he noted had vfithdra-vm their most unpalatable demands. The Kadets, never­
theless, resigned from the government when the socialists and the Kerensky 
triumvirate refused to withdraw the Ukrainian agreement
While the Ukrainian issue was important to the Kadets, it also served
as an excuse to end the ’’illusion of unity” of the coalition. Miliukov
and the Kadet ministers had e>hausted the patience of Tseretelli and the
Petrograd Soviet by refusing to play the role of "bourgeois ministers",
reading from a script written by Menshevik leaders. Tseretelli was anxious
to maintain the "democratic united front" with the Kadets, but actually
played a major role in its dovnfall by refusing to pu:sue any political
program but the Menshevii-; one. The Kadets probably did induce the cabinet
crisis in order to force Tseretelli into accepting more points of the Kadet
program. The resignation of the Kadets forced the socialists to reconsider
their position on government in revolutionary Russia. Once more policies
in support of revolutionary defensism had led the Petrograd Soviet leaders
17L
to an ever more impossible position vis-a-vis the popular masses.
The Petrograd Soviet either ignored or rejected outright the demands 
of other nationalities. The Moslem Provisional National Shuro (Council) 
sought to cooperate with the Provisional Government and the Petrograd Soviet 
only to be rebuffed by the latter. Chkheidze, the Petrograd Soviet chair­
man, categorically vetoed Moslem participation in the government on the
258
ground that parties, not nationalities should compose the coaltion. 
Tseretelli also threw his weight against such participation. Despite 
differences between the Petrograd Soviet leaders and the Moslem Shuro, 
the latter did not hesitate to unite with the former against General 
Lavr Kornilov's march on Petrograd in September 1917 (Shuro sent agita­
tors brealîing up the Caucasian Cavalry, the so-called Savage Division, 
marching on Petrograd to overthrow the Petrograd Soviet and the Kerensky 
government). Like other minorities, the Moslems wanted a centralized 
Russian republic in which they would participate in the central adminis­
tration and have their own cultural autonomy. In Belorussia half of the 
area was occupied by German and Polish troops and political activity was 
highly embryonic with the Russian SR's at first and then the Bolsheviks 
in the fall of I917 giving direction to the Belorussians. Due to the 
prominence of a number of Georgian Menshsviiis in the Petrograd Soviet 
and the coalition governments (Tseretelli, Chkheidze, Voitinskii),
Georgians generally advanced no national demands until after November 1917» 
Armenians were supporters of any Russian government as long as it was 
anti-Turkish; they therefore cooperated with both the Provisional Government 
and the Petrograd Soviet. Azerbaijani nationalists, masking their pro- 
Turkish sympathies, cooperated with Petrograd until the Turkish conquest 
of Transcaucasia in the spring of I918. The close proximity of Petrograd 
worked against the nationalist movement in Estonia. Estonians favored a 
federal republic, to be implemented by the All-Russian Constituent Assembly,
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in which the government would recognize the right of self-determination of 
the peoples of Russia and the use of Estonian in official communications 
in Estonia. Such modest demands found no argument in Petrograd, In Lith­
uania, as it was occupied hy German troops, little more could he done 
other than the holding of a provisional Sejm in Petrograd which split into 
a right wanting amiable separation from Russia and a left demanding that 
national goals should he above revolutionary ones. Though Latvians in 
Petrograd and Moscow enthusiastically supported the Petrograd Soviet policy 
on the nationality question, and there was much discussion about a demo­
cratic federated Russian republic (to include Latvia), in reality the 
anti-Russian feelings of the general populace and the pro-German attitude 
of the Lettish barons and farmers made such talk inconsequential. Inasmuch 
as these national groups presented no problems on the scale of the Finnish
and Ultrainian questions, their fate was slighted in favor of more pressing
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issues before the capital Soviet. '
At the All-Russian Congress of Soviets in June the Petrograd Soviet 
leaders, through Voitinskii and Liber, made their point-of-view on the 
nationality question unmistakably clear. The nationality question had to 
be viewed from a revolutionary standpoint first and foremost. The defense 
of the revolution had to be guaranteed if the rights to be granted by the 
Constituent Assembly were to be realized. "At this time," e:cplained Liber, 
"there is not so much the need for making an agreement on the rights of 
peoples, as for fighting to protect those rights. To speak of self-determi­
nation is meaningless as long as no guarantee has been found for harmonious
260
relations between nations." The revolutionary democracy was not against 
minority rights, only their priority in the order of the goals of the 
revolution. The minorities had to help defend the revolution against the 
Geimmn conqueror, the enemy of the freedom of all peoples, they emphasized, 
and once freed from this oppression could discuss the structure to be 
founded on the principle of the self-determination of peoples. On the 
motion of Voitinskii the congress approved "the general principle of 
granting each nation autonomy." Unilateral decisions by an national 
group were expressly condemned, hcrvrever. V/hile the Petrograd Soviet had 
endorsed cultural autonorry as early as the beginning of May, political 
and military autonomy were to be limited to the goals of revolutionary 
defensism. As Vilitor Chernov wrote, instead of a great vcr̂ -rer for 
constructive work, the pressure of the nationalities was turned into a 
destructive force: "Petty haggling with each nationality now awakening
to historic life, constant dread of getting the worst of a bargain, 
obstinate striving to postpone and evade payment on the notes presented
by history, such was the policy l:<equeathed by the Provisional Government."
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Such too was the legacy of the Petrograd Soviet.
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6. The Constituent Assembly
The Petrograd Soviet leaders postponed most reforms either
to avert civil war or because they were democrats and relegated
I7I1such decisions to the expected Constituent Assembly. Did they, 
however, use their influence to a sufficient degree to see that 
the assembly convened at a propitious time?
The ultimate aim of the liberation movement in Russia since 
the 1870’s was the convocation of a Constituent Assembly, The 
1905 Revolution revived the idea and the first proclamation of 
the Petrograd Soviet on March 13 called for a Constituent Assembly 
on the basis of universal, equal, direct, and secret sufferage.̂ 75 
The following day Sukhanov broached the subject before the exe­
cutive committee. Though later indifferent to the body, at the 
time he urged the immediate convocation of a Constituent Assembly 
in order to reinforce "with a legal framework the work of the 
provisional catastrophe period and make the new status permanent 
and capable of organic evolution, wider scope, and development
to its logical conclusion." ̂ 76
On the night of March lb-15 discussions between the Temporary 
Committee of the State Duma and the Soviet leaders led to agreement 
on the convocation of a Constituent Assembly. The two groups, 
however, disagreed on a date for the convocation. The Soviet leaders 
demanded an immediate start on organizing elections and the elec­
tions themselves as soon as possible. The liberals considered 
elections impossible during wartime, particularly in the army.
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The liberals also disputed the Soviet leaders' demand that the
socialists alone should decide questions concerning the proposed
177Constituent Assembly. On March 26 the Provisional Government 
and the Petrograd Soviet leaders again discussed the convocation 
of the Constituent Assembly. The parties now agreed that only 
"intensified military activities" might delay the opening of the 
assembly, that the date of convocation would come no later than 
the middle of summer (though the Soviet leaders considered the 
date quite late), that the army would participate in elections, 
and that the government and the Soviet would work out conditions
178regulating the assembly's elections and its work.
Following these initial steps toward convoking the Consti­
tuent Assembly, the Petrograd Soviet and the government tended 
to neglect the matter. According to Voitinskii, "In the beginning 
the leaders of the Soviet were not seriously interested in this 
issue, believing it not very important whether the Constituent 
Assembly convened three months sooner or l a t e r . I n  the govern­
ment the conviction arose that the assembly could convene only 
during a lull in military operations, i. e., not before autumn.
The Kadets began to urge postponement of elections in order to 
elect a "better" assembly. They maintained that national elections
should follow only after the establishment of strong local admin-
181istration and the careful preparation of voter lists. Even 
Buchanan, the British Ambassador, urged postponement, claiming the 
elections would prove disruptive in the armed forces.-'-'-’̂
Delay enveloped the activity involved in summoning the assem-
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bly. Though the government on March 21 took steps to convoke a 
special council to draft election laws for the assembly, the 
council was not established until April 7* While Chkheidze on 
April 6 urged the speeding up of the process summoning the assem­
bly, the Soviet leaders, once the council was set up, delayed its 
work for two months by bickering over the number of seats allocated 
to the socialists. Stankevich noted additional complications 
in convoking the assembly, when he declared before the All-Russian 
Conference of Soviets in April that "the Constituent Assembly can­
not be summoned before September" as local self-government had not 
drawn up the electoral l i s t s . R e f o r m e d  local self-government, 
however, did not exist; the miunicipal reform statute appeared only 
on April 28 and the zemstvo (rural) reform as late as J'une 3*^^^ 
Chernov questioned later why the voters' list for the Constituent 
Assembly was not drawn up at the same time as those for municipal 
and zemstvo elections?^®^ "This was an insolent question, regard­
ed by the liberal bourgeois wing of the government and its learned 
commission of jurists as an insult to the eternal principles of 
constitutional law," the SR leader wrote.
By June "the Soviet had realized the danger of further delay" 
Voitinskii recalled later,and therefore used its influence in the 
coalition government to set the date for elections to the assembly 
on September 30 and its convocation on October 3-^^ F. F. Kokoshkin, 
the Kadet head of the special council, had had a serious clash with 
Tseretelli and Chernov over convoking the assembly as early as 
October 3, and though the Soviet leaders won out in the government,
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Kokoshkin’s Kadet-dominâted council succeeded in delaying the
convocation d a t e . ^^9 addition to needing more time to draw up
the voters' lists, the Kadets even found that not enough paper
was available for the sealed envelopes required for secret ballot- 
190ing. Despite protests from the Soviet leaders, the Provisional 
Government on August 22 delayed the convocation of the Constituent
191
Assembly until December 11. VThile the Soviet leaders acknow­
ledged the need for some delay, they found the convocation date 
of December 11 inordinately l a t e O n  September 25 the SR 
Central Committee ’’unanimously decreed, as an ultimatum” that 
"the convocation of the Constituent Assembly must not be delayed." 
Chernov remarked that by this late date this was "a conversation 
in the realm of s h a d o w . " T h i s  was the chief disease of the 
1917 Revolution--tardiness,” the SR leader added.
Tseretelli recollected later that the chief mistake of the 
Petrograd Soviet leaders was allowing the delay of the convoca­
tion of the Constituent Assembly.VIhile the Soviet did ini­
tially neglect the Constituent Assembly, were they also guilty 
of too readily accepting the Kadet position that technical elec­
tion difficulties made postponement inevitable? Could elections 
have occurred earlier than November 26?
N. D. Avksent’ev, the SR chairman of the All-Russian Peasants’ 
Soviet and a frequent participant in "Star Chamber” deliberations, 
became Minister of Interior in August and thereby general super­
visor of the voting machinery for the Constituent Assembly. He 
found the electoral process beset with difficulties and therefore
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urged tJaat the populace vote in at least one local election before 
voting for the assembly. He remarked that in some areas the pea­
sants had even refused to vote. Were technical election diffi­
culties, the vastness of Russia, the lack of a democratic tradition 
causes for delaying the elections? True the political conscious­
ness of the peasantry was low, but if politiceü. education was neces­
sary, when would the elections take place? In such a case the gov­
ernment had to accomplish something more than provisional solutions. 
Russian had elected four national assemblies, the first two on a 
fairly broad franchise. Furthermore, the lack of a democratic tra­
dition did not prohibit elections from finally taking place after 
the Bolshevik coup. Technical difficulties had not prevented a hardly 
democratically trained France in l8U8 from mounting an election in 
two and a half months after the outbreak of revolution, and, though
much smaller than Russia, the progress in communications by 1917
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more than offset this last disparity.
While some have accused the Soviet leaders of merely "tailing
along behind the Kadets" in delaying the Constituent Assembly, the
lOBmatter was probably much deeper than this. ^  Throughout the revol­
ution the Soviet leaders had to conçromise to avert civil war. They 
joined a coalition government for this reason alone; they compromised 
on their peace program for this reason; they came close to trans­
forming their policy of revolutionary defensism into patriotic 
offensism; they preached calm and patience to the masses concerning 
reforms. When their peace program faded away, nothing remained ex­
cept the glimmer of the Constituent Assembly to which they had de-
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ferred so much and which they finally also deferred into oblivion. 
Was it the specter of civil war that led to this tragic decision?
No testamony exists to support such a supposition, only the re­
cord of the Soviet leaders’ past actions leads to such a conclu­
sion.
Was a Constituent Assembly really necessary to accomplish 
reforms? As democrats the Soviet leaders certainly thought so.
Yet, as Sukhanov noted later, "It did not, after all, occur to 
anyone that the question of concluding peace could wait for the 
Constituent Assembly. Nor would anyone, least of all the employers 
themselves, e>rpect the conditions of labor to remain the same 
after the revolution had been accomplished. . . . For what we 
were in the midst of was a revolution. . . The Soviet
leaders apparently never realized that the Kadets did not wish 
a Constituent Assembly unless built upon the wake of nation­
alism resulting from a military victory over the Germans.
While the Soviet leaders risked all in April to force the 
Miliukov-oriented government to accept its peace program, they 
never appeared willing to do so for reforms and the Constituent 
Assembly. Would they continue to act as reluctant revolutionaries 
even in the face of popular uprisings urging them onward?
26?
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- CHAPTER VI 
THE SOVIET UHDER SIEGE
1. The Urban Masses in Revolt 
From July l6 to l8 workers and soldiers emptied onto the streets 
of the capital demanding the abolition of the Provisional Government 
and the assumption of state power by the Petrograd Soviet. The pop­
ular outbreak followed upon a rising wave of strikes in Petrograd 
factories, political friction between authorities in the capital and 
the masses of nearby Kronstadt, the Provisional Government's storm­
ing of a popular anarchist center, the transfer of more troops to 
the front from a Petrograd garrison increasingly rebellious over 
projected offensive operations, and an aborted mass demonstration 
set for June 23.
Did the governmental crisis, the July offensive, a partisan 
political conspiracy (i. e. by the Bolsheviks or anarchists), or 
socio-economic needs of the masses and the very lives of the soldiers 
precipitate the outbreak? A mass protest stemming from a political 
cause constituted a severe challenge to internal stability and thus 
a threat to the Petrograd Soviet's policy of revolutionary defensism; 
an outbreak springing from socio-economic demands was a clear indict­
ment of the Soviet's policy of provisional change until the convocation 
of the Constituent Assembly.
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The first signs of overt popular unrest occurred among the work­
ers. From the latter part of May and throughout June worker unrest 
swept the country from end to end with the large concentration of 
workers in the capital leading the way. As Trotsky noted in his his­
tory of 1917 j "The strikes were especially stormy among the more 
backward and exploited groups of workers. Laundry workers, dyers, 
coopers, unskilled workers, shoemakers, paper-box makers, sausage 
makers, furniture workers, were striking, layer after layer, through­
out the month of June."^ While the impulse to strike reached the most 
backward and least organized groups of workers, the skilled and organ­
ized workers turned from individual economic strikes to making poli­
tical demands that might lead to bettering their increasingly inçov- 
erished condition. As early as April 26 the workers of the Old 
Parviainen metal factory passed a strongly worded resolution demand­
ing among other things, the retirement of the Provisional Government, 
"which only slows up the revolution . . . ." During May and June 
more and more factories passed similar resolutions. On June 13 the 
Workers' Section of the Petrograd Soviet, reflecting the spontaneous
reelections to the Soviet plenum that began in May, passed a Bolshevik
3resolution that power should be in the hands of the Soviets. On June
30 the newly created Central Council of Factory Committees called on
workers to go into the streets and demand the transfer of state power 
kto the Soviets.
Other events occurred during this time that spurred the popular 
masses to demand the transfer of state power from the government coal­
ition to the Soviet. The Anarchist-Communists, one of two major anar-
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chlst organizations in Petrograd, momentarily confiscated the printing
press of the rightwing newspaper Russkaia volia on June l8. While the 
government and Petrograd Soviet leaders had long looked askance at the 
anarchists* seizure of the villa of the former tsarist minister Durnovo, 
until the attack upon the conservative organ, the Anarchist-Communist 
were left alone. Two days after the confiscation, the Minister of Jus­
tice ordered the anarchists to vacate the Villa Durnovo. They refused 
to comply and the Vyborg soldiers and workers supported their neighbors 
through strikes and mass protests. The executive committee of the Pet­
rograd Soviet received appeals from the popular masses to take steps 
against the eviction and to secure **to the ' toiling people ' the poss­
ession of the villa." Once more the Petrograd Soviet became the med­
iator between the government and the pPpulace. At its afternoon session 
on June 21, the bureau of the Soviet Executive Committee requested the 
government to rescind temporarily its ultimatum to the anarchists. L.D. 
Sokolov and I, P. Goldenberg of the bureau drafted an appeal to those 
on strike to resume work, while A. R. Gotz and V. A. Anisimov of the 
"Star Chamber" went to Villa Durnovo to formulate a compromise with the 
anarchists. Gotz and Anisimov reported to the All-Russian Congress of 
Soviets, then in session, that the anarchists demanded not only reten­
tion of the villa, but the release as well of all socialists and anar­
chists arrested since March, and the confiscation for socialist and 
anarchist purposes of Rech* (the Kadet organ), Russkaia volia, and the 
rightwing paper, Novoe vremia. Instead the Congress voted a resolution 
quite similar to that of the Petrograd Soviet executive's, urging work­
ers to return to their jobs and affirming the absolute unacceptability
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of armed demonstrations without the specific authorization of the Pet­
rograd Soviet. The Congress, with the government's acceptance, post­
poned the eviction of the anarchists from Villa Durnovo, pending an 
investigation of the matter. According to Tseretelli, the failure of 
the Congress and the government to deal decisively with the anarchists, 
led to worse consequences later: "The indecisiveness exhibited by the
Congress and the government on the matter of the Anarchists reassured 
the Bolshevik Central Committee, while the unrest on the Vyborg side 
heightened tension in the capital." Furthermore, that the matter came 
up before the Congress rather than the government handling the situa­
tion revealed the weakness of the Provisional Government. By assuming 
the responsibility for dealing with the affair, the Soviet Congress in­
directly encouraged the mass psychology of "All Power to the Soviets."^ 
Besides the increasing number of strikes and spontaneous popular 
protests such as the Villa Durnovo affair, the first report of organized 
protest occurred in the Petrograd garrison on June 5» The Bolshevik Mili­
tary Organization informed its party's central committee that the Pav- 
lovskii, Izmailovskii, Grenadier guards, and the 1st Reserve Infantry 
regiments, among others, "were ready to go out on their own if a posi­
tive decision were not adopted at the center," of the Bolshevik party.^
At nearby Kronstadt naval base plans were underway for a mass garrison 
demonstration in the capital when the Bolshevik Military Organization 
added their efforts to organize the protest and include participation 
by the Petrograd garrison. On June 17 several hundred Kronstadt sailors 
and troops from the Petrograd garrison steiged a peaceful demonstration 
in honor of the dead heroes of the March coup d'état.̂  Bolshevik leaders
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heatedly debated the proposition for a mass demonstration of soldiers
and sailors, as all party members acknowledged that the Petrograd Sov-
o
let would vigorously oppose such a move.
While popular unrest grew, central authority came under attack 
from local and provincial soviets. In the capital the Schlusselburg 
district soviet declared their sector a free republic and organized 
a red guard of former criminals and undesirables. Schlusselburg is­
sued a decree "nationalizing" the land and all factories in the dis­
trict. The capital Soviet chairman, after great difficulty, persuaded 
the Schlusselbui’g Soviet to nullify its decree. The Tsaritsin, Kras- 
noiarsk, and Krasnodar Soviets, among others, telegraphed the Petrograd 
Soviet that they would only recognize the authority of the All-Russian
Congress of Soviets, then in session, as the legitimate government of
9Russia. At nearby Kronstadt, the Petrograd Soviet received what was 
in essence a challenge to its authority. The Kronstadt Soviet had ar­
rested a number of officers at the time of the March coup, but by con­
tinuing to hold them "in pre-trial custody" had assumed governmental 
powers. Neither the Petrograd Soviet nor the Provisional Government 
recognized Kronstadt's right to perform governmental functions, but 
the capital took no action against the usurpation until the Kronstadt 
Soviet issued a decree on May 29 declaring that it exercised sole local 
authority and on national matters would deal directly with the Petro­
grad Soviet. The action followed an attempt by Voitinskii, the "Star Cham­
ber’s" trouble-shooter, to gain the transfer of the incarcerated Kron­
stadt officers to Petrograd. Now the executive committee of the Petro­
grad Soviet summoned the leaders of the Kronstadt Soviet to Petrograd 
to explain their resolution. As the statement was less than satisfactory to
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Petrograd, Tseretelli and Skobelev went to Kronstadt, gained the
Kronstadt Bolsheviks' agreement to their program, exacted a promise 
from the Kronstadt Soviet to transfer all prisoners to the govern­
ment and obtained a declaration of Kronstadt's obedience to the 
Petrograd regime. Under pressure from the local sailors, however, 
the Kronstadt Soviet reversed the Tseretelli conç>romise and re­
affirmed itself as sole authority in Kronstadt. On June 9 Tsere­
telli carried through the Petrograd Soviet a resolution condemning 
the "apostasy" of "anarchist" Kronstadt from the "revolutionary 
democracy »" by a majority of 58O votes against 162, with ?4 absten­
tions. The next day the All-Russian Peasants' Congress opened in 
Petrograd and after hearing Tseretelli's report on the Kronstadt 
situation, refused to hear Trotsky's rebuttal and even threatened 
to "refuse foodstuffs to Kronstadt." While Trotsky claimed credit 
for resolving the crisis on practical grounds by releasing the off­
icers, in fact Kronstadt yielded under the threat of the mainland's 
big guns. While the authority of the central governmental apparatus 
was saved, it had been won at a price. As Trotsky announced in de­
fense of Kronstadt on June 9 before the Petrograd Soviet plenum, "when 
a counter-revolutionary general tries to throw a noose around the neck 
of the revolution, the Kadets will soap the rope, and the Kronstsuit 
sailors will come to fight and die with us."^^
The rising wave of strikes, the unrest in the Petrograd garrison 
and the Villa Durnovo and Kronstadt affairs brought to a head a demand 
initiated in the garrison on June 5 that the Bolsheviks lead a mass 
demonstration in the streets of Petrograd to transfer "All power to
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the Soviets". As a result, the Bolshevik leadership voted to 
sponsor a demonstration for June 23* Though both the Soviet 
Congress and the Petrograd Soviet on June 21 outlawed any armed 
demonstration not authorized by the capital Soviet, the Bol­
sheviks, nevertheless, enticed even supporters of the other 
socialist parties inasmuch as the demonstration appeal was for 
the transfer of state power to the Menshevik-SR controlled Pet­
rograd Soviet and All-Russian Congress of Soviets.
Though the Bolsheviks tried to make the preparations for the 
demonstration as secret as possible, the Petrograd Soviet Exe­
cutive Committee learned of it on the afternoon of June 22 and 
immediately informed the presidium of the All-Russian Congress of 
Soviets and the Provisional Government. Both the Petrograd Soviet 
and the Soviet Congress had not only condemned unauthorized armed 
demonstrations, but also had voted the Provisional Government their 
full cooperation and support. As the demonstrators would be armed 
and demanding "All Power to the Soviets", the decisions of the Soviet 
bodies would appear to be repudiated by the very popular masses they 
were supposed to represent. Furthermore, as Tseretelli recalled 
later, "The direct consequence of this demonstration would be corpses 
on the streets of Petrograd, the discrediting of the democracy unable
to protect the capital from such eruptions, and the strengthening of
12counterrevolutionary currents in the country."
The Soviet bodies set about at once to halt the demonstration. 
Chkheidze, Gotz, Dan, and Tseretelli of the Congress presidium 
drafted an appeal to the populace which the Congress plenum adopted at a
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12:30 A. M. meeting. It partially declared:
The Bolshevik Party calls you into the streets.
This appeal was prepared without the knowledge and 
authorization of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers'
Deputies . . . , the All Russian Congress . . . , the 
Soviet of Peasants' Deputies and all the Socialist parties.
Do not do what you are called upon to do.
In this uneasy time you are called into the streets to voice 
a demand for the overthrow of the Provisional Government, the 
support of which the All-Russian Congress has just acknowledged 
as necessary . . . .
Not a single demonstration should be held today.^3
The Congress also appointed a Bureau for Counteracting the Demon­
stration and outlawed all demonstrations for a three-day period. 
After the session members of the Congress fanned out across the 
capital to persuade the workers and soldiers not to demonstrate.
"All night long, without a wink of sleep," reported the Moscow 
Izvestiia, "a majority of the Congress, more than five h'ondred 
members, dividing themselves into tens, traveled throughout the 
factories and shops and military units of Petrograd, urging every­
one to stay away from the demonstration . . . .  The Congress had 
no authority in a good many of the factories and shops, and also 
in several regiments of the garrison. . . . The members were fre­
quently met in a far from friendly manner, sometimes hostilely, and 
quite often they were sent away with insults.Particularly re­
vealing is the report of Congress member, N. Voronovich, who repre­
sented the Luga garrison. He recalls an exchange between Dr. Levich, 
a Congress member, and the Reserve guards of the Grenadier regiment;
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'What do you want?' asked Levich, 'Do you demand the 
proclamation of Soviet power?'
The crovrd of thousands confirmed his words.
'It is excellent' continued Levich, 'Let it be your 
way. We will notify the Soviet authorities. Just who 
among you will rise to the head of authority? A 
Council of Ministers?'
'Down with Ministers,' roared the crowd, 'All Power to 
the Soviets I'
'Just which Soviet will assume power?' asked Levich,
'The Soviet of Petrograd or the Soviet of Kronstadt?'
The crowd of soldiers was dumbfounded . . . .  a grena­
dier stepped foriv'-ard and announced: 'Neither the Pet­
rograd Soviet nor the Kronstadt Soviet will elect the 
Government. The Congress of Soviets will do so.'
'There, we have come to an understanding with you,' smiled 
Levich, 'This means that the Supreme Organ of State Power 
is the Congress of Soviets.'
'Correct, roared the crowd, 'All Power to the Soviets.
Down with the Provisional Government!'
'On behalf of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets,' continued 
Levich, 'I suggest that you obey the decisions of this Con­
gress and return to your barracks to await its orders . .
At 2:00 A. M. on June 23, the day set for the demonstration, the Bol­
sheviks reversed their position and joined the Congress members in 
the streets and the barracks calling on the workers and soldiers not 
to demonstrate that day.
On June 2k a commission of Mensheviks and SB's met to consider 
how to prevent similar threats in the future. According to Tsere­
telli, the solitary account of the meeting, a bitter split developed 
within the Menshevik-SR leadership: Gotz, Liber, and Ermolaev sup­
porting Tseretelli, and Dan, Bogdanov, and Khinchuk opposing him.
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"We cannot satisfy ourselves with an ideological fight with the 
Bolsheviks and verbal prohibitions of armed demonstrations," Tsere­
telli maintained, "but must at the same time adopt practical mea­
sures to make it impossible for them to consider armed attacks on
18the democratic system." Tseretelli demanded the disarming of 
military regiments and units of the Red Guard under Bolshevik 
control. The opposition argued that such action was contrary to 
democratic principles and would only strengthen the Bolsheviks.
They required only public condemnation of the Bolsheviks and the 
prohibition of future armed demonstrations. Though a majority of 
the commission favored the latter measures, Tseretelli took his 
argument later that same day to a closed session of the highest 
Soviet organs: the presidium of the Congress, the Petrograd Soviet
Executive Committee, and the b'ureaus of each of the Soviet parties. 
This meeting demanded an explanation from the Bolsheviks for what 
Dan called a "political adventure". Kamenev (in Lenin's absence) 
asked what all the fuss was about, as the Bolsheviks had merely 
scheduled a peaceful demonstration which "flowed out of the right 
of the revolution and which had never been questioned before". 
"Where," asked Kamenev, "was there any illegality in this? Where
19was there any disloyalty?" Tseretelli, his face white as a sheet 
jumped to his feet and interrupted those questioning Kamenev, 
charging:
What has happened is nothing but a plot against the revol­
ution, a conspiracy for the overthrow of the government 
and the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks, who know that 
they can never get this power in any other way. The
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conspiracy was rendered harmless when we discovered it. 
But it may be repeated tomorrow. They say that counter­
revolution has raised its head. That is not true. 
Counterrevolution has not raised its head, but lowered 
it. Counterrevolution can penetrate to us only through 
one door: through the Bolsheviks. What the Bolsheviks
are doing is no longer ideological propaganda. It is a 
plot. The weapon of criticism is not being replaced by 
criticism with weapons. Let the Bolsheviks accuse us 
as they will. How we will go over to other methods of 
struggle. The revolutionaries who cannot wield their 
arms worthily must have their arms taken away. The 
Bolsheviks must be disarmed. We will not permit any 
conspiracies.
Kamenev immediately screamed back at Tseretelli: "Mi'. Minister,
if you are not talking wildly, do not confine yourself to words.
21Arrest me and try me for plotting against the revolution!" The 
Bolsheviks stormed out of the meeting. Tseretelli now became the 
object of attack. Sukhanov found the evidence insufficient to 
support a charge of conspiracy against the Bolsheviks. The Inter- 
districtite A. V. Lunacharskii maintained that the Bolsheviks in­
tended only a peaceful demonstration and had always been "against 
Blanquist conspiracies." The SR S. Saakian and the Trudovik V. 
Bronzov suggested that reactionary Black Hundreds had made the 
demonstration appear worse than intended. Iu. 0. Martov, the 
leader of the Menshevik-Internationalists, however, cut to the 
heart of the debate; "Much has been said here about Bolshevik 
adventurism, but don't forget that you are dealing not with a 
small group of Bolsheviks but with the great masses of workers who 
stand behind them. Instead of trying to attract these masses of 
workers away from Bolshevik influence, you hasten to measures which 
create a gulf be ween you and the more active part of the prole­
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tariat . . . .  Instead of applying force, shouldn't we tell the 
workers that their dissatisfaction is justified and that the Con­
gress will speed up the passage of reforms in the control and or­
ganization of industry?" The right socialists, Kerensky, Avksent'ev, 
Znamenskii, Liber, A. A. Vilenkin, a Fifth Army delegate , çame 
to Tseretelli's defense. When the meeting adjourned for each dele­
gation to discuss the question before taking a final vote, the SR- 
Menshevik bloc approved by a narrow margin an initial proposition 
by Dan that demonstrations be permitted only with the knowledge 
and approval of the Soviets, that military' units might take part 
in such demonstrations j and that any party disobeying this position 
be excluded from the Soviets. Tseretelli reluctantly accepted 
the resolution and the Soviet Congress adopted it the evening of 
June 25.̂ ^
At the June 25th meeting the Soviet Congress also voted to 
schedule a peaceful demonstration on July 1 as a farewell parting 
for the socialist delegates about to go abroad to make preparations 
for the international peace conference at Stockholm. The real 
reason for the demonstration, however, was to appease the Bolsheviks 
and channel the popular unrest into support for the Soviet Congress. 
The trio that opposed Tseretelli on condemning the Bolsheviks for 
June 23 proposed the demonstration; Chkheidze was skeptical and 
Voitinskii "violently opposed it, arguing that the masses of work­
ers in the capital knew nothing about our delegation or believed 
what the Communists had told them. Besides, the Bolsheviks had 
made all their preparations for a demonstration, while the major-
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ity of the Executive Committee had not had time even to get flags
and placards r e a d y . T h e  Bolsheviks saw that they could turn
the demonstration to their advantage and they resolved "to trans-
2kform the demonstration, against the will of the Soviet." In­
asmuch as Pravda on June 27 made these Bolshevik intentions pub­
lic, Petrograd Soviet leaders made a feeble atteaçt to limit parade 
banner slogans to those approved by the Soviet organizers. When 
this failed to come to a vote, a few delegates urged the cancell­
ation of the demonstration. The majority of the Petrograd Soviet, 
however, felt confident of their position with the popular masses 
and underestimated the strength of the Bolsheviks and anarchists.
Though the Soviet Congress even appointed a special committee 
under the supervision of Bogdanov to oversee the demonstration, 
the Bolsheviks turned the demonstration to their complete advan­
tage. When Sukhanov went to the Champ de Mars to watch the demon­
stration, he saw only banners inscribed with Bolshevik slogans:
"All Power to the Soviets", "Peace to the Huts— War to the Palaces," 
and "Down with the Ten Capitalist Ministers." A small group from 
Plekhanov's Edinstvo faction paraded under a banner inscribed, "All 
Power to the Provisional Government," only to be set upon brutally 
and dispersed from the march. Some Anarchist-Communists, the only 
demonstrators to carry arms, called for the establishment of the 
commune and the abolition of the government and of capital. While 
some of the demonstrators at the reviewing stand exacted from 
Chkheidze a promise to look into the recent arrest of the editor 
of the Bolshevik Military Organization's frontline newspaper, Okopnaia
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pravda, a force of Anarchist-Communists and soldiers assaulted 
the prison in which editor F. P. Khaustov was being held and 
gained his release. Not only were a number of political prison­
ers released at the same time, but some 200 dangerous criminals 
as well. As the Anarchist-Communists and army of the escapees 
went to the anarchist headquarters after the prison breakout, 
the Provisional Government responded by storming the Villa Durnovo.
The next day the Petrograd Soviet heard long and loud protests 
about the government's assault on the Durvono Villa, the "murder" 
of the Anarchist-Communist leader Asnin during the course of the 
raid, and the mass arrest of Anarchist-Communists. The Petrograd 
Soviet's executive committee set up a special investigation comm­
ittee and ordered the immediate release of those arrested at the
raid not accused of specific crimes. Despite these actions, the
27threat of renewed demonstrations arose.
The next day, July 3, the executive committee of the Petro­
grad Soviet heard rumors that the First Machine Gun regiment was 
urging troops of the Petrograd garrison to support an armed demon­
stration. While the Villa Durvovo raid had raised the tempers of 
the First Machine Gun regiment, the real cause of their renewed 
activity was an order of the government's on July 3 that the large 
stocks of garrison weapons (e. g., 500 machine guns from the First 
Machine Gun regiment) and the transfer of as much as two-thirds of 
some garrison regiments to the front lines. Only the day before 
the government had officially announced the opening of the July 
offensive against the Austrians and Germans. Now the government
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demanded these soldiers' lay their lives on the line and forgot 
its promise that units participating in the March coup would not 
be disarmed or removed from Petrograd. The Petrograd Soviet exe­
cutive committee sent the following telegram to all garrison units:
According to information received by the Executive Committee, 
the First Machine Gun regiment has sent delegates to all 
units with a proposal to demonstrate against the Provisional 
Government. The Executive Committee's Military Section ab­
solutely condemns the machine gunners' call, which acts 
against the All-Russian Congress and Petrograd Soviet and 
is a stab in the back of the army heroically and selfishly 
fighting at the front for the triumph of the revolution, 
the establishment of universal peace, and the common good 
of all people . . .  .28
The Bolsheviks added their efforts to those of the Petrograd Soviet 
and the machine gunners halted their activity but not without issuing 
a solemn warning: "If the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies
threatens this and other revolutionary regiments wimh forcible dis­
solution, in response we will likewise not stop at using armed 
strength to break up the Provisional Government and other organi­
zations supporting it."^^
The machine gunners, though ordered to send 30 detachments, 
finally agreed to transferring 10 units from the First Machine Gun 
regiment to the front, but only after great difficulty and the ur­
gent appeal of the All-Russian Congress. The last straw came on 
July 13 when a representative of the military section of the Pet­
rograd Soviet tried to mediate with the machine gunners on a new 
governmental request to transfer additional large numbers of men 
and weapons to the front lines. This time the regiment did not
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even trust its leaders and insisted on initiating an armed de­
monstration to overthrow the Provisional Government. Indeed, the 
machine gunners informed the Bolsheviks that with large stock of 
weapons at their disposal they alone could overthrow the govern­
ment. The Anarchist-Communist encouraged the machine gunners in 
their preparations for the demonstration, while the Bolshevik 
Military Organization made plans in case a demonstration material­
ized (though the Bolshevik Central Committee ordered its military 
organization not to participate in the movement and to take all 
measures necessary to prevent an outbreak). Negotiations between 
the military section of the Petrograd Soviet and the regimental 
committee of the machine gunners resulted in a "last" shipment of 
troops to the front on the night of July 15."*
When negotiations resumed between the Military Section of the 
Petrograd Soviet and the machine gunners' regimental committee the 
next day, a Provisional Revolutionary Committee was set up and 
emissaries selected to mobilize the garrison against the government. 
While the Litovskii, Volinskii, and Preobrazhenskii regiments re­
jected the machine gunners appeal, being "benevolently neutral," 
the Moskovskii, l80th Reserve Infantry, Finliandskii, Grenadier, 
and Pavlovskii regiments as well as the Sixth Engineer battalion 
appear to have received the call favorably. Ten to twenty thou­
sand Kronstadt sailors and some thirty thousand Putilov metal 
workers soon joined the machine gunners' appeal. By 7:00 P. M. 
on July l6 the capital was in turmoil.
The Petrograd Soviet leaders first learned of the mobiliza­
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tion of a new demonstration at 11:00 A. M. on July l6. The execu­
tive committee had just approved Tseretelli's motion that the Central 
Executive Committee of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets take 
up the reorganization of the cabinet (the Kadet ministers having 
resigned that day). At an afternoon meeting of the bureau of the 
Central Executive Committee of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets 
and All-Russian Executive Committee of the Soviet of Peasants' 
Deputies the delegates learned that Russian forces at the front 
were everywhere under attack by the Germans and suffering heavy 
casualties. Both the news of the Kadet resignations and the rever­
sal at the front appeared in the evening press of July l6, un- 
doubtedly escalating the tumult already gripping the capital.
Tseretelli and the other Soviet leaders followed their usual 
practice of dealing with a crisis by issuing an appeal for order 
and sending delegates to the workers and soldiers to halt the move­
ment. By 7:00 P. M. the following appeal appeared throughout 
Petrograd:
COMRADE SOLDIERS AND WORKERS:
Contrary to the clearly expressed 
will of all socialist parties, with­
out exception, certain obscure persons 
are calling you to go out armed into 
the streets. It is in this way that 
you are asked to protest against the 
disbandment of regiments which have 
discredited themselves at the front 
by criminally violating their duty to 
the revolution.
We, authorized representatives 
of the revolutionary democracy of all 
Russia, issue this statement to you:
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The disbandment of regiments at the front 
was carried out at the insistance of army and 
frontal organizations and in compliance with 
the order from our Minister of War, Comrade A. 
F. Kerensky, who was selected by us.
An action taken in defense of the disbanded 
regiments is an action against our brothers who 
are shedding their blood at the front.
We remind comrade soldiers that no military 
unit has the right to go out armed without a , 
call for such action by the Commander, wno acts 
in complete accord with us.
Anyone who violates this resolution during 
the troubled days that Russian is going through 
will be denounced by us as traitors and enemies 
of the revolution.
All available measures at our disposal will 
be adopted for implementing the present résol­
ut ion.
BUREAU OF THE ALL-RUSSlAIT CENTRAL 
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF SOVIETS OF 
WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES
BUREAU OF THE ALL-RUSSIAN D E C U T E Æ  
COMMITTEE OF FEASANTS' SOVIETS^]
In addition to this posted proclamation, all units of the Petrograd 
Military District received telegrams instructing that "Some military 
units have violated the instructions of the All-Russian Congress 
which has prohibited armed demonstrations . . . .  Comrades, beware 
of provocateurs. Defend your Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Depu­
ties against the forces of disorganizers who undermine it. Save 
the unity of the revolutionary forces . . . As for sending
Soviet delegates among the demonstrators, no one wanted the assign­
ment. Finally, Kamenev and Shliapnikov, Bolsheviks, agreed to con­
front the workers and soldiers. The appeals of the Soviets, unlike 
previous situations, this time fell on deaf ears, and the demonstra-
35tion continued to expand.'
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At 7:00 p. M. on July l6 a meeting of the Workers' Section of
the Petrograd Soviet, scheduled originally for July l4^^ resulted
in a further erosion of Menshevik-SR bloc dominance in the capital
Soviet. While the original purpose of the meeting was a Bolshevik
37proposal for dealing with counterrevolution, once Kamenev, Trotsl^y, 
and Zinov'ev learned from their party headquarters that the Bolshevik 
party could not contain the demonstration then in progress, they 
proposed that the Petrograd Soviet assume the task of insuring that
oO
the demonstration would be peaceful. In a bitter exchange bet­
ween the proponents of this plan and the Menshevik-SR bloc, the lat­
ter walked out of the meeting and the Bolshevik proposition carried,
including a vote in favor of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets
39taking governmental power. While the decision appears to have had 
no significant affect on the demonstration,^^ it did require, even 
if momentarily, the Menshevik-SR leaders to shift their base of 
power to the board of directors in the bureau of the All-Russian 
Central Executive Committee of the Congress of Soviets.
At 10:00 P. M. the machine gunners appeared at the Tauride 
Palace and demanded that the Soviets assume state power. Chkheidze 
and Voitinskii asked the troops if their appearance in the streets 
meant that they no longer recognized the power of the All-Russian 
Executive Committee. The soldiers responded that they recognized the 
executive, but they had heard rumors that the executive committee was 
about to enter a new coalition with reactionary capital. The machine 
gunners demanded, "All Power to the Soviets!" Voitinskii informed 
the soldiers that the All-Russian Executive Committee was about to
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meet and would make decisions in conformity with the desires of all
the Russian people, not a solitary regiment. The soldiers announced
4lthat they would wait for the executive's decision.
At midnight the Central Executive Committee of the All-Russian 
Soviet opened in extraordinary session. Dan immediately called 
on all members present to bind themselves to the decisions of the 
session or leave the meeting. Trotsky, Riazanov, Uritskii, and 
lurenev (interdistrictites) walked out of the meeting. Sukhanov 
and Mariia Spiridonova heatedly attacked the Dan-Chkheidze propo­
sition, but it passed by an ovem/helming majority. Trotsky returned 
later with several Bolsheviks and also attempted to reverse the de­
cision but without success. The session passed in charges and counter­
charges. Then one concrete proposition e:qr,loded like a bomb: Tsere­
telli suggested that the plenum of the All-Russian Soviet convene in 
Moscow, where it could work free from mob pressure. The proposition 
attracted support only from the peasant delegates who did not visualize 
the political implications: admittance by the Soviets that they
could not maintain stability even in the capital much less the nation. 
Bogdanov at sunrise finally called for adjournment of the session 
and proposed that all members mingle with the workers and soldiers 
to head off any impending demonstrations scheduled for that day. As 
the meeting closed the following appeal was adopted:
COMRADE WORKERS AND SOLDIERS I
. . . The All-Russian executive organs of the 
Soviets of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies in­
dignantly oppose all attempts to influence 
their will be force. It is outrageous that a
299
part of the garrison in one city should 
attempt to force its will on the whole 
of Russia by means of armed demonstration. . .
The All-Russian executive organs of 
the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and 
Peasants' Deputies demand that such demon­
strations, which bring shame to revolution­
ary Petrograd, be ended once and for all.
The Executive Committee of the All-Russian 
Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' 
Deputies call on all those who defend the 
revolution and its conquests to wait for the 
decision of the lawful organs of democracy 
on the government crisis. All those to whom 
the cause of freedom is dear must accept this 
decision, which will be an expression of the 
voice of all revolutionary Russia.
Despite the Soviet efforts, by 10:00 A. M. on July 17 demon­
strations were again in progress. The Bolsheviks had circulated 
an appeal at h;00 A. M. emphasizing the need for a new power which 
only the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies 
could realize; the Bolsheviks urged the demonstrators to be peace- 
ful. At 10:30 A.M. machine gunners from Oranienbaum and sailors 
from Kronstadt descended on Petrograd and marched straightaway
ilkto Bolshevik headquarters where a reluctant Lenin addressed them.
The Bolshevik leader informed the throng of his confidence in the 
eventual realization of "All Power to the Soviets" but admonished 
the sailors to be peaceful, determined and vigilant. In fact, Lenin 
opposed the demonstration as being inopportune. Let down by Lenin's 
comments, Sverdlov encouraged the sailors, workers, and soldiers to 
demand the dismissal of the government and await further instruc­
tions should the Soviets refuse to assume state power.
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Violence increased on July 17, mostly the result of wild and 
accidental shooting, resulting in the death or wounding of some 
400 persons between July 16-1?.^^ The demonstrators began to direct 
their hatred at the Soviet leaders (the Provisional Government seem­
ed to be something bygone). The Kronstadt sailors and a huge throng 
of workers surrounded the Tauride Palace in which the Soviet Exe­
cutive was in session. VThen some anarchists shouted for explana­
tions from Justice Minister P. N. Pereverzev about the continued 
Villa Durnovo imprisonments, Tseretelli informed the crowd that the 
matter was none of their business and that in any event the minister 
was unavailable as he had resigned--which was not true. The crowd 
attempted to seize Tseretelli who escaped behind the doors of the 
palace. Sailors then began to break down the doors of the Tauride, 
demanding an accounting for the imprisonments from another minister. 
Chernov, the popular peasant leader, elected to brave the crowd, but 
no more than got out the door of the palace than his interrogators 
searched him for weapons. When he attempted to condemn the Kadets 
and explain the Soviets' position, the crowd became more hostile 
and a giant sailor stuck his fist under Chernov’s nose and shouted: 
"Take power, when we offer it to you, you son of a bitch!" Chernov 
attempted to get inside the palace but some Kronstadters seized him 
and dragged him into a nearby car. Trotsky at Chkheidze's sugges­
tion hastened to free Chernov. Sukhanov's description of what 
followed indicates just how far mobocracy had captured the spirit 
of the masses:
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The mob was in turmoil as far as the eye 
could reach . . . .  All Kronstadt knew Trotsky 
and, one would have thought, trusted him. But 
he began to speak and the crowd did not sub­
side. If a shot had been fired nearby at that 
moment by way of provocation, a tremendous 
slaughter might have occurred and all of us, 
including perhaps Trotsky, might have been 
torn to shreds. Trotsky, excited and not find­
ing words in this savage atmosphere, could 
barely make the nearest rows listen to him. . . . 
He was listened to with hostility. Ifhen he tried 
to pass on to Chernov himself, the ranks around 
the car began raging....
Trotsky stretched his hand down to a sailor 
who was protesting with special violence. But 
the latter firmly refused to respond . . . .
Let Chernov go? Then why had they been summon­
ed? Not knowing what to do, the Kronstadters 
released Chernov.^9
While the crowd, minus most of the Kronstadters, milled around 
the Tauride Palace, a combined session of the executives of the 
All-Russian Congress of Soviets and the Soviet of Peasants' Depu­
ties opened, only to be repeatedly, interrupted. At 4:30 P. M. ninety 
representatives of Petrograd Factory Committees invaded the meeting 
demanding that it take power immediately. Tseretelli informed them 
that a plenary session of the Central Executive Committee would 
discuss that question at a meeting in two weeks. In the meantime 
the socialist ministers had no intention of shirking their respon­
sibilities as had the Ka dets.Shortly  thereafter the 176th Re­
serve regiment appeared and though it had been summoned to support 
the demonstration for "All Power to the Soviets," as no one gave 
it such instructions, Dan came out of the Tauride Palace, welcomed 
the regiment and stationed the men as guards around the very build­
ing they were supposed to lay to seige.^^ At 7:00 P. M. 30,000
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Putilov metal workers suddenly surrounded the Tauride Palace. A 
few Putilovites broke inside the palace and searched high and low 
for Tseretelli, as he had responded so impersonally earlier to the 
factory committeemen. Not finding him they broke into the session 
of the executive committees, demanding that the Soviets take power. 
Chkheidze, infront of whose nose a rifle danced manifested com­
plete self-control, pushed a proclamation into the worker's hands 
and said, "Here, please take this. Comrade, read it. It says here 
what you and your Putilov comrades should do. Please read it and 
don't interrupt our business. Everything necessary is said here." 
All of the workers quickly stole out of the hall, yet all the mani­
festo said was that the demonstrators in the streets should return
52home, lest they be considered traitors to the revolution. Though 
a dramatic gesture by the frontier-seasoned Georgian, the Soviet 
leaders could think of nothing else to propose to the rank-in-file 
at a moment of extreme tension. Outside the Tauride Palace, the 
Putilov workers quickly drifted away; they had been caught in a 
cloudburst on the way to the palace and were wet to the skin. As 
Sukhanov noted in his memoirs, the rain more than anything pro­
bably influenced them to return home; a downpour routed the demon­
strators earlier that same d a y . 53
Inside the Tauride Palace the Soviet leaders continued to de­
bate the question of the transfer of state power to the Soviets.
At 1:00 A. M. the assembly suddenly grew silent. Sukhanov captured 
the drama of the scene:
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. . . Suddenly a noise was heard in the distance. It 
came nearer and nearer. The measured tramping of thou­
sands of feet was already clearly audible in the sur­
rounding halls . . . The hall again grew agitated. Faces 
looked anxious, deputies leaped from their seats. What 
was it? VIhere was this new danger to the revolution 
coming from?
But Dan appeared on the platform as though out of 
the ground. He was so filled with glee that he tried 
to conceal it, at least partially, bu assuming a 
some what more serene, objective, and balanced ex­
pression.
"ComradesI' he called out, 'be calm! There is no 
danger! Regiments loyal to the revolution have 
arrived to defend the Central Ex. Com.'
Just then in the Catherine Hall a powerful Marseillaise 
thundered forth. Enthusiasm in the hall--the faces of the 
Mamelukes lit up. Squinting triumphantly at the Left, 
they took hands in an outburst of emotion and standing , 
with bared heads ecstatically chanted the Marseillaise.
The units that came to support the Soviets were from the Izmailovskii 
regiment, shortly followed by units from the Semenovskii and Preobra­
zhenskii regiments, vrhy had these previously "benevolently neutral" 
units come to the support of the men in the Tauride Palace? First, 
they knew that A. A. Vilenkin, chairman of the Fifth Army Committee, 
had promised Tseretelli that loyal troops would arrive in Petrograd
55no later than July 6. Second, once these infantry regiments ar­
rived in the capital, the Cossacks had promised the Soviet leaders 
that they would clear the streets.Third, the veteran Social 
Democrat Alexinskii showed documents to these regiments released 
by Justice Minister Pereverzev which seemed to indicate that a trea­
sonable relationship existed between Lenin and the German General 
57Staff. With this armed protection of these guards regiments the 
Soviet executives quickly resolved that "all power must remain in 
the hands of the present government" and that "only a full meeting 
of the executive committees has a right to decide" the question of
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transferring all power into the hands of the Soviet.
The demonstration petered out on July l8. la the pre-dawn 
hours that day the Bolsheviks voted to end the demonstration and 
announced their decision in the daily issue of Pravda. That day 
the Provisional Government with the concurrence of the Soviet exe­
cutive committees^^ launched its campaign to liquidate the demon­
stration. Governmental forces raided the offices of Pravda and 
demolished the party's printing shop, "Labor." That afternoon the 
German spy allegations against Lenin appeared in the press, launch­
ing stn anti-Bolshevik campaign by reactionary Black Hundreds.
In the meantime the Bolsheviks attempted to reconcile their posi­
tion with the Soviet executive committees and at Bolshevik head­
quarters reached an agreement with Liber for a total liquidation 
of the demonstration in return for safe-conduct and the release of 
all party members not accused of specific criminal acts.^^ At the 
Tauride Palace the Kronstadt leaders received a Soviet ultimatum
62that they give up their arms and leave the capital or be disarmed. 
Despite the Soviet guarantee that no further repressive steps would 
be taken against the Bolsheviks, governmental forces either out of 
ignorance or conscious disregard continued plans to assault Bolshevik 
headquarters which followed at 3:00 A. M. on July 19.̂  ̂ Though some 
Bolsheviks, incensed by the attacks on Pravda and party headquarters.
tried to arouse the masses, soldiers returned to their barracks and
65
workers prepared to return to the factories.Lenin himself was
vehement in his opposition to any renewed struggle for the present. 
The rump Provisional Government, with the demonstration liqui-
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dated, now upstaged the Soviet executive committees. On July 19 
the government ordered the arrest of Lenin, Zinov'ev, and other 
Bolshevik leaders as well as the Interdistrictite leaders Trotsky 
and Lunacharskii. Scores of other persons were arrested for parti­
cipating in the disorders. The next day, upon Kerensky’s recommen­
dation, the government decreed that at the discretion of the Ministers 
of War and Marine, all military units that had engaged in the demon­
stration were to be disarmed and transferred to the front. The 
government also ordered the arrest of Tsenroflot, the 67-member 
Baltic Fleet Central Committee for its refusal to come to the aid 
of the capital when ordered to do so. All other naval "counter­
revolutionary instigators" were ordered arrested within twenty- 
four hours. On July 22 the Provisional Government created a commis­
sion to investigate the participation of military units in the demon­
stration. Finally, a temporary ban was issued against public assembly 
and private possession of firearms.
The Soviet leaders' reaction to the government’s measures was 
rather general and mild. On July 20 a joint resolution of the Men­
sheviks and SR's called upon the government to safeguard "revolu­
tionary freedom and order" and work in agreement with the central 
organs of the Soviets. They agreed that "special measures might 
be taken against individuals, but not against political parties pr 
movements as a whole." The government was asked "to wipe out all 
traces of the old regime, to establish a democratic republic, and 
to carry out some of the long delayed legislation on land, labor, 
local self-government, preparation for the elections to the Con-
306
stituent Assembly, regulation of the economic life of the country, 
and so on."^^ The government responded with a declaration that 
went further to the left than any of its previous statements. It 
promised that the blood of Russian soldiers would not be shed for 
aims against the ideals of the "Russian Democracy," that the govern­
ment would propose an Allied Conference to discuss foreign policy 
in light of the principles of the Soviets, that elections to the 
Constituent Assembly would be held on September 30 in a free and 
orderly way, that local self-government would be instituted as 
quickly as possible, that radical reforms in labor and economic 
policy would be forthcoming as well as in agrarian reform, and that 
all class distinctions, ranks, orders of merit save those won in 
battle would be abolished.The  Soviet declaration and the govern­
ment's response brought the resignation of Prime Minister L'vov and 
the necessity for the Soviet executive committees to come to the 
rescue of the government or assume state power. In the meantime 
the rump Provisional Government appointed Kerensky as prime minister 
while the Kadets and the Soviets exchanged verbal volleys over a 
new government.
Tseretelli, as orchestrator of Menshevik-SR policy, rejected 
a Soviet assumption of state power for the same reasons that the
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Mensheviks had done so in March and April, Unlike the July days
Dan supported Tseretelli fully on this interpretation, as did most
of the Mensheviks and SR's despite Martov's eloquent appeal for the
70seizure of state power. What Tseretelli did support was "great 
strides" in reform: the prohibition in land speculation, dissolu-
307
tion of the State Duma and State Council to liquidate these insti­
tutions as bases for counterrevolution, industrial and financial 
reform, and finally, the declaration of Russia as a republic.
Ifhen the second coalition took office, however, the last two points 
disappeared from the new government's list of reforms.The 
composition of the new government, for which Tseretelli sacrificed 
some reforms to achieve, reflected a compromise between Kerensky 
and Tseretelli. While socialists held all of the important offices 
in the new government, except foreign affairs and finance, the 
triumvirate of Kerensky, Nekrasov, and Tereshchenko dominated the 
cabinet. Tseretelli accepted the post of Temporary Minister of 
Interior and shortly left it to work full time in Soviet organ­
izations, while the three Kadets in the government resigned their
72posts after the coalition was only days old.
Could the Petrograd Soviet leaders have sponsored an alternate 
plan of government? Martov, who opposed both a socialist seizure 
of power and coalition with the bourgeoisie until the July days, 
argued for a "democratic government" based largely on the parties repre­
sented in the Soviet, without the organized bourgeoisie. "History 
demands that we take power into our hands," he urged. No reason 
exists why "our ministers ought to remain in a minority in a coalition 
government" when bourgeois ministers such as Tereshchenko, Nekrasov, 
and Godnev represented no party, only themselves. Indeed, the bourgeois 
parties had deserted the revolution; they were increasingly becoming 
counterrevolutionary. The slogan was "All power to 'the democracy'," 
not "All power to the Soviets," as the government would include social 
strata not represented in the Soviet (other than the bourgeois parties)/^
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Tseretelli and Dan rejected Martov's plan of government not on its own 
merits but because it would lead to the destruction of the policy of 
revolutionary defensism. As Tseretelli explained:
Should we, the Soviet majority, take power into our hands, 
would not all of you, from Martov to Lenin, demand of us 
actions which, in our opinion, would lead to separate war, 
or would you not want to foist on us your slogan: "No of­
fensive but an armistice"? But such policies are unaccep­
table to us.
Was Martov's plan of government realistic? Would it have led to civil 
war? Tseretelli had entered the first coalition in May to avert civil 
war and thereby protect the policy of revolutionary defensism. While 
only Miliukov and Guchkov had left the government in May, now the bourg­
eois parties themselves deserted the government. Therefore was the 
second coalition in fact only mythical? The resignations that shortly 
followed its formation appear to confirm this. In light of the popu­
lar demands of the July days, Tseretelli avoided the Martov "democratic 
government" probably because he was indeed fearful that his socialist 
opposition might well succeed in foisting on him its slogans. Finally, 
if the Soviet had formed a "democratic government," could the bourgeoisie 
have mounted an attack on the new government. The middle class was 
small and the Kornilov affair would reveal whether they were even capable 
or willing to join in a military coup. The Menshevik-SR bloc had travelled 
far since the early days of the revolution when they forced their demands 
on the Provisional Government. In early August they were quite happy 
merely to have the burden of state power in other hands. Tseretelli's 
program looked more and more hopeless and headed for bankruptcy.
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2. The Specter of Counterrevolution Arises 
News on September 8 of an armed march on Petrograd by General Lavr 
Kornilov took the Soviet in the capital completely by surprise. Ignor­
ance of preceding events dictated reaction at Smolny (the new Petrograd
75
Soviet headquarters). The executive committee knew only that General 
Kornilov, who had just surrendered Riga to the Germans, had announced as 
a pretender to power and that Prime Minister Kerensky had declared the 
general "outlaw." The bureau of the executive committee approved of 
actions by Kerensky without knowing what they were and without knowledge
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about the Third Corps' march on Petrograd. Despite the element of
surprise, the leadership at Smolny apparently showed little fear that
Kornilov would consumate his attempted coup against the government and
77
the Petrograd Soviet.
While astonished at the actual unfolding of a military coup, the 
Petrograd Soviet leaders had not completely ignored the danger of rising 
counterrevolution since the July days. On the same day that Tseretelli 
received word of Kornilov's march, the executive committee had appealed 
to the workers and soldiers of Petrograd to stay off the streets and 
to ignore rumors about an uprising set for the next day. The committee 
warned that the rightwing Black Hundreds intended to use the half-year 
anniversary celebration of the revolution to bathe the toiling masses
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in blood. The Petrograd Council of Trade Unions and the Central 
Union of Factory Committees urged the populace to heed the executive
79
committee's advice and exercise restraint.
From the first moment the Petrograd Soviet parties heard of Kor-
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nilov's attempted coup, they dropped their differences, at least 
temporarily, and united against their common opponent. The social­
ist press attacked Kornilov in unison, the Petrograd Soviet through 
P iC )Izvestiia censored the general and called on the populace of the 
capital to remain steadfast by the Provisional Government. A comm­
ittee of all parties was formed to mobilize and organize opposition 
to Kornilov on September 9> the People’s Committee for the Struggle 
with Counterrevolution, also known as the military revolutionary 
committee. Headed by the SR officer, V.N. Filippovskii, its member­
ship consisted of three members each from the central committees of 
the SR, Menshevik, and Bolshevik parties, as well as a Popular Social­
ist, five members each from the executives of the Peasants’ Congress 
and the All-Russian Soviet Congress, two members from the Petrograd
Soviet, one member from Kronstadt, and two members from the Central
SlLTrade Unions Council. Despite the fact that a member of the "Star 
Chamber" proposed the appointment of the committee and despite the 
variety of groups represented in it, the Bolsheviks dominated the
82committee, not the "Star Chamber". Bolshevik strength derived 
from their dominant influence with the Kronstadt sailors and with 
the district soviets of the capital that controlled the workers’ 
militia (later the Red Guard).
Following upon the Petrograd Soviet’s typical response to any 
crisis of appointing a committee, also came the usual Soviet appeals 
to the masses. While issuing a general appeal, the Petrograd Soviet 
also sought to undercut Kornilov’s operations through specific ap­
peals. Thus to all railway workers the Soviet appealed to "detain
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troops and send them in another direction" and "obey only the Pro­
visional Government and the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' and 
Peasants' Deputies."^3 To support the railway workers the Soviet
attempted to mobilize the peasantry by identifying the Kornilov
Alland the high command with the enemies of land refomi. Finally, 
the Soviet issued a direct appeal to the soldiers of the army: 
"Kornilov has mutinied against the revolution and the Provisional
85Government . . rally to the defense of the country." Workers 
in Petrograd were asked to dig trenches, to set up machine guns, 
and to prepare the resistance of the capital. Kronstadt sailors 
were called to Petrograd and the Cruiser Aurora, anchored in the 
Neva river that flowed thgough the capital, ordered 5o defend the 
Winter Palace, the seat of the government.®^
The response to the Petrograd Soviet's appeals was overwhelming 
and immediate. Railway workers either sidetracked or delayed trains 
carrying Kornilov's troops to the capital. Telegraphers declined 
to transmit messages for the Kornilovites. At every station workers, 
peasants, and soldiers from local garrisons agitated among the troops, 
A workers' militia soon appeared, numbering between 25,000 and 100,000
87men. ' Disorder occurred even at Kornilov's headquarter's. A bat­
talion of St. George Cavaliers declared in favor of the Soviets.
Seven officers from Kornilov's own regiment were arrested for insub­
ordination. Soldier-printers ordered to set up and print Kornilov’s 
proclamation did so only when a Tekintsy detachment threatened to 
shoot them unless they complied, and then the printers actually set 
up and printed Kerensky's proclamation against Kornilov and got away
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with it because the Turlunen could not read Russian. On September 
10 as two echelons of the Savage division approached Petrograd, a 
delegation of Moslems and Cossacks sent by the executive of the 
All-Russian Soviet won over these cavalry men when the delegation 
informed them that no Bolshevik demonstration had occurred in the 
capital. The misinformed soldiers of the Savage division thereupon 
sent a delegation to Petrograd apologizing for allowing themselves 
to be deceived; they paid glowing tributes to their brother Cau­
casians, Chkheidze and Tseretelli,According to "Star Chamber" 
member, Voitinskii, by September l4 troops loyal to the Petrograd
Soviet occupied all roads leading from the fronts and Stavka
90(Kornilov’s G.H.Q.), In fact, the "defection" of the two echelons 
of the Savage division liquidated Kornilov’s march, and he and his 
command remained isolated at the city of Mogilev. On September 13 
the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Congress cabeled all 
Soviets that the Kornilov affair had aborted.
The military revolutionary committee now commenced retaliation 
against the counterrevolutionaries. On September lU the committee 
demanded the dispersal of all Kornilov’s forces at Mogilev. Even 
though the government had set up an Extraordinary Investigation 
Commission to probe the Kornilov affair, the Soviet committee de­
manded the immediate arrest of Generals Kornilov, Lukomskii, and 
Romanovskii. The generals were to be conveyed to Petrograd no later 
than the following day. The committee directed the Minister of War 
to see that these measures were carried out in his presence at Mog­
ilev. Until the completion of these actions, the committee ordered
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the troops loyal to the Soviet to stand fast and make preparations 
to advance against Mogilev. The committee rejected any suggestions 
by the Kadets and General Alekseev of a con^romise between Kornilov 
and the Soviet; it rejected outright any suggestion of a reconcil­
iation between the Provisional Government and Kornilov developing.
Not only the Bolsheviks, but the entire membership of the committee,
particularly its SR chairman Filippovskii, were in usnanimous agree- 
91ment in this. The SR organ, Delo naroda, damned any armistice
with Kornilov as merely prolonging an intolerable state of a f f a i r s . 2̂
Members of the Soviet assumed governmental powers during the
crisis by arresting as "conspirators" fourteen high-ranking officers.
93The Soviet incarcerated some 7,000 other "counterrevolutionaries".
Even the former War Minister, Guchkov, was imprisoned for a short
while, as was Kerensky’s brother-in-law, War Minister assistant P.
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Pal'chinskii. As Chernov wrote, "The Soviet had no time to legal­
ize its actions. It functioned as a genuine revolùtionary authority. 
Without waiting for the numerous secret Kornilovist societies to 
expose themselves as counterrevolutionaries, it began to make arrests. 
Homes were searched and documents seized. The Petrograd paper, Hovoe 
vremia and the Moscow newspaper, Russkoe slovo, were suppressed for 
printing Kornilov’s proclamations. The Kadet organ, Rech’, was cen­
sored for an editorial which its printers carried to the Soviet in 
which the Kadets maintained that "Kornilov is not a reactionary" and 
"has been pursuing the aims which we too consider essential for the 
salvation of the country."^ Though certainly not approved by the 
Soviet leaders, lynching took place at Vyborgr the crew of the Petro-
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pavlovsk shot four of their naval officers, and an army officer was
shot by his men for referring to the Soviet as the Sovet sobachikh
i rachikh denutatov (Soviet of Dogs and Crayfish Deputies)
In the midst of the Kornilov affair the government had resigned,
leaving all power in Kerensky's hands. On September 9 the Soviet
Executive Committee adopted a proposition by F. I. Dan that the rump
Provisional Government call a democratic conference (to exclude
non-socialists) that would dictate the composition of a new coalition
93which would thereafter be responsible to the conference. Kerensky 
countered with a proposal for a six-man "Directory" to have full powers 
and not be held responsible to the Soviet proposed democratic confer­
ence. The counter proposition touched off a bitter debate within the 
Soviet. Lunacharskii, for the Bolsheviks, demanded a "completely 
democratic" government. Martov for the Menshevik Internationalists 
argued that a new Provisional Government should be modeled on pre­
vious governments with the Soviet supporting the cabinet "insofar as" 
it accepted and implemented the Soviet's program as enunciated by 
Chkheidze at the Moscow State Conference. Once more Tseretelli found 
a middle road and the executive adopted a resolution calling upon
Kerensky to form a new coalition that would fight determinedly against
99counterrevolution.^^ Kerensky, however, stuck by his guns, demanding 
a true coalition to include liberals as well as socialists. Chernov, 
Skobelev, Avksent'ev, and Zarudni resigned from the government, re­
fusing to serve with bourgeoisie. Kerensky thereupon appointed a 
"Directory" of four socialists and one non-party affiliate, and pro­
claimed Russia a republic as of September l4.
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The same day Kerensky proclaimed the republic Chkheidze for the 
Soviet Congress and Avksent'ev for the Peasants' Soviet called for a 
democratic conference to meet in P e t r o g r a d . T h e  bulk of delegates 
went to the new rural and municipal councils (500 seats) and central 
Soviets of workers, soldiers, and peasants (300 seats); local sold­
iers' organizations received 150 seats, cooperatives, 150, and trade 
unions, 100; 225 seats went to national minorities, professional 
organizations, and other groups. Of the 1,582 delegates that attend­
ed the conference between September 27 and October 5, 532 were SR's, 
305 Mensheviks, 13^ Bolsheviks, 55 Popular Socialists and Trudoviks, 
4l Kadets, and 97 representing Bundists, Ukrainian Social Democrats, 
Ukrainian SR's, etc. In the party caucuses that preceded the con­
ference the SR's and Mensheviks were each hopelessly split. Simi­
larly at a plenary meeting of 200 members of the Executive Committee
of the All-Russian Soviet could come to no decision and therefore
102went to the conference with no program and no definite policy.
With such division in the ranks of the socialist parties the 
conference produced only endless debate. While the formation of the 
conference on October 2 approved the formation of a coalition, amend­
ments to the motion made coalition impossible. After the failure 
of a Bolshevik resolution, the conference passed a motion by Tsere­
telli to : 1) make the government responsible to a representative 
institution or pre-parliament until the convening of the Constituent 
Assembly, 2) to appoint a permanent representative institution 
from among the members of the democratic conference to be augmented 
by bourgeois elements should they share in the new government
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In negotiations with the bourgeoisie and Kerensky, Soviet represen­
tative acquiesced to according the liberals, 120 to 15O seats in the 
preparliament, and allowed that the preparliament could question but 
not interpellate the government, that the preparliament would work 
on all questions and legislation submitted to it by the government, 
and that the ministry would not be responsible to the preparliament. 
Before these concessions more than hOO members of the democratic 
conference had refused to vote on the proposition of establishing 
a preparliament, though a majority of 829 votes to IO6 with 69 ab­
stentions passed the Tseretelli resolution. Voitinskii recorded 
the despair of the last day of the conference: "The concluding
session was gloomy. Chkheidze sat at a long table on the stage, 
a picture of melancholy and despair. Many chairs at the table were 
empty. I wanted to leave also, but Chkheidze implored me to deliver 
the concluding speech. There was not much to say about the results 
of the Convention. Then Chkheidze got up and left the stage, for­
getting to declare the meeting a d j o u r n e d . T h e  ministry that 
now succeeded the "Directory" was neither a coalition nor a govern­
ment; nothing but a group of men picked by Kerensky from business 
and intellectual circles, not parties. Tseretelli's coalition com­
promise had hit rock bottom as the new government offered no unity 
to the nation to avert civil war; furthermore, the entire policy had 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE BOLSHEVIZATION OF THE SOVIET
Bolshevik control of the Petrograd Soviet came only after the in­
ternal political organs of the institution had decayed. Many of the 
commissions created in the first days of the revolution, such as the 
supply and military commissions, were absorbed by committees of the 
Provisional Government. The contact commission died a natural death 
through neglect. The international department for all intents and 
purposes ceased to function after the demise of the ill-fated Stock­
holm Conference in August 191?. The agrarian, finance, and labor 
departments achieved no successes, though Bogdanov labored incessantly 
for the workers. After the formation of the executive bureau and the 
first coalition government, those members of the executive committee 
that remained and were not members of the former bodies, spend most of 
their time in the newly established lounge. Sittings of the execu­
tive committee, as they only endorsed propositions of the executive 
bureau, often began late and without a quorum. Chkheidze, the presi­
dent, would ring the bell for the opening of a session, but members of 
the executive came in at their leisure. Despite threats and persuasive 
arguments on the part of the Soviet president, he was unable to move 
the membership of the executive toward constructive work. Even Tsere­
telli, who for a while was able to overcome this inertia in the execu-
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tive committee, failed to motivate the membership. In the first days 
after the formation of the first coalition government, Tseretelli re­
ported regularly to the executive- committee on the activities of the 
Provisional Government. As the membership usually knew what the Georg­
ian was going to say, the radical wing of the committee, in order to 
break the monotony, heckled him and used the occausions to make their 
own interpellations. Tseretelli initially brushed aside these annoy­
ances but inasmuch as the reports served no purpose other than that 
of his opponents, he ceased delivering them. In the Petrograd Soviet 
the desire for work had disappeared, as the leadership of the institu­
tion had relegated the decision-making process to the bureau and the
"Star Chamber" making the rest of the Soviet more or less a rubber 
2
stamp.
The Menshevik-SR bloc leaders of the Petrograd Soviet were also 
overcome by despair. At the time of the establishment of the Kerensky 
government in early August I917, Voitinskii recalled that "In the Tau- 
ride Palace a persistent feeling of approaching catastrophe was mixed 
with apathy." Overwhelmed by the apparent futility of his activities 
in Petrograd, Voitinskii resigned his duties in the capital ajid. became 
a military commissar at the front. "When I told Chkheidze I was leav­
ing the Tauride Palace. . ., he said gloomily, "I do not blame you. I 
wish I could leave tool'"^ At the time of the Democratic Conference 
the same atmosphere of gloom was present among the leadership : "Chkheidze 
sat at a long table on the stage, a picture of melancholy and despair."^ 
Many of the Soviet leaders had not even bothered to attend the closing 
session and Chkheidze himself forgot to adjourn the meeting. Tseretelli
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became increasingly pessimistic. Since April he had warned that the 
counterrevolution would march through the left gate, meaning the Bol­
sheviks.^ In the last days before the Bolshevik coup Tseretelli told 
the Kadet leader, V.D. Nabokov, that the Bolsheviks "will not be able 
to keep power for long, maybe for only two or three weeks, but think 
of the destruction. One has to stop them somehow...." As for those 
efforts toward halting the Bolshevik tide, Tseretelli remarked after 
November "J: "Of course, all that we did was like a futile attempt to
7dam a raging torrent with little chips of wood." Tseretelli's forced 
convalescence in the Caucasus to allievate his severe tubercular con­
dition at the height of the Bolshevik crisis, in late October and early 
November, certainly did not bolster Menshevik-SR spirits.
The Menshevik-SR bloc leaders who guided the direction of the
Petrograd Soviet had by September lost their rank-and-file support.
The Menshevik organization, which at one time counted 10,000 members
in Petrograd, had dwindled away to a handfull. Mensheviks were so
despaired that only twenty to twenty-five members usually attended ward
8meetings in the capital. The SR's were hopelessly split into three 
factions, the bulk of members remaining under Chernov's leadership but 
losing a growing number to the Left SR's.^ In September the bloc leaders 
lost their high posts in the All-Russian Central Council of Trade Unions 
to Martovist (Menshevik) Internationalists ; positions that they had re­
tained with great difficulty in A u g u s t O n  August 22 the Martovists 
regained their pre-March 1917 control of the Petrograd Menshevik organ­
ization.^^ Martovists definitely opposed the policies of Tseretelli.
Following the Kornilov affair, the Petrograd Soviet plenum shifted
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sharply toward the Bolsheviks in its voting pattern. In the irregular 
elections of May and June the Bolsheviks had gained about half of the 
seats in the Workers' Section of the Petrograd Soviet and approximately 
one-fourth of the membership in the Soldiers' Section.More irregular 
elections in September increased the number of Bolshevik deputies, and 
the dramatic shift of the Petrograd garrison toward the Bolsheviks 
strengthened their hand in the Soldiers' Section. On September 13 the 
Petrograd Soviet plenum voted overwhelmingly for a Bolshevik resolution 
as against approximately 15 votes for one by Tseretelli.On a roll 
call vote that dragged on to 3 A.M. in the morning the Bolshevik resol­
ution still carried 279 votes to 115 with 51 abstentions, many of the
deputies either refusing to vote against Tseretelli or having left be­
ltcause of the late hour. As the total vote was thin, the Menshevik-SR 
bloc leaders attempted to override the pro-Bolshevik decision on Sep­
tember 22. The presidium of Tseretelli, Chernov, Skobelev, Dan, Gotz, 
and Chkheidze demanded a vote of confidence from 1,000 soldiers' and 
workers' deputies who attended the meeting of the plenum. The Bolshe­
viks attempting to compromise, proposed that the presidium be elected 
on a proportional basis. Tseretelli rejected this out-of-hand, demand­
ing to know whether the Petrograd Soviet had actually changed its direc­
tion: "We cannot carry out the tactics of the Bolsheviks," he declared.
Trotsky now obscured the question by asking: "Is Kerensky still
a member of the presidium?" As the reply was affirmative, Trotsky noted 
that he "had firmly beleived that Kerensky would not be allowed to sit 
in the presidium. We were mistaken. The ghost of Kerensky now sits 
between Dan and Chkheidze. . . . When they propose to you to sanction
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the political line of the presidium, do not forget that you will he 
sanctioning the policies of Kerensky. "15 As the balance lay with the 
soldiers' deputies, who hated Kerensky, Trotsky's pipy changed the 
ençhasis from a vote for the presidium to one against Kerensky. Even 
so, the Bolsheviks figured that they would be a hundred votes shy, at 
best, of unseating the present leadership. Yet when the vote was fi­
nally tabulated the Bolsheviks won by 519 to 4lh with 67 abstentions.
With magnificent aplomb Tseretelli made his last statement to the plenum 
of the Petrograd Soviet; "We withdraw from this tribune in the con­
sciousness that for half a year we have held worthily and held high 
the banner of the revolution. This banner has now passed into your hands. 
We can only express the wish that you may be able to hold it in the same 
way for half as long!" The Menshevik-SR bloc leaders thereupon walked 
out of the hall. Trotsky later recollected that the presidium took 
with them to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the Petrograd 
Soviet's two newspapers, all funds and technical equipment as well as 
automobiles, and all administrative offices.
A provisional presidium of the combined presidia of the Workers' 
Section and the Soldiers' Section replaced the outgoing members until 
elections could be held. On September 21 the Workers' Section had elect­
ed a new presidium; the SR's receiving 102 votes, the Mensheviks 
the Menshevik Internationalists 10, and the Bolsheviks 239 votes. The 
new eleven man presidium consisted of six Bolsheviks, three SR's, and 
two Mensheviks. The Bolshevik G.E. Fedorov had become chairman of the
17Workers'Section. The Soldiers' Section did not hold new elections 
until September 26, four days after the defeat of the Menshevik-SR bloc
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presidium. Before electing a new presidium for the Soldiers’ Section, 
the soldiers voted for representatives on the executive committee of 
the Petrograd Soviet. The SR’s received 155 votes, the Bolsheviks
1 Û
138, and the Mensheviks 30. Many members of the executive committee
were defeated and the chairman of the Soldiers’ Section, the right SR
V, Zavadye, resigned. Furthermore, the SR votes were for Left SR’s,
not for Chernov-led SR’s, the former supporting the Bolsheviks. The
result was that ten Left SR’s, nine Bolsheviks, and three Mensheviks
entered the executive committee as the Workers’ representatives. When
the presidium of the Soldiers’ Scetion was elected shortly thereafter,
the Bolsheviks received three seats, the Left SR’s three, and the
Mensheviks one. The Left SR L. I. Diesperov became chairman of the
19Soldiers’ Section. ^ The Workers' Section did not hold new elections 
for representatives on the executive committee until October 6-7. Of 
the 396 deputies voting on that occasion, 23O votes went to Bolsheviks, 
102 to SR’s, 5^ to Mensheviks, and 10 to Menshevik Internationalists. 
Thirteen Bolsheviks (including Fedorov, A.S. Bubnov, A.M. Kollontai, 
P.A, Krasikov, L.M. Karakhan),six SR’s and three Mensheviks now com­
posed the Workers’ Section representation on the executive committee. 
Coopted onto the new executive committee were four delegates from poli­
tical parties, three from public bodies (the trade unions, factory 
committees, and army organizations), making a combined total with the 
22 representatives each from the two sections of the Petrograd Soviet 
of 51 members. The party allegiance of the members of the new execu­
tive committee was Bolshevik, 23; SR, 17; Menshevik, 7; and non-party, 
4. Also coopted onto the executive were two representatives from each
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of the 13 district soviets in the cïçital but with non-voting rights.
As the Menshevik Internationalists who had made up the core of the 
original executive did not receive a single seat on the new executive 
committee, six of their number were coopted onto the body with a con­
sulting voice: Sokolov, Kapelinskii, Sokolovskii, Martov, Steklov,
21and Sukhanov. Sukhanov tells us why the Martovists were added to the 
committee: "In its negative, critical part we . . . were in accord
with the Bolsheviks. In the arena of the struggle going on at that
PPtime sigainst the coalition and the bourgeoisie we stood at their side."
With the elections of new presidia in each section and a new exe­
cutive committee, a new presidium for the whole of the Petrograd Soviet 
was in order. While Trotsky and Zinov'ev supported a proportionally 
based presidium according to party and received the endorsement of the 
Bolshevik Central Committee on September I9 for such a coalition, 3̂ 
Lenin, still in hiding since the July days, chided the party, noting 
that "the revolutionary proletariat would never do anything worth while 
in the Soviet as long as the Iseretellis were allowed proportional par­
ticipation; to let them in meant depriving ourselves of the opportunity
piito work, it meant the ruin of Soviet work." As a result, the new 
presidium as proposed to the Soviet plenum and endorsed by it on Octo­
ber 8, consisted of four Bolsheviks, two SR's and cme Menshevik.
Leon Trotsky became the new president of the Petrograd Soviet on 
October 8. There was a hurricane of applause at his election. The 
only question, says Sukhanov, was where Trotsky would lead the Soviet: 
"Trotsky's Soviet did not act like an acknowledged State power carrying 
on a revolution. It did not act by methods of opposition," pressure, ,
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and 'liaison'. It was a latent potential revolutionary force, gather­
ing together the elements for a general explosion . . . .  For what did 
it contain but destruction?" In his first speech as chairman the 
newly converted Bolshevik said that actually he had not taken Chkheidze ' s 
place as chairman, but, on the contrary, Chkheidze had been occupying 
his (Trotsky's) place, inasmuch as the I905 chairman of the Petersburg 
Soviet was Trotsky. Then he added: "We are all party people, and we
shall have to cross swords more than once. But we shall guide the work 
of the Petersburg Soviet in a spirit of justice and complete independence 
for all factions; the hand of the presidium will never oppress the min-
27
ority." Sukhanov later reflected: "Heavens I What liberal views !
What self-mockery I But the point is that about three years later, while 
exchanging reminiscences with me, Trotsky, thinking back to this moment, 
exclaimed dreamily: 'What a happy time I ' Yes, wonderful: Perhaps not
one person in the world, not excluding himself, will ever recall Trotsky's
28rule, with such feelings." Regardless of Trotsky's intentions on 
September 2k, he nevertheless heeded Lenin's advice and on September 
25 scrapped his plan for a coalition presidium in favor of a Bolshevik 
dominated presidium. This was only the first move away from the spirit 
of Trotsky's September 2k statement, as Sukhanov noted, "not thinking 
that in time he would have to disregard it and create a theory to justify 
its opposite.
While the takeover of the Petrograd Soviet by the Bolsheviks worried 
the Menshevik-SR bloc leaders, it by no means made them give up the 
struggle. Instead these leaders attempted to attract the masses away 
from such bodies as the Petrograd Soviet to supporting the executive of
330
the Democratic Conference or the Preparliament. The Central Executive 
Committee of the All-Russian Soviet announced in Izvestiia (no longer 
the Petrograd Soviet's organ) that with the formation of the Preparlia­
ment: "The significance of local Soviets is diminishing, and they
have ceased to be general democratic bodies. We want to replace the 
temporary Soviet set-up by a permanent, comprehensive, and complete
30organization," that is, a preparliament. The Mensheviks and SR's 
maintained that the current situation was "a crisis of Soviet organ­
ization." Delo naroda, the SR organ, stated that ". . .as soon as 
the new elements of the state organization appeared typical of a modern 
democratic state— the municipal dumas and the zemstvos— the question 
arose of the limits to the state competence of the Soviets. . . ."31 
Indeed the Preparliament was probably the most popular political insti­
tution in Petrograd, and definitely in the country as a whole. Even 
Sukhanov, who opposed it, admits that the Preparliament was a de facto
32
power. The Bolsheviks admitted in late October on two different
occasions that the executive committee and the Petrograd Soviet plenum
33were in total disorganization and producing no practical results.
The last atten^t to turn the new orientation of the Petrograd Soviet 
around and in support of coalition government came on September 2h.
Dan defended the coalition before the Petrograd Soviet plenum; Trotsky 
spoke for a Soviet government. Coalition was rejected overwhelmingly 
with only ten votes in favor and seven abstentions.^^
With the Preparliament as a competing center of power to the Petro­
grad Soviet the Bolsheviks either had to gain control of the executive 
of the All-Russian Congress or mount a seizure of power with the Petro—
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grad Soviet as its base. The Bolsheviks therefore demanded the calling 
of a Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets, inasmuch as a congress was 
to convene every three months until the convocation of the Constituent 
Assembly. Lenin hoped to gain control of the Central Executive Com­
mittee in new elections and from this all-Russian position declare 
the Soviet government. The Menshevist Rabochaia gazeta exposed Lenin's 
plan and declared the convening of a new congress on the eve of elec­
tions to a Constituent Assembly inopportune.^^ Martov, the left-wing 
Menshevik leader, even declared that "At the present moment a drift to 
the Bolsheviks is absolutely out of place. Now the revolution is en­
dangered not by the Right, but by the Left I D e s p i t e  the well-founded 
fears of the Mensheviks and SR's that the second congress would be over­
whelmingly Bolshevist in its membership, the Central Executive Committee 
finally agreed to call the congress for November 2. In the meantime 
the Bolsheviks held a congress of the northern region on October 2k in 
order to increase the prestige of their political base, the Petrograd 
Soviet. The congress was overwhelmingly Bolshevist in its sympathies 
and actions. While the Bolsheviks were strong in the northern region, 
they were uncertain of their strength in the rest of the country and 
therefore made preparations for the armed insurrection should they fail 
in the second congress.^'
The military revolutionary committee, the instrument of the Bolshevik 
armed insurrection, came into being as the result of an October 22 meet­
ing of the executive committee of the Petrograd Soviet. The committee 
met to discuss the danger of approaching German forces that threatened 
the capital. Tne Mensheviks proposed the creation of an organ of coop-
332
eration between the Petrograd Soviet and the military staff of the 
Petrograd military district which would take measures to insure the 
defense of the capital. The Bolsheviks capitalized on this proposition 
so that the resolution which was passed included l) an appeal to the 
garrison to take such actions as necessary to mount a defense of the 
city. 2) that a board composed of representatives from the Petrograd 
Soviet, the Bolshevik Central Committee, and Tsentroflot, the Bolshe­
vik-controlled Baltic naval committees' center, function alongside the 
Petrograd military district commander, 3) that the militia (or Red 
Guard) be reorganized, h) that exceptional measures be taken to purge 
the Commanding Staff, and 5) that the executive committee of the Petro­
grad Soviet, the presidium of the Soldiers' Section of the Petrograd 
Soviet, and representatives from the Petrograd garrison create a com­
mittee of revolutionary defense to work cut a plan to defend the city. 
The military revolutionary committee, however, was empowered to do more 
than merely work out a plan of defense: it could decide which forces,
if any, could be withdrawn from the capital, register all personnel of 
the garrison and toivns nearby, take account of all supplies and food­
stuffs in Petrograd, protect the capital from riots and desertions, up­
hold discipline among the masses and soldiers, and so forth. The moder­
ate socialists, by boycotting the committee, simply made the work of its 
fourteen Left SR's, four Anarchists, and forty-eight Bolsheviks less 
inhibited. Lazimir was the committee's chairman, but Trotsky was its 
moving spirit. From this committee the Bolsheviks were able to plot 
armed insurrection in the name of "defending the conquests of the rev­
olution."^^
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As the Second Congress of Soviets was postponed to November 7j 
Lenin decided to present the congress with a fait accompli of the Pet­
rograd Soviet assuming state p o w e r . F i r s t ,  however, the Bolsheviks 
had to repudiate the Preparliament which opened on October 20. At that 
first session Trotsky made a verbal assault on the Preparliament call­
ing for all power to the Soviets, all land to the people, and long life 
to the Constituent Assembly. As Sukhanov said of this declaration, 
"Despite all the power and brilliance of his speech Trotsky, as we see, 
was far from having proved the necessity of the break . . . .  If they 
were on the other side of this entire order, then there was really no­
thing for them to do in the Preparliament. . . . There was only one road 
for them out of the Preparliament--to the barricades. If they cast 
away the 'electoral ballot', they must take up the r i f l e . T h e  Bol­
sheviks stomped out of the Preparliament.
The Petrograd Soviet and its military revolutionary committee now 
prepared to inclement an armed seizure of state power. While the Bol­
sheviks ironed out internal differences between the members of its 
central committee and Lenin over the dangers of a power seizure, prepar­
ations continued apace. On November 3 delegates of the regimental 
committees in the capital promised full support to the Military Revolu­
tionary Committee and demanded that the All-Russian Congress of Soviets 
assume state p o w e r . O n  November 1 a proclamation was issued on behalf 
of the military revolutionary committee accusing the Provisional Govern­
ment of "having broken with the revolutionary garrison and with the Pet­
rograd Soviet . . , becoming a direct tool of counterrevolutionary 
forces." The committee ordered that no directives to the garrison were
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42to be considered valid iinless signed by it. That same day workers 
and soldiers throughout the capital observed'"The Day of the Petrograd 
Soviet" which Trotsky hoped would erase from the "consciousness of the 
workers and soldiers the last hindering recollections of the July days."^^ 
The gigantic review reached its climax at the People’s Home where Trotsky 
in a tense atmosphere of emotional frenzy demanded: "Let this voting
of yours be your vow, with all your strength, at any sacrifice, to sup­
port the Soviet, which has taken upon itself the great task of bring­
ing the victory of the Revolution to the end, and of giving land, bread, 
and peace.
On November 5 the Provisional Government aided the Petrograd Soviet's 
assumption of power by issuing mostly unenforceable but threatening 
orders. A cabinet meeting that night ordered the closure of the Bolshe­
vik newspapers Soldat and Rabochii Put’.̂ "* The next morning the Cruiser 
Aurora, known to be Bolshevist in its sympathies, was ordered to put to 
sea on a training e x e r c i s e . I n  an attempt to isolate the Petrograd
Soviet, the telephones to Smolny Institute, headquarters of the workers'
4?and soldiers' organization, were disconnected. A women's battalion 
appeared at the Winter Palace and military cadets and a few Cossacks 
were stationed throughout the city in government buildings, at stations 
and bridges, and communication centers. At the Preparliament a resol­
ution was passed to the effect that "In order to combat active outbursts 
of anarchy and pogroms, it is necessary to take immediate measures for 
their termination and to create for that purpose in Petrograd the Com­
mittee of Public Safety comprised of the representatives of the municipal 
corporations and organs of the revolutionary democracy acting in concert
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Uflwith the Provisional Government." The leaders of the Preparliament 
proposed to overcome their opposition by cutting away the wavering 
elements in the Bolshevik camp though an offer of reforms; l) the 
government w’-̂ uld announce it had asked the Allies to stop all military 
action and to stî̂ rt peace negotiations, 2) the government would issue 
an order puttlig all land in the possession of the local land com­
mittees, and 3) the date for the meeting of the Constituent Assembly
liQwould be moved up. ^
The military revolutionary committee immediately responded 
to the government's actions by issuing a circular to the Petrograd 
garrison:
Danger threatens the Petrograd Soviet. During the night counter­
revolutionary plotters attempted to call up junkers and shock battal­
ions from the suburbs. The newspapers Soldat and Rabochii Put' 
have been closed.
We Order you to put the regiment into a state of military prepared­
ness and await new orders. Any delay or non-exgcution of the order 
will be regarded as treason to the Revolution.
On November 6 Trotsky informed the Petrograd Soviet that all the 
actions of the Provisional Government were being successfully 
countered by the military revolutionary committee. He announced that 
the troops of the Petrograd garrison refused to obey the orders of 
the Kerensky government, that the Cruiser Aurora had follov/ed the counter 
command of the military revolutionary committee to remain anchored in 
the Neva river, and that troops of the Lithuanian regiment and the 
Sixth Reserve Sappers' battalion were guarding revolutionary presses 
against counterrevolutionary attacks. Trotsky then continued:
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We are asked whether we planned to have an uprising. I replied 
that the Petrograd Soviet stood for a transfer of power into the 
hands of the Soviets, and at the present time, today or tomorrow, 
when the All-Russian Congress of Soviets opens, this slogan will 
be put into force. VOiether this will lead to an uprising depends 
not on us, but on those who oppose us.
We regard the Provisional Government as nothing more than a 
pitiful, helpless half-government, which waits for a motion of 
a historical broom to sweep it off, to make room for a real, 
popular government. The present government has lost everything —  
support, authority, right,morale.
But a conflict in the form of an uprising is not our plan for 
today or tomorrow, when the All-Russian Congress is about to meet. 
We believe that the Congress will carry through our plan with 
considerable force and authority. But, if the government wishes 
to make use of the hours —  2h, 48, or 72 —  which it still has 
to live, and comes out against us, then we will meet it with a 
counter-attack, blow for blow, steel for iron . . , .
The defense of the headquarters of the Provisional Government at the 
Winter Palace caused Bolshevik plans to hit a snag and Lenin sounded 
a call to arms on the night of November 6. "With all m)' power", he 
wrote, "I wish to persuade the comrades that now everything hangs on 
a hair, that on the order of the day are questions that are not solved 
by conferences, by congresses (even Congresses of Soviets) but only by 
the people, by the masses, by the struggle of the armed masses.". .
It would be disaster or formalism to wait for the uncertain voting of 
November 7 • • • the people have a right and a duty. . . to give direc­
tion to their representatives . . . The government is tottering. We
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must deal it the deathblow at any cost. ' That same night soldiers 
of the Petrograd garrison seized the public utilities, the banks, and 
communication networks in the capital. The Bolsheviks received only 
token resistance. The next morning, November 7, the city was plastered 
with posters declaring the Provisional Government deposed.
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TO THE CITIZENS OF RUSSIA
The Provisional Government is overthrown. State power 
has passed into the hands of the organ of the Petrograd 
Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies— the Military 
Revolutionary Committee, which stands at the head of the 
Petrograd proletariat and garrison.
The cause for which the people fought— immediate pro­
posal of a democratic peace, abolition of landlords' prop­
erty rights in land, workers' control over production, 
the creation of a Soviet Government— this cause is assured.
Long Live the Revolution of the Workers, Soldiers, and 
Peasants.53
The Mensheviks and SR's condemned the Bolsheviks, not the Petrograd 
Soviet for the seizure of power. The Menshevik organ, Rabochaia gazeta, 
called the coup "a military plot . . .  as one recollects from his read­
ing of the history of the South American republics." Lenin now became 
the equal of Napoleon 111.5^ Izvestiia placed the "blame" squarely on 
the Bolsheviks: "Yesterday we called the Bolshevik uprising an inane
venture. Today, when the attempt was crowned with success in Petrograd, 
we have not changed our mind. We repeat, this is not a transfer of 
power to the Soviets, but a seizure by one party— the Bolsheviks . . . 
They can call themselves whatever they please, but this will not alter 
the fact that the Bolsheviks alone participated in the uprising." De­
spite the fact that the Preparliament was dismissed and the city in the 
hands of the Bolsheviks, except the Winter Palace which fell on November 
8, a number of Mensheviks and SR's attended the opening session of the 
Second Congress of Soviets to plead their view. After firing off sev­
eral verbal shots, L.M. Khinchuk, on behalf of the Mensheviks, and M. 
la. Gendelman, for the SR's, announced that their delegations would re­
tire from the hall. Rafail Abramovich with fire in his eyes, led the
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Bundists from the congress. Martov appealed to the delegates at the 
congress not to continue in their purpose as the result could only be 
civil war. He left the hall under a barrage of vulgarities. The 
Bolsheviks held 390 of the 65O seats at the congress; the Mensheviks 
of all factions 80, and the SR's 60, the rest going to Left SR's. With 
the dissident parties absent from the proceedings, the Second Congress 
of Soviets confirmed the decisions of the Petrograd Soviet and the de­
claration of a Soviet government assuming state power. A.V. Lunacharskii 
read a Bolshevik resolution drafted by Lenin: "Backed by the will of
the vast majority of the workers, soldiers, and peasants, backed by the 
victorious uprising of the workers and the garrison which has taken place 
in Petrograd, the Congress takes power into its own hands. The Provi­
sional Government has been overthrown. The majority of the members of 
the Provisional Government have already been arrested. . . . The Congress 
decrees: all power in the localities shall pass to the Soviets of
Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies, which must guarantee genu-
cQ
ine revolutionary order." The resolution was approved by the Congress 
with only two dissenting votes and 12 abstentions. The Bolsheviziation 
of the Petrograd Soviet was complete ; the era of Soviet Russia had begun.
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CONCLUSIONS
All revolutions are a collaboration of men, events, and nature--
both immediate and long-term. Were the Petrograd Soviet leaders
primarily victims of objective circumstances or primarily the
authors of their own misfortunes? Some historians maintain that Rus-
(1)
Sian traditions prevented a democratic solution in 1917, while others 
assert that such a failure was neither the product of the deepest histor­
ical trends in the Russian past nor a deliberate and untoward reversal
of what is presumed to be Russia's natural evolution toward constitu- 
2 3
tional democracy. Other scholars stress immediate circumstances,
rather than the preconditions of Russian society as the cause of "rev­
olutionary democracy's" failure. Doubtless, the backwardness of Rus­
sian common life, human will, and the World War all influenced the 
destiny of the Petrograd Soviet. What was the measure of the influence 
of each of these elements?
In the beginning objective circumstances greatly influenced the 
course of the Petrograd Soviet. With the socialist parties hopelessly 
bankrupt, it arose as an ad hoc, united socialist and revolutionary 
front--a temporary substitute for the trade union and political organi­
zations of the toiling masses. It served as a rallying point for the 
populace and became a provisional organ of popular control. Under the 
influence of the mutinous Petrograd garrison this proletarian organ 
quickly became a Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. As the 
socialist leaders were in exile, the initial period of its existence 
was a heyday of independent radicalism. Nevertheless the revolutionary
3 4 2
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intelligentsia present in Petrograd built the Soviet from the top 
down as opposed to mass-controlled organ from the bottom up. While these 
sub-leaders established some modicum of control by taking the initia­
tive in establishing the Soviet, the elections to the executive com­
mittee and the plenum were so erratic and the membership of the two 
bodies so numerous that the Petrograd Soviet became unwieldy thereafter and 
floundered for a while. Commissions set up to deal with the more 
urgent problems were so divisive that they did not function; even the 
pages of the news organ of the Petrograd Soviet reflected the chaos 
characteristic of the institution.
Objective circumstances influenced the basic purpose of the Petro­
grad Soviet more so than the individual rationale of its deputies. With 
the socialist leaders in exile, the Soviet lacked the ability to assume 
state power. The Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies also lacked a unanimity 
of program, Russia, slow to industrialize, had produced only a minu­
scule proletariat and bourgeoisie, hardly the basis on which the prole­
tariat alone could hope to establish a new state power. In addition, 
while the Russian High Command opted to cooperate with the bourgeoisie 
rather than divide the nation before the German war machine, a Soviet 
assumption of state power would most likely have produced a Cavaignac 
and the destruction of the revolution. Ignorant of the technique of gov­
ernment, they sought out those whom they overrated as skilled in state
power, the Kadets, "the party of university professors," the party
4
that was the "repository of wisdom and statecraft." This error stemmed 




Their frame of mind must have had some degree of influence on 
their position concerning state power. The Mensheviks and SR's sup­
ported the orthodox Marxian position which demanded that the bourgeoisie 
assume state power in a feudal society. Furthermore, as democrats they 
insisted that the Constituent Assembly decide the ultimate form and 
repository of state power; that the Petrograd Soviet until that time 
serve only as a temporary institution. Then too, their great familiar­
ity with historical precedent haunted them; their fear of counterrevo­
lution as justified by any number of reactionary episodes since 1789, 
including their own revolution in 1905. Their individual experiences 
with tsarist repression led them to view power not as a socially necessary 
function but as an entity focusing on the solitary individual. The 
exercise of power to coerce others was rejected as unethical and accep­
table only as a faculty of an individual trying to accomplish a purpose.
6
As Tseretelli put it: the Soviet had no will to power. Leadership
meant only to awaken what was latent in the individual and bring it in
line with marxian reality. According to Martov, the Menshevik ideologue,
the class struggle was not necessarily a struggle for government: "In
revolutionary times state power means organs of revolutionary self-gov- 
7
ernment." During the March days the absence of any other political 
decision-making organ forced the Soviet to assume certain governmental 
functions: the supplying of food and the defense of the city. That it
quickly deferred these functions to another temporary institution, the 
Provisional Government, upon the letter's creation, indicates the cer­
tainty of the Soviet's reluctance to assume governmental powers.
3̂ 5
If state power rested with the bourgeoisie, what was the role of 
the Petrograd Soviet? As the socialists put it: they would cooper­
ate with the bourgeoisie "insofar as" the result was not detrimental 
to the toiling masses. As Chernov complained, the Soviet "thought that 
by transferring power to the bourgeoisie, while keeping it on a 'short 
leash' by its 'conditions,' it could later part with it and begin its 
'struggles.' It relied on the censitary government's being both a
party to the struggle and an impartial umpire enforcing the rule of
8
'honest battle' on both sides." Sukhanov demanded that the Soviet
have "complete liberty of struggle against this enemy" in order "to
guarantee complete political liberty, absolute freedom of organization 
9
and agitation." Yet how far would the bourgeoisie go in acting as 
puppets from a Soviet script? If the bourgeoisie became alienated and divided 
the nation, most socialists agreed that averting civil turmoil had to 
take precedence over all policies lest it destroy the revolution. Lenin 
alone did not shrink from the prospect of civil war.
The war question revealed the anomaly of the Soviet position on power. The 
socialists insisted that the war would either conquer the revolution, 
or the revolution would conquer the war. Initially divided on the war 
question the formulation of a program of revolutionary defensism, emphasiz­
ing peace equally with defense produced a bloc of Menshevik and SR deputies 
under the leadership of Tseretelli and his Siberian Zimmerwaldists. The 
Georgian hoped to liquidate the war through a reunited Second International 
and by Russian diplomatic pressure, while the Russian army maintained de­
fensive operations. That his peace program catapulted him into chief
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strategist of the Petrograd Soviet is testified to by the veteran
Bundist Grigorii Aronson: "Few were those who predicted that he
would lead it. In the Social Democratic Party. . .there were. . .
influential and widely experienced Social Democratic leaders, but
somehow by general agreement, Tseretelli was acknowledged the main
10
leader of the democratic revolution. . . . "
While Siberian ZimmerwaIdism triumphed in the Petrograd Soviet, 
the bourgeoisie resisted its adoption by the government. When the 
cabinet went to pieces during the April crisis, Tseretelli and his 
associates tried to avoid the exercise of state power only to face 
the terrible prospect of civil turmoil. To resolve this dilemma they 
attempted to join the government as individuals, not as representatives 
of their parties or the Soviet. When they withheld their talents and 
refused to exercise governmental powers, they in actuality confirmed 
this position. Therefore, already in May the cabinet represented 
essentially no one but itself. Further reorganizations of the cab­
inet made this crystal clear by August.
Their persistent attitude on state power produced several negative 
consequences. It eroded the party base of the Menshevik-SR bloc. The 
bloc itself came close to breaking up over the question; fractionaliza- 
tion increased within the bloc parties. Furthermore, revolutionary 
defensism now included the possible necessity of offensive preparations 
and operations. In addition, the peace campaign received only the 
nominal acquiescence of the cabinet and continued to depend on the good 
offices of Miliukov's apprentice, Tereshchenko, and the old tsarist 
diplomatic corps.
3 4 7
The Petrograd Soviet's position on state power contributed to 
its failure by producing in essence a united revolutionary front 
among socialists and between socialists and bourgeoisie. Though unity 
was a fiction at lower party levels, it did exist formally at least 
between the political leaders of the government and the Soviet. As 
the Bolsheviks alone offered an organized opposition within the Petro­
grad Soviet and to the government, socialists disaffected with Menshevik- 
SR bloc policies had no other political center to turn to except Lenin's 
party. Each successive crisis brought the Bolsheviks an increasing 
number of followers, many reluctantly, but followers nonetheless.
This position ironically contrasted sharply with that of 1905 when the 
revolution failed largely for lack of cooperation between the prole­
tariat and other social classes.
The threat of destroying state power and enveloping the country 
in civil war also impinged on the Petrograd Soviet's attempt to realize 
other socialist goals. Konovalov's resignation as Minister of Trade 
and Industry signalled the fruitlessness of attempting to improve the 
immediate lot of the worker and of attempting to halt economic chaos 
through governmental intervention. The threat of mass resignations 
from the General Staff retarded the Soviet's attempt to transform the 
military into an effective revolutionary fighting force. The Soviet 
even succumbed to the General Staff's demand to mount an offensive op­
eration. To avoid overly alienating the bourgeoisie, they even post­
poned the establishment of a permanent state power through the Constitu­
ent Assembly, thereby opening their provisional institutions up to the 
prospect of counterrevolution or radical revolution.
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While circumstances and belief shaped the Soviet position on
state power, the consequences of their views, as democrats, derived
entirely from theory. Not only did it limit their field of action, but
their ability to do so as well. As an institution that regarded itself
as temporary and as the promoter of socialist goals in a bourgeois
revolution, it refused to act on a number of pressing problems until
the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. While this position
partially stemmed from the Mensheviks and SR's unreadiness to execute
11
their somewhat hazy programs, it mainly derived from their democratic 
outlook. Thus the peasants had to await the assembly to receive land; 
the nationalities to know their fate of independence, federation, or 
nationalization; and the nation to learn of the new form of government. 
Indeed, all controversial problems ended up on the proposed agenda of 
the Constituent Assembly. As this greatly limited its realm of activity, 
the Soviet became a crisis-solving agency, an agency for calm.
Their democratic outlook made anything more than elemental action 
impossible. As democrats, they relied solely on the art of persuasion 
and agitation to accomplish their goals--shunning any suggestion of the 
use of coercion; a strange outlook as they believed in restructuring 
Russian society along Marxian lines. Though the Soviet had party whips 
and troubleshooters in its service and some simulance of organization to 
take care of the avalanche of daily affairs, the Soviet leaders attempted 
to resolve crises on a personal level or through hastily constituted 
committees to carry out instructions and issue exhortations to the pop­
ulace. Furthermore, the Soviet leaders made no real attempt to organize
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their political base beyond nominal acquiescence. Membership in the 
SR or Menshevik parties was little more than a formality. The Petro­
grad SR organization, for example, at first considered anyone an SR 
who paid the initial fee and declared himself an SR. The party fathers
apparently did not how many members made up the organization: 22,696 or(12)
1,000,000. Under Martov the Mensheviks had adopted the membership
policy that they were broad-based, democratized workers' party surrounded
13
by mass-based organizations of revolutionary self-government. The 
Bolsheviks, by way of contrast, were a narrow party of "hard" profes­
sionals under centralized command. When the supporters of the Menshevik- 
SR bloc melted away in the late summer and early autumn of 1917, the 
reason was partly from a lack of ordering the party following into a 
rank-and-file under some sort of party discipline. Lenin testified to 
the democracy of the Menshevik-SR type of organization; the Bolshevik 
"strives to proceed from the top downward, and upholds the extension 
of rights and powers of the center in relation to the parts," while 
the "opportunist" Menshevik or SR "strives to proceed from the bottom
upward, and therefore, wherever possible and as far as possible, upholds
14
autonomism and 'democracy'." The Menshevik E. I. Dan noted that the
paradox of socialism versus democracy had led Menshevism to emphasize
more and more after 1905 the latter over the former while the Bolshevik
15
sought socialism at the expense of democracy. Sukhanov simply admitted 
his own political ineffectiveness when he accused Tseretelli and the 
"Star Chamber" of establishing a dictatorship over the Soviet. The 
basic structure of the Soviet remained unchanged after Tseretelli appeared 
in the institution. The "Star Chamber" did nothing more than the infor­
mal caucasing practiced by the leaders of any political organization.
That it could obtain the adoption of its program in the executive committee 
and its bureau through a Menshevik-SR coalition revealed not its tyranny
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but its political adroitness.
Did the Soviet leaders have an alternative to their approach
to state power? According to "Star Chamber" member Voitinskii,
"It is interesting to speculate what would have been the course of
events in Russia and abroad if a strong Provisional Government with
a vigorous participation of democratic groups had taken over the
helm after the March revolution; and if this government had succeeded
in convoking the Constituent Assembly and transferring power to a
16
regular government in, say, four or five months." While the Soviet 
could not have seized power in March, it could have joined a coalition 
with the bourgeoisie. Even in May and August how much better it would 
have been to have had a government of parties rather than a government 
of men representing only themselves. The policy of refraining from state 
power while agitating against the bourgeoisie to gain the acceptance 
of their Soviet program was unrealistic. As the war question and the 
problem of economic chaos appeared as the only immediate Soviet con- 
cerns--all else being deferred to the Constituent Assembly--these propo­
sitions would have received a much more realistic handling from a coalition 
government than from the divided efforts of the government and the Soviet. 
Indeed was the Soviet position on the questions of war and peace even 
realistic? As the Soviet modified its policy of revolutionary defensism 
in May, it could have done so in March with the return of Tseretelli-- 
if it had been willing to sacrifice on its theoretical reasoning. For 
the Marxian Menshevik, however, their subjective reasoning was part of 
the objective reality around them--thus what good would it have done to chart 
a course other than one of realism! In the final analysis the Mensheviks 
and SR's authored their own misfortunes more so that the objective cir­
cumstances surrounding them, for they were captives of their ideological 
commitments.
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